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Morhaf Al Achkar 
CRITICAL DIALOGUES AND REFLECTIONS 
Medicine and medical education have become technicized. Aspects of the subjective and 
normative worlds are shoved to the side or annulled. Doctors and medical students are reduced 
to “specialists without spirits.” Patients are objectified and dehumanized. “Critical dialogue and 
reflections” is an attempt to call out the inadequacies of our current framework of thinking about 
medicine and medical education, written by someone who is a patient, a doctor, an educator, 
and a researcher.  This is a two-paper dissertation. The first paper is a conversation in critical 
theories. In the first part, I present dialogues and reflections on Foucault’s Power/Knowledge 
and Habermas’s Theory of Communicative Action. In the second part, I advance the 
conversation on Habermas’s distinction between communicative and strategic actions, 
leveraging Hegel’s early writings on morality. This paper develops a methodological framework 
that gives the theory of communicative rationality a central position. It is a methodological 
framework in three interrelated senses: methodological foundations for conducting research on 
the social aspects of medical education and medical practice; methodological framework to 
guide pedagogy in medical education; and methodological framework for doctor-patient 
relations. In the second paper, I use the communicative rationality framework to propose a 
developed method of learning for doctors in training. The theoretical features of this method are 
articulated through qualitative data analysis of video-taped doctor-patient interactions. It argues 
for general principles as they are implicitly embedded within the interactions that I analyze 
through the framework presented in the first paper.  In this method, resident physicians review 
videos of their work through dialogues with their peers. Attending physicians also review the 
videos and dialogue with one another as they reflect on resident performance. In this work, I 
restore the normative evaluative and let the subjects speak. It is my belief that medical 
education and medicine are in desperate need of an alternative theoretical framework. My work 
here comes to provide just that. 
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Introduction to the two-papers dissertation 
This two-paper dissertation in inquiry methodology in social sciences presents a project 
that spans medicine, theories of research, and medical education. Critical dialogues and 
reflection are the common threads of the two papers, which aim to contribute to the theory and 
practice of research.  
The work as a whole is motivated conceptually by the need to participate in research 
theory conversations to address what I call the “technicizing of medicine,” which I argue is 
implicated in societal crises and is a crisis in the medical profession itself. The dissertation is 
thus anchored in the doctor–patient interaction that is the essence of medicine. It brings a 
philosophical perspective to what takes place in the dialogue between these two parties as 
social actors and to our understanding, as researchers, of this dialogue. It ends with advancing 
a framework of medical education and evaluation research, maintaining that if we change how 
we learn, think and teach about medicine, we change how we practice it.  
Medicine is technicized. By the technicizing of medicine, however, I do not refer to the 
excessive utilization of technology in making diagnoses and providing treatments. Following 
Habermas, I use this term to refer to the shifting of what demands the lifeworld mechanism of 
dialogue in a framework of communicative action into system mechanisms of problem solving 
using technical approaches alongside a framework of strategic action. What ought to be 
handled in a dialogue between two participants, the doctor and the patient, that which is the 
lived experience of a human being, has been turned into sets of problems demanding solutions 
from experts. The normative and subjective aspects have been relegated to the margins of the 
profession. The ends are taken for granted as objective truths, and the means are rarely 
questioned, and then only in the domain of effectiveness and never in that of normative 
rightness. Doctors are turned into experts with no subjectivity, and patients are objectified.  
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I encountered the serious problems I believe to be at crisis level when conducting 
research on opioid prescription practices. The results of that research have been published in 
The British Medical Journal. Because that study has an intimate relation to my dissertation 
research, I include the published article as Appendix I. In the article I argue that viewing the 
patient’s experience of pain as a technical problem to be solved instrumentally, with opioids, 
and viewing the over-prescribing of opioids as another technical problem to be solved 
instrumentally, with laws, are two sides of the same reductionistic framework. In a medicalized 
context, the experience of pain and suffering are viewed by both doctors and patients only as 
pain scores that need to be improved with whatever means are available. Opioids were 
consequently prescribed at astronomical rates, leading to an epidemic of opioid use and 
dependence. Then, as the prevalence of this problem, which is now a struggle for millions of 
opioid users, gained public visibility, state legislators attempted to solve the problem by 
implementing laws.  
In the opioid research project I explored, with colleagues, the experiences of patients 
and provides in the wake of state legislation regarding opioid prescribing. This project attempts 
to give a voice to the persons involved and to provoke dialogue and reflection. The inclusion of 
this study here serves to anchor the dissertation as a whole in the empirical problems of 
medicine and couch the conversation in terms of broader social theories. The published study 
focused on the experiences of patients with chronic pain who were recruited from safety-net 
clinics providing care to the underserved. It also included interviews of doctors providing care at 
the same clinics to shed further light on the patients’ experiences. Pain disrupted the lives of 
patients, so they responded with coping strategies; the external force of legislation then 
disrupted these same strategies. The inequality that characterized the doctor–patient 
relationship was worsened by the impact of legislation. What ought to have been conversed 
about, in conversations that include patients as well as doctors, is the holistically understood 
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health of persons in pain. But this was pushed to the margins and not even recognized due to 
instrumentalized ways of thinking about medical practice. Instead, in many patient experiences, 
the language of public health and the procedures of the law assumed dominance. 
The published article on the opioid crisis establishes a dialogue, exposes certain 
hypocrisies, and returns the doctor and patient to their rightful places as subjects rather than 
objects. After the publication of the paper, I quickly came to sense that I did not, in fact, achieve 
my goal. I had aimed to present the experience of the person and lend a voice to the patient. 
Yet, in the research paper, the patient disappeared among the words and multiple voices; every 
person was reduced to fragments of utterances. This weakness in the opioid study was a strong 
motivator for my research project.  
An especially strong motivation for undertaking the project of this dissertation originates 
in my experiences with one of the participants in the opioid research project. This is a participant 
named Elliot, and my interactions with him are so significant to the goals of this dissertation that 
I believe it important to describe them in some detail here. Elliot has the language to name his 
struggle and call out what is not right. In my reflections on our conversations, he helps me ask 
the difficult questions about what we do as researchers, educators, and doctors. He was in pain 
“24 hours a day, 7 days a week, 365 days a year.” A 43-year-old man struggled with severe 
arthritis that left him experiencing “something that I wouldn’t wish on my enemy.” With his 
statement, he challenged the physician in me who is accustomed to pain scales that go from 0 
to 10 but never penetrate the unbearable suffering. He also challenged the researcher in me to 
understand what he was going through—I took for granted that if I dropped my wallet, I could 
simply bend down and get it and I can tie my own shoes just as easily. To understand his 
experience and to reflect on it, I brought to bear my own position as a patient. 
I relate to why Elliot can get frustrated when people do not empathize with him. His 
suffering is not because of anything he did wrong. He was just carrying on with his life when he 
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became ill. He did not choose his illness nor do anything to bring this disease onto himself. All of 
us have a contingent and fragile existence, and he was an unlucky one who got dealt a bad 
hand. I, as a person, had a similar experience when I was diagnosed with lung cancer. I 
understand, as a patient, how frustrating it can be when individuals lacking competency in 
empathy say what is demeaning to a patient’s suffering. Elliot is failed by the medical 
community, and failing him is personal to me. As educators in medicine, we fail him whenever 
learners master self-assurance to claim knowing the truth before they master humility and 
empathy.  
Pain medicines helped Elliot. Yet, his experience in pain management stopped being the 
same “when they changed the laws.” There is an epidemic of opioid use, and doctors have 
prescribed opioids at unacceptable rates. It is time to reverse that. The law provided shortcut 
answers for doctors, who now have no need to carry the burden of proof of showing a patient 
why this or that treatment is right and effective or wrong and harmful. Instead, doctors can 
simply say “It’s the law.” To Elliot, however, “the doctors should have the patient’s best welfare 
in mind and not be thinking about what some politicians are telling them to do.” As a rational 
citizen, Elliot did not accept the law just because it is a law, and he criticized its legitimacy. He 
argued that what regulates the interactions between his doctor and him are the norms of the 
doctor–patient relationship. Moving decisions on treatment from the provider–patient realm to 
the realm of administrative tasks is a categorical mistake, Elliot argues back.  
What frustrated Elliot more was knowing that the law, while leveraged by doctors for its 
power to shut down the conversation, did not specify that he should not be getting pain 
medications. It only stated that specific procedures needed to be followed if pain medicine was 
to be given. Here, Elliot’s frustration was no longer directed at the politicians or at the abstract 
law but rather at the hypocrisies of the doctor. He felt his doctor had betrayed an essential duty, 
that of caring for the patient. Now, his suffering had become greater than before—“You leave 
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there, and you’re still suffering.” He reminisces about his old primary care doctor and wants to 
have him back; together with his rheumatologist, they made a good team. “They cared about 
what you felt. They listened to how you felt, and they tried to help you. And it wasn’t sitting there 
worrying about that law, or if they were, they weren’t telling me about it.” It appeared as if the 
laws had pushed medical practices toward the specification of procedures only, with grave 
consequences if the procedures are not followed, and pushed doctors who respond to such 
laws toward purely instrumentalized reasons such as prescribing less opioids to avoid law suits. 
The response of Elliot’s doctor, and no doubt other doctors, to this law would also be 
conditioned by the medical training they had, which made medicine more about acting out 
objectified strategies upon objectified patients than about caring, respectful and understanding 
relationships. 
Before our conversation ended, Elliot asked me if the interview was going to help him 
with his problems with doctors. I could not promise that it would change his circumstances. I 
explained that as a researcher, I do not have authority over his doctors. But I shared that I work 
in medical education and that what I learned from him would help me better understand and 
teach young physicians. He ended the conversation with a request: 
Would you tell doctors to stop letting elected officials, politicians, or somebody else or 
some board affect how they treat their patients? . . . When it was just the doctor and 
patient relationship, hey, I was doing a whole lot better then.  
I promised that I would, and that promise became a major motivation for this two-paper 
dissertation.  
The first paper turns from empirical research and moves to research theory and 
philosophy. It is divided into two parts. The common theme in both is bringing philosophical 
insights into the theories of research in social sciences to set a framework for understanding the 
problematics of the doctor–patient relationship. Part 1 of the paper is motivated by reflection on 
research as a form of social action. In any research, we come to interrogate the subject matter 
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using methodology in a selected framework that is conditioned by assumptions related to how 
we act in society, how we interact with one another, and how we come to know. Our view of 
ourselves and our methodology are related to the way we answer the basic question of the 
social sciences: How is social order possible? Thus, Part 1 collates some answers to this 
question. Then, Part 2 comes to enrich the conversation on social actions by bringing insights 
into the moral aspects of these interactions. The way researchers write about participants has 
moral implications. The project, in the second part, expands the conversation in social sciences 
to explore the notions of conviction, action, judgment, forgiveness, and love–notions that are 
essential to our existence and cannot be ignored, especially when conducting research with 
humans.  
Thus, Part 1 of the first paper presents three answers to this question of how social 
order is possible: those of Hobbes, Foucault, and Habermas. According to Hobbes’s theory of 
the social contract, men are equal and they want the same ends. Because they desire the same 
ends, they compete and eventually engage in warfare. It is only with the surrender of certain 
freedoms (e.g., the freedom to kill others and to take others’ property) that a social order can 
emerge. After humans relinquish their freedom to the power of the state and enter into a social 
contract, there can be social order. This theory, while appealing, is limited. Hobbes and those 
who followed him within the purposive rationality framework view society with the eyes of 
engineers. They see only technical problems and technical solutions, describing from the third-
person perspective what they have come to understand through observing only behaviors of 
individuals. 
Foucault criticizes Hobbes and offers his own answer to the question. He claims that 
Hobbes’s work served only to legitimize power. Instead of accepting the legitimacy of the social 
contract, Foucault exposes its illegitimacy and claims that social order is maintained through 
power, that is, through mechanisms of oppression and repression that uphold the status quo. 
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Foucault describes power as a machine in which everyone is merely a cog. At times, power 
takes the form of surveillance, in which everyone is observed and kept in check by everyone 
else. At other times, it takes the form of a war of everyone on everyone. In Foucault’s 
understanding of society, knowledge becomes a product of power and science a constraint on 
truth. The subject who knows and acts disappears and is replaced by subjectless relations.   
Foucault brings important insights to social science research, especially to that 
conducted in medicine and medical education. Power relations taking the form of oppressive 
positions between subjects, synonymous to those between a prison warden and prisoners, are 
also produced in many professional settings such as between medical educator and learner, 
doctor and patient, researcher and participant. Hierarchical relationships in medicine and 
medical education are blunt regarding what simulates a pecking order: an attending on the top, 
then a senior resident, then a junior resident, and finally, a student at the bottom. The doctor–
patient relationship is also laden with power; in the end, the doctor has the final say. And at the 
conclusion of research work, it is the researcher, not the participant, who tells the story.  
However, from the perspective of coherence and consistency in theories of research in 
social sciences, Foucault’s answers are not unproblematic. While attributing everything to 
power, Foucault explains neither how he escapes the snares of power nor why the fragments of 
resistant knowledge are not also products of power. He views power as a transcendent force, as 
a being in itself that consolidates, or as Habermas recognizes, transcendental syntheses and 
empiricists’ ontological presuppositions. He ends up with metaphors that are uplifting but 
contradict each other and other knowledge. Because Foucault takes only the observer’s 
position, he functionalistically reduces validity claims to the effects of power and reduces the 
“ought” to the “is.” To me, these positions are not sufficient to explain what takes place in the 
discourse of medicine. Medicine is a normative context, and the subjects in it are present and 
loud. Turning the tables and calling all that takes place there hypocritical is a misguided and 
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hyperbolic approach. I cannot take such a nihilistic position while remaining a doctor, a teacher, 
and a patient myself. It is simply not how I authentically experience the world or how I 
experience others as they relate to me. Recognizing the normative and the intersubjective 
continues to be my position. For me, taking a nihilistic position that denies both is self-
contradictory and unreasonable. In my work, I aim, however, to preserve the insights gleaned 
from Foucault without becoming entangled in the contradictions of viewing power as that which 
is all there is. This is why Habermas’s work, in continuity with the project of modernity, can 
provide language to re-interpret Foucault’s views and, for me, make them accessible to 
research.  
Habermas’s answer to the question of social order comes also as an inspirational 
alternative. Here, I present Habermas's answer within the framework of the theory of 
communicative action. Habermas distinguishes between communicative action and strategic 
action. In the first, participants coordinate their actions and come to an understanding and 
agreement with one another. In the second, they influence each other’s actions or conditions of 
action in order to achieve their own individual goals. According to the theory of communicative 
action, we come to understand meaning from the performative position of a participant, not from 
an observer position. We understand meaning when we can say yes or no to the validity 
conditions for its truth, rightness, and truthfulness.  
Similarly, when we act, we relate not only to the objective world (as teleological actors 
do) but also to the normative and subjective worlds. In ideal conditions, we primarily act 
communicatively and partake in a lifeworld that provides unthematic grounds for understanding 
and agreement in language. As the lifeworld of acting subjects becomes more complex, its 
system dynamics begin to relieve the burden of agreement based in language. Power and 
money come to represent abstracted values in themselves and provide shortcuts that support 
social integration. Thus, social order is possible through the binding and bonding powers of 
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speech acts for action coordination in the lifeworld and through the media of money and power 
(uncoupled, yet anchored in the lifeworld) in the subsystems of purposive rational action.  
However, the rationalization of society can be paradoxical. As lifeworld and systems 
grew in complexity, system mechanisms colonized the lifeworld, and the media of money and 
power substituted for language in spaces of actions that ought to rely only on linguistic 
consensus and not on external influences or incentives. The lifeworld became technicized: 
values were relegated to the margins, the subject was cancelled, and interactions now take 
primarily objectivated forms that deny the subjective and normative. Colonizing the lifeworld with 
system mechanisms of power or money and technicizing the lifeworld by marginalizing the 
normative and subjective dimensions, replacing both with objectified and instrumentalizing 
tendencies, represent two powerful analytical concepts I use to investigate medicine and 
medical education problematics. 
Habermas’s position is very relevant. Large domains of human activities in modern 
societies have been pushed toward instrumental and procedural domains of action. Bringing 
here the insights of Habermas’s theory of communicative action helps us understand the 
limitations in research designs that study patient–doctor relations in a norm-free, 
instrumentalized fashion. Furthermore, bringing insights regarding lifeworld colonization gives 
us ways to understand the interpersonal effects of human interactions in medical settings and 
also to understand what takes place at the macro level of society. 
When I moved in the empirical project to explicate aspects of medical education, 
Habermas gave a way to understand the tendency to teach only objectified and formalized 
procedures for doctors to use when interacting with patients. In addition, Habermas’s critical 
insights helped explicate how traditional ways of caring for people have been replaced by 
instrumentalized and formalized processes. But before I brought Habermas’s notion to bear on 
the problematics of medicine and medical education in the second paper, I wanted to enrich the 
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conversation on the distinction between communicative action and strategic action by 
leveraging Hegel’s concepts of morality, conscience, acting and judging, hypocrisy, and 
recognition. These notions became particularly relevant to inquiry methodology when 
developing a framework for investigating medicine and medical education that brings in critical 
dialogues and reflections.  
In this second theoretical project, presented here as Part 2 of the theoretical paper, I 
invite Hegel’s thoughts to the conversation about the distinction between communicative and 
strategic action. Participants in social interaction rely on their intuitive competency to distinguish 
action orientations. However, because any act arises from a combination of value- and interest-
based motives, the distinction becomes less clear when viewed empirically. Hegel’s explication 
of the moral view in Phenomenology of Spirit, at the stage of “Conscience: The ‘Beautiful Soul,’ 
Evil and Its Forgiveness,” provides fruitful insights into the existential aspects of this distinction.  
In this project, I explicate Habermas’s position on the distinction between communicative 
and strategic actions. I elaborate especially on the notions of illocutionary acts and 
perlocutionary effects. I also distinguish the relations subjects can have to other subjects and 
those they can have to objects in order to then elaborate on the notion of the internalized other. 
I then make parallel excursions into Hegel’s view of morality at the stage of conscience that acts 
and knows, and I present the paradoxical position of the other consciousness that judges 
without acting. I then discuss how language resolves the contradictions of moral action in order 
to provide a space for intersubjective recognition. The movement of the acting conscience 
consists in acknowledging that in every act there is a violation of some duty, and thus falling into 
hypocrisy when claiming the act is moral. Confession comes in order to resolve this hypocrisy. 
Judging the acting conscience as hypocritical in order for the judging consciousness to protect 
herself makes the latter hypocritical as well. The judging conscience then realizes her 
entanglement and surrenders this hard-hearted position of discontinuity. Both movements are 
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distinguished from that of the beautiful soul, who clings to her purity and thus does not act, only 
to miss the chance of having an objective existence in actuality and in the recognition of 
language and only to lose herself to madness.  
I reconstructed Hegel’s ideas within Habermas’s framework of communicative rationality, 
and in so doing, suffused the richness of the Hegelian notions through this existential 
relationship between the self and the other. My attempt to enrich the conversation about the 
distinction between strategic and communicative action provided insights that I have applied to 
the study of medicine and medical education. These insights are particularly relevant to the 
notions of learning and judgment of a doctor’s performance. A case can be made that it takes 
critical dialogue and reflection for a judgment to be made and for learning to take place. This 
dialectic of forgiveness and detached love is also relevant to research and the work of 
researchers. Social relationships researchers form bonds with research participants and these 
bonds have moral implications.  
Those theoretical insights are brought up again in the second paper, the empirical study. 
Like medicine itself, medical education is in crisis, and the crises mirror each other. I trace the 
crisis of medical education in my work through the history of the use of video recordings as an 
education tool. This tool has been in use since 1958; it represents 70 years of change in 
medical education that reflects the twists and the turns of medicine itself. I capture the history in 
which the subjectivity of the doctor was abstracted into a mere being possessing technical skills. 
I also trace the objectification of the patient, in which patients were dehumanized and became 
an object for the medical reasoning of the physician. I then trace the tension around who owns 
the learning: the teacher who gives “feedback” in a mechanistic framework or the learner who 
participates in dialogue and reflection. I expose methodological inadequacies in previous 
empirical work and criticize theoretical assumptions.  
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In addition to explicating the problems of the technicizing of medicine (i.e., reducing the 
work of the doctor to the mere application of technical skills), I ground my work on criticizing and 
providing alternative answers to two problems in medical education: (1) thinking of learning 
within a framework of machine-like learning, where an observer documents the behavior of the 
learner and gives feedback in order to change her behavior, and (2) privileging the third-person 
perspective over the position of the self when it comes to judging performance. Learning, I 
argue, is a complex experience grounded in a normative social world and in the worlds of the 
subjects. Research methodology ought to reflect these complexities and capture them.  
Relevant also to theories of research regarding the subject and her role in reflection, I 
examined the problematic view of the person as an inadequate judge when she engages in self-
assessment. Many of the experiences presented in the literature undermine the value of the self 
as it engages in learning and reflection. Privileging the third-person perspective over the 
position of the self is dominating, as is privileging the observing attending physician who judges 
the learner’s actions. In many of these studies, score sheets were handed to the observer and 
to the learner performing a task. Variations in scores were interpreted as inaccuracies in self-
assessment, with no consideration of variations of positions or of limitations in access to 
privileged subjectivities.  
My project brings critical methodology to bear on the issue of learning in medical 
education. My empirical work defines the actions attending and resident physicians view as 
adequate, right, and good. It also identifies inadequacies in performances from the perspectives 
of the participants themselves. The project was completed in a residency program, where 
resident and attending physicians engaged in parallel settings of dialogues and reflections while 
reviewing video recordings of residents interacting with their own patients. The interactions 
between the participants were audio recorded, transcribed, and then analyzed. In the analysis, I 
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use critical qualitative methodology approaches consistent with the theoretical framework of 
communicative action.  
I present my findings according to two approaches. I first provide a primary 
reconstruction in which I organize the themes from the perspective of providers. A physician 
prepares for a visit before coming in. She first greets the patient and then negotiates the 
agenda. She listens to the patient’s history and examines the patient. Finally, she makes the 
diagnosis and, with the patient, manages the health condition. After the visit, the physician 
writes a note and documents a code for billing purposes. In terms of these themes, I present 
what attending and resident physicians considered adequate, right, and good. Each item 
features topics of conversation on which residents and attending physicians took evaluative 
stands. While some judged an action as adequate, others judged the same action as 
inadequate. The judgments were based on conditioned and contextualized understanding. 
Moreover, what was judged as right in one setting was judged as wrong in another setting.  
Motivated by these nuanced aspects and this complexity, I then provide a secondary 
reconstruction in which I argue for the multiple values intersecting in each action. There was 
never an action that fulfilled only a single value. For example, it was not the mere addressing of 
the patient’s concern that counted as good, but rather doing it efficiently so that another 
patient’s right to receive care was not violated. It is not simply setting the doctor’s boundaries 
that was valued but doing so while supporting the patient’s autonomy. We act in a normative 
context, and we relate to many norms and values at the same time in every action. Thus, what 
is judged as upholding one value can itself be judged as violating another. It is a right action 
when the judge can take the position of the actor and accept her reasons that what is judged is 
right and adequate. These and other concepts are reconstructions of empirical experiences and 
exemplify insights drawn from Hegel and Habermas in the previous theoretical pieces.  
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With these insights in mind, I bring to research methodology the value of engaging the 
subject in authentic conversation comes to the fore. I do not argue that judgment cannot be 
carried out from an observer’s position. It can. However, it is only when we have the actor’s end 
in mind that we can judge her means as adequate or inadequate. It is only when we know the 
norm the actor upholds that we can call his acts violations of such norms. It is only when we 
learn about her desires and intentions that we can call her actions authentic or unauthentic. 
Finally, it is only when we judge our judgments and surrender them to critique that we can have 
authentic conversations. Thus, my work argues for the value of dialogue and the value of 
reflection in making judgments, whether with a learner, with a patient, or with a research 
participant. That is the main contribution of this work. Another contribution to education research 
has to do with the structure of learning itself. Learning in dialogue and with reflection can be 
adapted in all settings to engage learners as they develop their capacity to attend to the 
complexity of the work of the doctor and to care for patients.  
I conclude the dissertation with an afterword—a reflection on the work as a whole. My 
dissertation was an existential experience that unfolded while I was myself a patient struggling 
with advanced lung cancer. Furthermore, my values as a researcher, a teacher, and a doctor 
are expressed in the work that I did throughout the papers. I make the case for an alternative 
framework for the practice of medicine, the practice of medical education and research 
conducted on both of these domains. I make this case because of my encounters with patients 
like Elliot, whose situation and reflections greatly motivated this study. But I also make this case 
because I myself am a patient. I have direct experiences of being doctor, educator, researcher 
and patient. And it is the last of these that is the most vulnerable. I argue that a world that does 
not recognize me as coming to knowing with others, to assenting to the norm, to claiming my 
privileged access to my own subjectivity is but a suffocating world of illegitimately objectivated 
power positions. There needs to be open space for the subject and there needs to be open 
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space for social normativity. Our social space and social science need to be decolonized; so 
does medicine. Medicine, so is research, is not just a technical endeavor.  
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The First Paper: Critical Dialogues and Reflections in The Philosophy of Social 
Sciences 
 
Part 1. The Possibility of Social Order: Hobbes, Foucault, then Habermas 
 
Introduction 
All research in the social sciences engages with the consequences of its philosophical answers 
to the question “How is social order possible?” The methodological tools used in the social 
sciences reflect the making of commitments to theoretical understandings, which themselves 
are commitments to metatheoretical philosophical positions. In this paper, I will first outline 
Thomas Hobbes’s answer to this question as put forth in his Social Contract Theory. Then I will 
present Foucault’s critique of Hobbes before I explicate outlines from Foucault’s theory of 
power. Next, I will present Jürgen Habermas’s critique of Foucault before I sketch an outline of 
Habermas’s Theory of Communicative Action focusing on the Habermas’s answer to the same 
question. 
 
Hobbes: The Social Contract 
Nature, Hobbes (1904) asserts, has made men equal in their body and mind faculties. From this 
equality of ability arises similar equality of hope for attaining their ends. When two men desire 
the same object and they cannot both enjoy it simultaneously, they become enemies. Man, in 
this state of nature, has the liberty to use his power and will for the preservation of his nature 
and attaining his own ends. Therefore, as long as men live without a common power to keep 
order, they will be in a state of war in which every man is against every other man. As a result of 
this state of war, no place would exist for industry, for culture of the earth, or for knowledge to 
be produced, and society would be in “continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of 
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man (becomes) solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short” (Hobbes, 1904, p. 78). Thus, man finds 
it necessary, for his liberty and for his protection, to lay down this right to all things and to “be 
contented with so much liberty against other men as he would allow other men against himself” 
(1904, p. 80). As all men renounce these rights to power, they enter into a contract and transfer 
their powers to a single powerful person: the sovereign. 
First reflection 
Hobbes had a revolutionary approach in manner of thinking by moving the question of social 
order to the new field of social philosophy rather than addressing it in practical philosophy, as 
his predecessors had done. His social philosophy aimed to establish conditions for society and 
the State by raising assertions and claiming validity across time, place, and circumstance. 
However, for Hobbes, application, meaning the translation of knowledge into practice, is only a 
technical problem. According to Habermas,  
With a knowledge of the general conditions for a correct order of the state and of society, 
practical prudent action of human beings toward each other is no longer required, but 
what is required instead is the correctly calculated generation of rules, relationships, and 
institutions. (Habermas, 1971, p. 43) 
As a result of this framework, what is considered adequate material for science is, therefore, 
only the behavior of the human and nothing else. Engineers of social order can thus confine 
themselves to constructions of conditions in which human beings will necessarily behave in a 
calculable manner, just like any object. These engineers can then disregard categories of 
ethical social intercourse. Instructions in leading just and good life, as in practical philosophy, to 
make possible a correctly instituted order within which a life of well-being is possible, was 
replaced by the separation of morality from politics and establishing order on the regulation of 
social intercourse. Hobbes’s position is, however, understandable in the 16th century, within the 
framework of a philosophy being applied as a first attempt to address the matter at hand. 
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Hobbes’s theory, however, was heavily criticized by Michel Foucault (1980). According 
to Foucault, the theory of sovereignty has played critical roles in the struggle with power, but not 
as it proclaimed to do, which was explaining how a social order is possible, but rather by 
legitimizing the sovereign. The theory came to serve as the instrument and justification for the 
construction of large-scale administrative monarchies. The discourse of right comes to efface 
the intrinsic domination of power and mask that under two implicit tenets: the right of the 
sovereign and the legal obligation to obey it. For Foucault,  
the theory of sovereignty, and the organization of a legal code centered upon it, have 
allowed a system of right to be superimposed upon the mechanisms of discipline in such 
a way as to conceal its actual procedures, the element of domination inherent in its 
techniques, and to guarantee to everyone, by virtue of the sovereignty of the State, the 
exercise of his proper sovereign rights. (1980, p. 105) 
The theories of right1 did nothing but establish the legitimacy of power. After the 
breakdown  of feudal monarchies, these theories became concerned not with absolutist and 
authoritarian monarchies, per se, but with their alternative mode, the parliamentary democracy. 
To Foucault, the theory of sovereignty persisted, as both an ideology and as an organizing 
principle in the development of a “disciplinary society.” These theories, for Foucault (1980), 
were mere weapons circulating from one camp to another, being utilized to either reinforce or 
limit the powers of conflicting parties. Thus, Foucault concludes that because sovereignty and 
disciplinary mechanisms are two absolutely integral constituents of the general mechanism of 
power in our society, the effects of disciplinary power cannot be limited merely through recourse 
to the philosophies of right. Foucault criticizes the approach to the struggle against power that is 
centered on the opposition of the legitimate and the illegitimate. Instead, he asserts, “Right 
                                                          
1 Foucault, in his Power/Knowledge essays, spoke of “system of right” (p. 96), “theory of right” (p. 108), and 
“ideology of right” (p. 105). Among the philosophers and theorists who spoke of rights (Hobbes, Locke, Jefferson, 
etc.), he only mentions Hobbes. For example, Hobbes explicated how men give power to the sovereign and enter 
in a state of social contract. The law in this new state maintains their liberty and clarifies their obligations. 
19 
 
should be viewed, I believe, not in terms of a legitimacy to be established, but in terms of the 
methods of subjugation that it instigates” (1980, p. 96). 
Foucault’s critique of Hobbes will make more sense when framed in his theories on 
power and knowledge, which I will elucidate next. 
Foucault: Power and Knowledge 
While Foucault does not directly answer the question, “how is social order possible?” he 
does engage thoroughly in explicating a representation of the social order. I will summarize 
Foucault’s thoughts on the topic by (1) outlining illustrative representations of power, and (2) 
analyzing the relation between power and knowledge. 
Illustrative Representations of Power 
I will elaborate on Foucault’s representations of power using his network, machine, 
panopticon, and war metaphors. 
Power as a network. To Foucault, power is always there and has no margin for someone 
to be outside of; it is coextensive with the social body. Relations of power are tightly interwoven 
with all social relations, where power plays a simultaneous conditioning and conditioned role. 
The State power is there not to protect human rights or institutionalize a rule, but rather to act as 
a superstructure in relation to a series of power networks investing the body, the family, 
knowledge, and sexuality. These power networks stand in a conditioned–conditioning 
relationship with the State metapower, which is structured around a number of prohibitive 
functions. On the other hand, metapower, with its functions, can only secure its footing if rooted 
in a series of indefinite power relations that supply the basis for these negative forms of power. 
Power is not to be taken as a homogeneous and consolidated domination of one 
individual over others or of one class or group over others. Power, according to Foucault, must 
be analyzed as  
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something which circulates, or rather as something which only functions in the form of a 
chain. It is never localized here or there, never in anybody’s hands, never appropriated 
as a commodity or piece of wealth. Power is employed and exercised through a net-like 
organization. (1980, p. 98) 
An individual is not only circulating between the threads of power, but she is always in a position 
of both exercising and being subjected to power. Individuals should not be conceived of as an 
elementary nucleus or primitive atom on which power fastens or against which it strikes; it is the 
prime effects of power upon which gestures, bodies, discourses, and desires can be constituted 
and identified as individuals. The individual is not in relation to power, but she is power’s effect 
and the element of its articulation—its vehicle. 
Power as a machine. In early modernity, power was embodied in the monarch. In our 
time, Foucault (1980) asserts, 
Power is no longer substantially identified with an individual who possesses or exercises 
it by right of birth; it becomes a machinery that no one owns. Certainly, everyone doesn’t 
occupy the same position; certain positions preponderate and permit an effect of 
supremacy to be produced. (p. 156) 
Power cannot be entrusted today to any one person as no one can or may occupy the King’s 
role in the old system, that of the source of justice and power. Rather, power works just like a 
complex system consisting of cogs and gears where every person has a designated place. 
Power as surveillance. One of the most famous tool-concepts that Foucault developed 
was based on Bentham’s panopticon. Foucault describes this theme used for spatializing, 
observing, and immobilizing as utopia and program. The panopticon is  
perimeter building in the form of a ring. At the center of this, a tower, pierced by large 
windows opening onto the inner face of the ring. The outer building is divided into cells 
each of which traverses the whole thickness of the building. These cells have two 
windows, one opening on to the inside, facing the windows of the central tower, the 
other, outer one allowing daylight to pass through the whole cell. All that is then needed 
is to put an overseer in the tower and place in each of the cells a lunatic, a patient, a 
convict, a worker or a schoolboy. The back lighting enables one to pick out from the 
central tower the little captive silhouettes in the ring of cells. In short, the principle of the 
dungeon is reversed; daylight and the overseer’s gaze capture the inmate more 
effectively than darkness, which afforded after all a sort of protection. (Foucault, 1980, 
p. 147)  
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Bentham thought of the panopticon as the egg of Columbus. He presented it to 
educators and industrialists as exactly what they were looking for. Since the 19th century, this 
system has been thought of as one innovation among many technologies for the effective and 
easy exercise of power. This formula of “power through transparency” or “subjection by 
illumination” became applicable to many domains. The technique represents a mode of 
operation where power is exercised by making people seen via a collective, immediate, and 
anonymous gaze. This gaze comes with an efficient answer to the question of the cost of power. 
With surveillance, very little is expended, and there is no need for physical violence, arms, or 
material constraints. All you need is  
just a gaze. An inspecting gaze, a gaze which each individual under its weight will end 
by interiorizing to the point that he is his own overseer, each individual thus exercising 
this surveillance over, and against, himself. A superb formula: power exercised 
continuously and for what turns out to be a minimal cost. (p. 55) 
Power as war. Power, to Foucault, manifests as relations of forces in struggle. Thus, he 
suggests that power should be analyzed as episodes in war and that the grid for deciphering it 
should be that of tactics and strategy. One must distinguish among events to differentiate the 
levels and networks to which the events are connected and engender one another. One’s 
reference point, to Foucault, “should not be to the great model of language and signs, but to that 
of war and battle. The history which bears and determines us has the form of a war rather than 
that of a language: relations of power, not relations of meaning” (1980, p. 115–116).  He inverts 
Clausewitz’s assertion that “war is politics continued by other means,” to emphasize “seeing 
politics as sanctioning and upholding the disequilibrium of forces that was displayed in war” 
(Foucault, 1980, p. 91). The political struggle, according to Foucault, and the conflicts waged 
with power over power and for power, the alteration of relations of forces, the reinforcement, the 
favoring of particular tendencies, all while coming within the civil peace, should be interpreted as 
a continuation of war (p. 91). Foucault urges liberating oneself from the economists’ analysis of 
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power and advances a hypothesis that he calls Nietzsche’s hypothesis, which states, “The basis 
of the relationship of power lies in the hostile engagement of forces” (1980, p. 91–92). 
Power and Knowledge 
I will outline Foucault’s explications of the relations between knowledge and power along 
the lines of his famous ideas: knowledge as a product of power; science as a constraint on truth; 
the role of theoretical work in resisting power; and the nature of the whole project as fragments. 
Knowledge as a product of power. Foucault attempts to define the articulation of 
knowledge and power. He insists that power does not have only the prohibitive meaning of 
preventing knowledge; power also does the opposite, namely, producing knowledge. For 
Foucault,  
We should not be content to say that power has a need for such-and-such a discovery, 
such-and-such a form of knowledge, but we should add that the exercise of power itself 
creates and causes to emerge new objects of knowledge and accumulates new bodies 
of information. (Foucault, 1980, p. 51) 
 Foucault goes on to add, “The exercise of power perpetually creates knowledge and, 
conversely, knowledge constantly induces effects of power. The university hierarchy is only the 
most visible, the most sclerotic and least dangerous form of this phenomenon” (p. 52). The 
linkage between power and knowledge is not seen only in university hierarchies; this 
intertwining of power and knowledge is diffuse, entrenched, and operates everywhere. Foucault 
puts forth that  
knowledge and power are integrated with one another, and there is no point in dreaming 
of a time when knowledge will cease to depend on power; this is just a way of reviving 
humanism in a utopian guise. It is not possible for power to be exercised without 
knowledge; it is impossible for knowledge not to engender power. (p. 52) 
Science as a constraint on truth. Foucault (1980) argues that science has been the 
constraint and obligation of truth. The ritualized procedure of producing it (i.e. methodology) has 
traversed all Western societies and thus has became universalized as the general law of all 
civilizations. This unified methodical approach became a pre-requisite for any production of 
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truth. Because of this constraint on truth, Foucault locates his research activity, genealogy,2 to 
challenge this tendency and  
entertain the claims to attention of local, discontinuous, disqualified, illegitimate 
knowledges against the claims of a unitary body of theory which would filter, hierarchize 
and order them in the name of some true knowledge and some arbitrary idea of what 
constitutes a science and its objects. (p. 83)  
Genealogies do not vindicate the right to lack of knowledge or ignorance, they do not deny 
knowledge, and they do not esteem direct cognition or the immediate experience that escapes 
encapsulation in knowledge. Instead, they are concerned  
with the insurrection of knowledges that are opposed primarily not to the contents, 
methods or concepts of a science, but to the effects of the centralizing powers which are 
linked to the institution and functioning of an organized scientific discourse within a 
society such as ours. (p. 84) 
Genealogy wages its war “against the effects of the power of a discourse” (p. 84). 
The role of theoretical work in resisting power. The role of theoretical work is, according 
to Foucault (1980), “not to formulate the global systematic theory which holds everything in 
place, but to analyze the specificity of mechanisms of power, to locate the connections and 
extensions, to build little by little a strategic knowledge” (p. 145). Foucault sees theory as a 
toolkit and constructs it, not as a system, but as an instrument or as “a logic of the specificity of 
power relations and the struggle around them” (p. 145). As a result of this definition of theory, 
investigation “can only be carried out step by step on the basis of reflection (which will 
necessarily be historical in some of its aspects) on given situations” (p. 145). To Foucault, the 
recourse to the theory of right is a blind alley that leads us only into a dead end because 
sovereignty and disciplinary mechanisms are integral constituents of the same general 
mechanism of power in our society. Instead of this recourse, one must turn “towards the 
                                                          
2 
In an earlier work, The Order of Things, Foucault uses Archaeology, a method he explicates later in his book The 
Archaeology of Knowledge. He attempts to trace how the order in which we think differs across time, showing 
epistemic discontinuities, then shifts to genealogy in his work Discipline and Punish and especially in 
Power/Knowledge in order to account for the epistemic shifts and the constitution of discourses.  
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possibility of a new form of right, one which must indeed be anti-disciplinarian, but at the same 
time liberated from the principle of sovereignty” (Foucault, 1980, p. 108). The intellectual’s role 
is different here, and for Foucault (1980) 
no longer has to play the role of an advisor. The goals, tactics, and project are the ones 
that belong to the fighters. The project, tactics and goals to be adopted are a matter for 
those who do the fighting. What the intellectual can do is to provide instruments of 
analysis, and at present this is the historian’s essential role. (p. 62) 
The nature of the whole project as fragments. Foucault problematizes the possibility of 
establishing the nature of his project in its totality. To do such a task, one must consider all the 
fragments of research and discourses that have been produced over the years, with all the 
discontinuity and superimposition. Foucault acknowledges the challenge with relation of forces 
preventing an autonomous life for disinterred knowledge. As soon as a fragment of genealogy is 
brought to light, the element of knowledge one seeks to disinter is accredited and put into 
circulation, running the risk of re-codification and re-colonization. Foucault (1980) is aware that 
the  
unitary discourses, which first disqualified and then ignored them when they made their 
appearance, are, it seems, quite ready now to annex them, to take them back within the 
fold of their own discourse and to invest them with everything this implies in terms of 
their effects of knowledge and power” (p. 86). Foucault is also aware that by attempting 
to protect these “liberated” fragments, one risks constructing a unitary discourse of the 
kind he is trying to avoid being trapped in. (p. 86) 
Other theories in social science, according to Foucault, have either remained silent or 
taken a cautious position regarding genealogies. Foucault viewed this silence or prudence on 
behalf of the unitary theories as reason to continue pursuing genealogy. He aimed to “proceed 
to multiply the genealogical fragments in the form of so many traps, demands, challenges” 
(p. 87). He sees his work as “thinking in terms of a contest, that of knowledge against the effects 
of the power of scientific discourse” (p. 87). Foucault proposes that the task in this war is to 
“expose and specify the issue at stake in this opposition, this struggle, this insurrection of 
knowledges against the institutions and against effects of the knowledge and power that invests 
scientific discourse” (p. 87). 
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Second reflection 
Foucault used powerful images and metaphors to depict the notions he was interested 
in. He masterfully presented his conception of power and its relation to knowledge in a way that 
captures the audience’s attention and interest. However, he makes a categorical error when he 
presents everything as belonging to power, or in what amounts to the same thing, viewing 
everything as power. This and other limitations were clearly exposed in Habermas’s (1990) 
critique of Foucault in the essay, “Some Questions Concerning the Theory of Power: Foucault 
Again.”  
Foucault forces together, Habermas asserts, the idea of transcendental synthesis taken 
from the idealist with ontological presuppositions taken from the empiricists. In this approach, 
the concept of power is taken from within the philosophy of the subject and, thus, cannot 
provide a way out of it.3 According to the philosophy of subject, Habermas explains, “The 
subject can take up basically two and only two relationships toward the world of imaginable and 
manipulable objects: cognitive relationships regulated by the truth of judgments; and practical 
                                                          
3  
Habermas uses the notion of “philosophy of subject” extensively in his books Knowledge and Human Interest and 
The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity. Within the philosophy of subject, it is accepted that the “I” exists. While 
the notions go back to Socrates, Descartes was the first to explicate it based on his well-known inference “I think, 
therefore I am.” Descartes’s cogito was quickly criticized: because you think, that does not mean you exist as a 
being. The empiricists, while doubting the possibility for proving the existence of the world outside, and for some 
(Hume), doubting causality outside the subject’s mind, still accepted the existence of the subject that comes to 
know its object. Kant also, while denying that the subject can be known in itself (the subject becomes a noumena), 
argued that “I think” can accompany all representations. Unsatisfied with Kant’s attempt to restore first a principle 
of a philosophy of subject, since the subject can only be known in mediation with an other (that is an object in 
sense-certainty and an other self-consciousness in later stages), Hegel then attempted to bring the movement of 
reflection to ground the existence of the subject. Hegel fails to break the philosophy of subject from inside 
(according to Habermas) since he ‘slipped in’ the assumption of absolute knowing and assumes the necessity of 
the movement of his dialectics. The question about the ontology of the subject became less relevant with a 
linguistic turn, especially with formal pragmatics. It became unimportant to ground philosophy on the ontological 
assumption of the existence of a subject as it became clear that we speak and act as if the subject exists although 
we may never succeed in proving its existence. Used interchangeably is the ‘philosophy of consciousness’, the 
notion Habermas uses in his book The Theory of Communicative Action. The emphasis on the subject puts the 
question in a metaphysical realm (ontology), while the emphasis on consciousness puts it in the realm of 
knowledge (epistemology).  
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relationship regulated by the success of actions” (Habermas, 1990, p. 274). Power is defined 
here as the way a subject affects an object in a successful action. In this framework, success is 
dependent on the truth of the judgment entering into the action plan based on criteria for the 
success of the action, so power depends on truth. According to Habermas, Foucault “abruptly 
reverses power’s truth-dependency into the power-dependency of truth. Then foundational 
power no longer need be bound to the competencies of acting and judging subjects—power 
becomes subjectless” (Habermas, 1990, p. 274). However, just because Foucault performs an 
operation to reverse the basic concepts does not mean he can escape the conceptual 
constraints within the philosophy of the subject, nor can he get away from contradictions. 
According to Habermas, Foucault “must have been irritated by the affinity that obviously 
existed between his archeology of the human sciences and Heidegger’s critique of the 
metaphysics of the modern age” (Habermas, 1990, p. 266). Not only did he fail to acknowledge 
this proximity, but he also did not admit the nearness to structuralism in his work; a position that 
would not have meant surpassing Modernity for Foucault. Further embarrassment, Habermas 
points out, arises from the circumstances of his study of the rise of the human sciences only in 
the form of an archeology of knowledge (i.e. exploring discursive statements and formations 
governed by a general knowledge theory). Habermas criticizes, “How could this analysis of 
scientific discourse be combined with the investigation of relevant practices familiar from earlier 
studies without endangering the self-sufficiency of forms of knowledge rounded off into 
totalities?” (Habermas, 1990, p. 267). Habermas’s critique here reminds of the now prevalent 
skepticism about carrying out a project similar to that of Hegel’s as he attempted to know the 
absolute. Such projects promise to explicate not only the forms of knowledge but the content 
itself and end up delivering explications of particulars claimed falsely to be explications of 
totalities.  
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Foucault proposed three reductions along the lines of positivism, and these have important 
methodological implications. Habermas (1990) explains,  
From the viewpoint of the ethnological observer, the understanding of meaning by 
interpreters participating in discourses is reduced to the explanation of discourses; 
validity claims are functionalistically reduced to the effects of power; the ‘ought’ is 
naturalistically reduced to the ‘is’.” (p. 276) 
 His genealogical historiography brackets both normative validity claims and claims to 
propositional truth. It abstains from answering the question whether some types of power 
formation and discourse can be more legitimate than others. He refuses to take sides and only 
contends that power is that which is ugly, sterile, evil, and dead and that what power is 
exercised on is good, rich, and right. He, himself, however, acknowledges no right side for 
himself. His theory of power comes to erase all traces of communicative action that are 
entangled in a lifeworld context. As the categories of value, validity, and meaning are eliminated 
from the metatheoretical and empirical levels, genealogical historiography will fail to find 
answers to the two main problems in classical social theory: “the issues of how a social order is 
possible at all, and how individual and society are related to one another” (Habermas, 1990, 
p. 280). 
Habermas: The Theory of Communicative Action 
Habermas presents the Theory of Communicative Action as a framework for addressing 
the classical question of how social order is possible. Since Hobbes, the question of social order 
has been framed as, “how norms with trans-subjectively binding normative validity claims can 
develop out of the interest positions and individual profit calculations of actors who make 
decisions in a purposive rational way and who encounter each other only haphazardly” (1998, 
p. 234). Habermas argues that only communicative action has the structural constraints for 
language, which is shared intersubjectivity, to impel the actors to step out of the egocentricity of 
their purposive-rational orientation toward success and to give themselves in to the public 
criteria of a rationality that is communicative. This trans-subjective capacity for language 
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provides a basis for answering the classical question of social order. To explicate Habermas’s 
answer, I will first outline the contrast between communicative action and strategic action as the 
two forms of social actions, according to Habermas. Second, I will elaborate on meaning and 
validity to describe the conditions for reaching communicative agreement with the purpose of 
coordinating action. Third, I will analyze the bringing together of action theory and system theory 
in delineating the distinction between lifeworld and systems. 
Communicative Action and Strategic Action 
Habermas constructs (in his early work) the notion of communicative action by 
explaining the difference between orientation to success and orientation to understanding along 
with the difference between communicative action and strategic action. According to Habermas, 
concrete actions can be classified into two types: strategic actions and communicative actions. 
The terms “strategic” and “communicative,” Habermas insists, do not designate  
two analytic aspects under which the same action could be described—on the one hand 
as a reciprocal influencing of one another by opponents acting in a purposive-rational 
manner and, on the other hand, as a process of reaching understanding among 
members of a life-world.” (1984, p. 286) 
Social actions are differentiated based on whether the participants adopt an attitude oriented 
toward success or an attitude oriented toward understanding. These attitudes are identifiable 
based on intuitive knowledge of the participants. Distinguishing between the two is a question of  
pretheoretical knowledge of competent speakers, who can themselves distinguish 
situations in which they are causally exerting an influence upon others from those in 
which they are coming to an understanding with them, and who know when their 
attempts have failed. (p. 286) 
Reaching understanding is a process of reaching a propositionally differentiated 
agreement among the acting and speaking subjects. Because of its linguistic structure, this 
communicatively achieved agreement must be presupposed or accepted as valid by the 
participants rather than being induced by an outside influence. This agreement has a rational 
basis and cannot be imposed by either party, whether strategically through indirectly influencing 
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the conditions of action or instrumentally through directly intervening in the situation. Only when 
one individual accepts the offer given by another one by taking a “yes” or “no” position on its 
validity claim does an action succeed in reaching understanding. This decision between “yes” or 
“no” or abstention is based solely on potential reasons and grounds. 
Habermas (1984) argues,  
The use of language with an orientation to reaching understanding is the original mode 
of language use, upon which indirect understanding, giving something to understand or 
letting something be understood, and the instrumental use of language in general are 
parasitic. (p. 288) 
To support this claim, Habermas refers to Austin’s distinction between locution, illocution, and 
perlocution. The term “locutionary” refers to the content of a propositional sentence (p) or a 
nominalized propositional sentence (that p). The speaker expresses the state of affairs and says 
something through locutionary acts. Additionally, the speaker performs an action in saying 
something, through an illocutionary act. Habermas (1984) explains, “The illocutionary role 
establishes the mode of a sentence (‘Mp’) employed as a statement, promise, command, 
avowal, or the like” (p. 289). The mode is expressed in the first person present by means of 
performative verbs, so the action meaning can be understood such that someone can add 
“hereby” to the illocutionary component of the verb: “I hereby command you (confess to you, 
promise you, etc.).” Finally, the speaker produces an effect upon the hearer through 
perlocutionary acts. The three acts, locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary, can be 
characterized using the catchphrase “To say something, to act in saying something, to bring 
about something through acting in saying something” (Habermas, 1984, p. 289). 
Habermas points out four criteria to distinguish between illocutionary and perlocutionary 
acts. (1) The illocutionary aim of a speaker follows from the meaning of what is said. In contrast, 
the perlocutionary aim can only be identified through the agent’s intention. (2) We can infer the 
success of the illocutionary act, but not the perlocutionary one, from the description of a speech 
act. The description of the perlocutionary speech act includes results that are beyond the 
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meaning of what is said and beyond what the addressee could directly understand. (3) Contrary 
to illocutionary acts, which have an internal connection with speech acts and are conventionally 
regulated, perlocutionary effects are external to the meaning of what is said. These effects 
depend on the context and are not fixed by convention. Habermas (1984) explains,  
When a hearer accepts an assertion of S as true, a command as right, an admission as 
truthful, he therewith implicitly declares himself ready to tie his further action to certain 
conventional obligations. By contrast, the feeling of being upset which a friend arouses 
in S with a warning that the latter takes seriously is a state that may or may not ensue. 
(p. 292)  
(4) Contrary to the illocutionary aims, which can only be achieved if expressed, the speaker 
must not make known her perlocutionary aims if she wants to be successful. Predicates used to 
express perlocutionary aims (such as “to frighten,” “to upset,” etc.) cannot appear among the 
ones used to carry out illocutionary acts. Perlocutionary acts are a subclass of teleological 
actions in which the actor uses speech acts without declaring aims. 
Habermas clarifies the division between locutionary and illocutionary as that between the 
propositional content and the mode of speech; the two are analytically different aspects of the 
speech act. He insists, however, that the distinction between these two types of acts and the 
perlocutionary act is not only analytical. Habermas argues that only when the hearer is able to 
achieve the illocutionary aims can the speech act then serve the perlocutionary role of 
influencing her. A strategic act cannot be carried out “if the hearer failed to understand what the 
speaker was saying” (p. 293). Only when the speech act is incorporated into a communicative 
act can the perlocutionary effect be achieved and bring the hearer to behave in a desired way. 
According to Habermas (1984) 
Perlocutionary acts are an indication of the integration of speech acts into contexts of 
strategic interaction. They belong to the intended consequences or results of a 
teleological action which an actor undertakes with the intention of influencing a hearer in 
a certain way by means of illocutionary successes. (p. 292–293) 
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Habermas then goes on to argue, “What we initially designated as ‘the use of language with an 
orientation to consequences’ is not an original use of language but the subsumption of speech 
acts that serve illocutionary aims under conditions of action oriented to success” (p. 293). 
Since, as Habermas (1984) argues, “it must also be possible to clarify the structure of 
linguistic communication without reference to structures of purposive activity” (p. 293), the 
teleological orientation to success is not enough to succeed in reaching understanding, which 
should be explained only in connection with illocutionary acts. Thus, we cannot explain 
illocutionary success by the condition of success of the teleological action. Illocutionary aims are 
different from those achieved when something is brought about in the world. Illocutionary effects 
are “achieved at the level of interpersonal relations on which participants in communication 
come to an understanding with one another about something in the world” (p. 293). On the other 
hand, perlocutionary effects are intended as a state of affairs that can be brought about by an 
intervention in the world. While illocutionary results should be perceived as what appears in the 
lifeworld to which participants belong and against the background of which they engage in a 
process of reaching understanding, perlocutions should be conceived of as a class of strategic 
interactions where illocutions are employed only as means in the teleological context of the 
action. 
Communicative action, according to Habermas (1984) is, “the type of interaction in which 
all participants harmonize their individual plans of action with one another and thus pursue their 
illocutionary aims without reservation” (p. 294). This type of interaction, which is not burdened 
with the provisos and asymmetries of perlocutions, should be, according to Habermas, the 
model of analysis that “explain(s) the linguistic mechanism of coordinating action by way of the 
illocutionary binding (or bonding) effect of speech acts” (p. 294). It is not unusual, however, for 
unintended consequences to occur in the context of a communicative act; however, participants 
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tend to quickly provide an explanation to push away the false impression that these 
consequences are perlocutionary effects. In justifying this conclusion, Habermas explains,  
Otherwise, he has to expect that the other participants will feel deceived and adopt a 
strategic attitude in turn, steering away from action oriented to reaching understanding” 
(p. 295). Habermas, however, accepts that in complex action contexts, an action can be 
performed under the conditions of communicative action and at the same time assume 
“a strategic position at other levels of interaction (p. 295)  
that has a perlocutionary effect on a third party. 
Habermas summarizes his position by saying,  
Thus I count as communicative action those linguistically mediated interactions in which 
all participants pursue illocutionary aims, and only illocutionary aims, with their mediating 
acts of communication. On the other hand, I regard as linguistically mediated strategic 
action those interactions in which at least one of the participants wants with his speech 
acts to produce perlocutionary effects on his opposite number. (1984, p. 295)  
Confusing acts of communication with communicative action, according to Habermas, leads to 
the error of not keeping separate these types of interactions. Speech acts have to be  
disengaged from contexts of communicative action before they can be incorporated into 
strategic interactions. And this is possible in turn only because speech acts have a 
certain independence in relation to communicative action, though the meaning of what is 
said always points to the interaction structures of communicative action. (p. 295) 
Meaning and Validity 
Habermas followed the formal pragmatic approach to meaning. This approach “begins 
with the question of what it means to understand an utterance—that is, a sentence employed 
communicatively” (Habermas, 1998, p. 131). Habermas traces understanding an utterance back 
to the knowledge of the conditions under which the hearer may accept the utterance as valid. 
He asserts, “We understand a speech act when we know what makes it acceptable” (1998, 
p. 131). From the speaker’s standpoint, the conditions for acceptability are the same as the 
conditions for the illocutionary success of her act. Acceptability is defined in the performative 
attitude of the participants in the communication and not in an objectivistic sense from the 
observers’ perspective. Thus, from the perspective of a hearer, the hearer understands an 
utterance, “that is, he grasps the meaning of what is said” (Habermas, 1984, p. 297). The hearer 
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thus takes a position on the raised claim with a yes or no or abstention to either accept or reject 
the offered speech act, and as a consequence of this achieved agreement, the hearer will 
“orient his actions based on conventionally fixed obligations” (1984, p. 297). “Reaching 
understanding,” within this framework, means that at least two subjects who are capable of 
action and speech understand an expression in an identical way.4 
A speech act, in the context of communicative action, can be contested or rejected 
by an addressee under at least one of the three aspects:  
the aspect of the rightness that the speaker claims for her action in relation to a normative 
context (or indirectly for these norms themselves); the aspect of the truthfulness that the 
speaker claims for the expression of subjective experiences to which she has privileged 
access; and finally, the aspect of the truth that the speaker, with her utterance, claims for 
a statement (or for the existential presuppositions of the context of a nominalized 
proposition). (Habermas, 1998, p. 141–142) 
A speech act is called acceptable if it satisfies the conditions necessary for the 
hearer to take a “yes” position on the validity claim raised by the speaker. These 
conditions have to be satisfied not one-sidedly, whether in relation to the speaker or the 
hearer, but have to be sufficient for the intersubjective recognition of the linguistic claims 
that, depending on the class of the speech act, ground an agreement with specified 
content related to obligations relevant to the interaction’s consequences. This standpoint 
                                                          
4 Habermas discussed the importance of the capacity to say “no.” One of the essential structures that 
emerge from this capacity is the “identity of meaning” which applies here to the notion of 
understanding an expression in an identical way. We never know whether two people experience an 
identical meaning of an expression. As Habermas writes, we only know when a possible negation (no) is 
not expressed by the Alter. Communicative actions are structured only in relation to the possibility of 
identical meaning, and they assume identical meaning (on the foreground level). Habermas emphasizes 
that “identical meaning” should not be understood from a third-person observer position as an 
observable isomorphism. “Identical meaning” has to be understood as a regulative principle since 
meanings can only work identically. He often puts phrases like “work as if identically” into statements, 
which acknowledges the fallibility of thinking there is an identical meaning in a positive manner. 
Absence of a communicative no (and there are other kinds of negation, too) is the only way we can 
interact communicatively as if we have identical understandings. This notion is essential to 
understanding Habermas. (This footnote is edited from a comments by Phil Carspecken.)  
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provides an explanation of the mechanism relevant to how speech acts coordinate 
actions. Assuming the expressions employed in the speech act are grammatically well 
formed and that there is satisfaction of the general contextual conditions typical for a 
certain type of a speech act, Habermas asserts,  
A hearer understands the meaning of an utterance when . . . he knows those 
essential conditions under which he could be motivated by a speaker to an 
affirmative response. These acceptability conditions in the narrower sense relate 
to the meaning of the illocutionary role that (a speaker) in the standard case 
expresses with the help of a performative action predicate. (Habermas, 1998, 
p. 132) 
When a hearer responds with a “yes” to a claim raised by a speaker, she accepts 
the offer embedded in the speech act and forms an agreement. This agreement concerns, 
in addition to the content of the speech, guarantees immanence to the speech act and 
obligations relevant to the sequel of the interaction. The action potential of the speech act 
is explicitly expressed in the claim by means of a performative verb. A hearer accepts the 
offer made in the speech act by acknowledging the claim. For Habermas (1984) 
This illocutionary success is relevant to the interaction inasmuch as it establishes 
between speaker and hearer an interpersonal relation that is effective for 
coordination, that orders scopes of action and sequences of interaction, and that 
opens up to the hearer possible points of connection by way of general 
alternatives for action. (p. 296) 
Lifeworld and Systems 
Habermas replaces Popper’s ontological concept of worlds with a more 
phenomenological ones and adopts the two concepts of “world” and “lifeworld.” Societal 
subjects employ the concept world implicitly when they participate in cooperative 
processes of interpretation.  
Popper speaks of three ontological worlds: the world of physical objects, or 
physical states; the world of states of consciousness, or mental states; and the world of 
objective content of thoughts. The third world, for Popper, mediates between the first and 
the second, is thought of as an advance proposal compared to the traditional empiricist 
35 
 
assumptions of non-mediated relations between objects and states of mind. Habermas 
advances a more phenomenological notion of three worlds. Within formal pragmatics, any 
action presupposes a relationship of the actor and at least one world, the world of objects 
(teleological action), but can require an assumed social world (normative action) and an 
assumed subjective world (dramaturgical action). Communicative actions also assume a 
relationship of at least two actors with these three worlds.  
The lifeworld, on the other hand, constitutes cultural traditions shared by the 
community and that have already been interpreted for members of the society. Cultural 
traditions, or what Popper refers to as “the products of the human mind,” can either be the 
topic of the intellectual endeavor or can itself function from behind as a “cultural stock of 
knowledge from which the participants in interaction draw their interpretations” 
(Habermas, 1984, p. 82). As the lifeworld is intersubjectively shared between the 
participants, it forms the background for communicative action. Phenomenologists speak 
of the lifeworld as “the unthematically given horizon within which participants in 
communication move in common when they refer thematically to something in the world” 
(Habermas, 1984, p. 82). This lifeworld can be brought to the fore equally by societal 
members and by research scientists in daily interactions and in any dialogical attempts to 
understand. 
Habermas then combines the perspectives from the action theory that befits the lifeworld 
and the systems theory that befits social systems to avoid the limited and one-sided 
perspectives of each one when taken alone. Habermas explains,  
From the participant perspective of members of a lifeworld it looks as if sociology with a 
systems-theoretical orientation considers only one of the three components of the 
lifeworld, namely, the institutional system, for which culture and personality merely 
constitute complementary environments. From the observer perspective of systems 
theory, on the other hand, it looks as if lifeworld analysis confines itself to one societal 
subsystem specialized in maintaining structural patterns (pattern maintenance); in this 
view, the components of the lifeworld are merely internal differentiations of this 
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subsystem which specifies the parameters of societal self-maintenance. (Habermas, 
1987, p. 153) 
A systems theory of the society cannot, based on methodological grounds, be self-
sufficient since the structures of the lifeworld can only be gotten at using hermeneutic 
approaches that take into consideration members’ pretheoretical knowledge. This inner logic of 
the lifeworld places significant internal constraints on the maintenance of a system. In addition, 
Habermas asserts, “the objective conditions under which the systems-theoretical objectification 
of the lifeworld becomes necessary have themselves only arisen in the course of social 
evolution. And this calls for a type of explanation that does not already move within the system 
perspective” (Habermas, 1987, p. 153). 
Everyday communicative practice is embedded, for Habermas, “in a lifeworld context de-
fined by cultural tradition, legitimate orders, and socialized individuals” (Habermas, 1987, 
p. 182–183). Participants in the lifeworld engage in interpretive performances to bring about and 
to advance consensus. They actualize the rationality potential5 of mutual understanding to the 
extent that they advance value and motive generalization, and they shrink the zones of that 
which is unproblematic. Rationality, for Habermas, is not to be understood as a necessity (as in 
the Hegelian and Marxist traditions) but only as one possibility among many. Problematic 
lifeworld circumstances exert pressure for rationality upon the mechanisms of mutual 
understanding. The growing pressure increases the need to achieve consensus and, thus, 
increases the expenditure of interpretive energy and the risk of the appearance of dissensus. 
These demands and dangers can be headed off by media of communication that function in two 
main mechanisms: (1) Focusing consensus formation in language through hierarchizing 
                                                          
5 According to Habermas, in the actor’s relationship with the three worlds resides, and can be mobilized, rationality 
potential for the goal of reaching an understanding that is cooperatively pursued. When a speaker raises a 
criticizable validity claim in relation to at least one world, she relies on the fact that this actor–world relationship is 
open to critical appraisal that calls Alter to take a rationally motivated yes or no position (or abstention). Thus, in 
the context of communicative action, participants reciprocally raise validity claims the other can accept or contest. 
To the extent this rationality potential embedded in communicative action is set free, the traditional norm 
dissolves, and there rises instead rationalized worldviews and universalization of morality and law, and the 
processes of individuation progresses.    
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processes of agreement and specializing in certain aspects of validity; and, (2) Uncoupling 
action coordination in language altogether, and neutralizing action coordination regarding the 
alternative of agreement or failing to agree.  
The first type of steering media generalizes the influence attached to rationally motivated 
trust in the possession of knowledge that is cognitive–instrumental, moral–practical, or 
aesthetic–practical. According to Habermas,  
Where reputation or moral authority enters in, action coordination has to be brought 
about by means of resources familiar from consensus formation in language. Media of 
this kind cannot uncouple interaction from the lifeworld context of shared cultural 
knowledge, valid norms, and accountable motivations, because they have to make use 
of the resources of consensus formation in language. (Habermas, 1987, p. 183) 
This type of media does not need any special institutional reconnection to the lifeworld and 
remains immediately dependent on the rationalization of the lifeworld. Examples of such media 
are influences of the professionals who acquire scientific reputation as they build expertise in 
certain cognitive matters and the influences of moral leaders in normatively specialized 
domains. 
The second type of steering media uncouples action from processes of reaching 
understanding and coordinates its effects by generalized instrumental values (like money and 
power), such as institutions are replaced by compulsory associations and organizations in the 
two central domains of action, namely economics and politics. According to Habermas, the 
social action is set loose from integration through the value consensus and turned over to 
purposive-rational steering media, which, by replacing language, makes possible the 
differentiation of subsystems of purposive-rational action. These media, rather than the 
purposive-rational action orientations, are what need to be motivationally and institutionally 
anchored in the lifeworld. The moral–practical foundation of the realms of action regulated by 
the law and the legitimacy of the legal order form the links that connect both the economic 
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system (differentiated by the media of money) and the administrative system (differentiated by 
the media of power) to the lifeworld. 
As the function of action coordination is transferred over from language to steering 
media, interaction uncouples from the lifeworld context. Habermas (1987) explains,  
Media such as money and power attach to empirical ties; they encode a purposive-
rational attitude toward calculable amounts of value and make it possible to exert 
generalized, strategic influence on the decisions of other participants while bypassing 
processes of consensus-oriented communication. Inasmuch as they do not merely 
simplify linguistic communication, but replace it with a symbolic generalization of rewards 
and punishments, the lifeworld contexts in which processes of reaching understanding 
are always embedded are devalued in favor of media-steered interactions; the lifeworld 
is no longer needed for the coordination of action. (p. 183) 
The process of societal rationalization appears, within the framework of the Theory of 
Communicative Action, as contradictory from the start. According to Habermas,  
The contradiction arises between, on one side, a rationalization of everyday 
communication that is tied to the structures of inter-subjectivity of the lifeworld, in which 
language counts as the genuine and irreplaceable medium of reaching understanding, 
and, on the other side, the growing complexity of subsystems of purposive-rational 
action, in which actions are coordinated through steering media such as money and 
power. Thus there is a competition not between the types of action oriented to 
understanding and to success, but between principles of societal integration—between 
the mechanism of linguistic communication that is oriented to validity claims—a 
mechanism that emerges in increasing purity from the rationalization of the lifeworld—
and those de-linguistified steering media through which systems of success-oriented 
actions are differentiated out. (Habermas, 1987, p. 342–343)  
Reminded that rationalization is not a movement of necessity, this contradiction represents a 
paradox of rationalization. As the rationalization of lifeworld makes possible the systemic 
integration, the latter enters into competition with and disintegrates the principles of social 
integration of the lifeworld that are founded on reaching understanding. As the societal 
subsystems differentiate out via the steering media of money and power and make themselves 
independent of the lifeworld context, according to Habermas, the lifeworld gets shunted aside 
into the system environment and technicized. 
Habermas’s theses on “the colonization of the lifeworld” and “shunting the lifeworld” go 
as follows: Maintaining social order demands that participants in the lifeworld cooperate by 
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arriving at an understanding and coming to an agreement. The complexity of the lifeworld puts 
demands on achieving consensus that are burdensome to the linguistic mechanisms available 
to participants. Thus, there forms the media of money and power to provide shortcuts. This 
allows for the formation of systems of economy and politics that are guided within a framework 
of purposive rationality. Yet, such systems are anchored in the lifeworld and its communicative 
rationality framework. Colonization of the lifeworld takes place when the system mechanisms 
replace the linguistic mechanisms of the lifeworld in spheres that do not befit a purposive 
rationality framework, such as spheres of values, intersubjective communication, and the 
subjective world of a person. Shunting the lifeworld takes place when its views (i.e., the 
participant’s views) and mechanisms (language) are pushed to the side and devalued next to 
the system views (i.e., third-person views) and mechanisms (money and power).     
Final reflection 
I first presented Hobbes’s answer to the question of social order. I not only take with 
charitable understanding the limitations of Hobbes’s theory situated within the purposive-rational 
framework, but I also give him, like Habermas did, credit as an honored thinker who 
revolutionized thought in the political and social sciences. My position toward Foucault’s critique 
of Hobbes, however, is different. Although Foucault did not reflectively admit this claim, one can 
read into his assertions that he was framing Hobbes and the philosophers of right as acting 
strategically, to use Habermas’s term. Their perlocution was to justify and to give legitimacy to 
the status quo and to power. Their illocution was raising claims to “truth” about the state of 
things. Foucault did not address the moral aspect of this hypocrisy and did not wrong these 
philosophers but rather exposed their truth as an untruth and presented his as an alternative. 
Further, he did not engage in criticizing the validity of their objective claims about the state of 
things. He only rejected their truthfulness and, based on that rejection, refused their claims so 
he could open the space for his own alternative claims. However, what Foucault provided of 
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truth is at the same level as the ones he criticized. He literally called them untruthful, turned their 
claims on their heads, and then presented these upside-down claims as the truth. This method 
is problematic because these types of skeptical arguments are only like “the squabbling of self-
willed children, one of whom says A if the other says B, and in turn says B if the other says A, 
and who by contradicting themselves buy for themselves the pleasure of continually 
contradicting one another” (Hegel, 1977, p. 126). These skeptical arguments are only grounded 
in their antithetical relation to what they claim to be wrong and this grounding is not sufficient for 
the validity of a truth claim.  
Moving on to Foucault and his theory of power. I sketched out my main representation of 
the theory and then presented Habermas’s critique. Foucault, despite his denial, moved within 
the limits of the philosophy of subject, I agree with Habermas. He was entangled in its 
presuppositions as he was coming to know his object non-reflectively and, thus, only found in 
his objects of knowing the evidence to support the image he had in mind. Foucault seems to 
assume a priori the existence of “power” as a transcendent and omnipresent being; thus, he 
saw it everywhere. He did not bother to give proof. He adopted the schemas of war-repression 
or contract-repression or many others of his choosing at the time, and as a consequence (of his 
contingent selection), he grabbed what fits within his schema and presented it as the proof to 
his pre-formulated conception. Foucault fell into a repetitive formalism; the least that can be said 
about it is that it is boring. This formalistic instrument, as Hegel says,  
is no more difficult to handle than a painter’s palette having only two colors, say red and 
green, the one for coloring the surface when a historical scene is wanted, the other for 
landscapes. It would be hard to decide which is greater in all this, the casual ease with 
which everything in heaven and on earth and under the earth is coated with this broth of 
color, or the conceit regarding the excellence of this universal recipe: each supports the 
other. (Hegel, 1977, p. 51) 
When I presented Foucault’s work I employed Habermas’s theory, especially the 
distinction between strategic action and communicative action. One can argue, applying 
Habermas’s notions, that Foucault followed a strategic action pattern rather than communicative 
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one in understanding others, in the content of his topic, in his framework, and in his work 
biography itself. Foucault claims for himself the position of an outsider and the gaze of God’s 
eye as he looks at power from above and sees it subjecting all the participants in the lifeworld, 
of which Foucault is only one. In doing this, he takes a privileged position above all the 
participants and fails to acknowledge what they themselves think or say. Furthermore, in taking 
this position, he does not look backward to reflect on how he got the privilege to make such 
claims. Foucault denies the agency and the freedom of every person. Everyone is subjected to 
the effects of power while, he, Foucault, is free from it! He did not bother to explain his freedom 
from power. He only claimed the fragmentation of his discourse, suspending his claims to 
truthfulness with that argument and dispensing with the need to maintain consistency and 
integrity.  
With that suspension, he was refusing, in principle, to be held accountable to norms of 
practice, including scientific practices, and contesting anyone who would hold him to 
consistency and honesty, giving himself license to say whatever came to mind, especially if it 
resisted the standards of science, named here as only the “constraint on truth,” and which he 
had finally rejected, along with its power as criteria for truth.   
Habermas’s critique is instructive. Habermas powerfully showed how someone can 
engage in a conversation with someone who can be viewed as strategically acting without 
having to be drawn into the game of strategies. He was consistent with his theoretical 
assumptions and his own framework. His critique of Foucault can be viewed as raising criticism 
against Foucault’s subjective claims to authenticity (hiding the references to Heidegger and the 
similarity to structuralism), normative claims to rightness (failing to maintain scientific 
standards), and objective claims to truth (the content of the critique itself). Habermas, however, 
did not announce that Foucault was acting strategically and, thus, he did not himself engage in 
a strategic counter act. He invited Foucault to an open conversation and engaged in his critique 
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with all the three validity domains, leaving Foucault the opportunity to clarify and reserving final 
judgment for the reader. 
I presented Habermas’s Theory of Communicative Action along the same lines as he 
presented it in the 1970s and early 1980s. Due to space constraints, I did not present his 
description of the theory communicative action in contrast to other theories of actions 
(teleological actions, normative actions, and dramaturgical actions). Instead, I focused primarily 
on the distinction from purposive rationality and strategic actions, which he contrasted with 
communicative action and communicative rationality. I then elaborated on his explanation of 
validity and meaning along the lines of communicative rationality and finished with explicating 
the distinction between the lifeworld and the system, which is an essential distinction for the 
theory itself and for social sciences in general. 
I take a position similar to Habermas’s in stating that it is not power that glues or forces 
society together, nor is it strategic acts in which individuals are moved to achieve their own 
ends. What establishes and maintains social order is, rather, the communicative action of 
participants in the lifeworld and media of the system. Looked at from the participants’ 
standpoint, communicative action maintains social integration through relying on and 
reproducing the lifeworld when they participate in communicative actions. Looked at from a 
systems perspective, what supports order is also the differentiated media of money and power 
that replaces language in maintaining consensus while still being anchored in the lifeworld of 
society. 
One can demand of Foucault, like Habermas did, an authentic, explicit acknowledgment 
of similarities and of what influenced one’s work. These are, to say the least, norms of the field. 
On the other hand, one can defend Foucault and say a norm is only a norm if assented to, and 
an observed similarity or influence may exist only for the observer. It is my position that such 
questions can be answered only with critical dialogues and reflections.  
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Part 2. Conscience. Communicative and Strategic Actions. 
Introduction 
The distinction between strategic action and communicative action is a core component 
of Habermas’s theory of communicative action. Analytically, participants in social action rely on 
their intuitive competency in distinguishing an act with an orientation to understanding from an 
act with an orientation to success. Empirically, and since every social actor is moved by a mix of 
interest- and value-based motives, the distinction is not always as clear as it is in the limit cases. 
Hegel’s explication of the moral view of the world at the stage of “Conscience: The ‘beautiful 
soul,’ evil and its forgiveness” provides fruitful insights into the existential aspects of this 
distinction. In this reflective piece, I will first explicate Habermas’s position on the distinction 
between communicative and strategic actions. Then, I will explore Hegel’s critique of Kant’s 
moral theory, the notions of conviction and acknowledgment, and the dialectics of acting and 
judging self-consciousnesses. Each summary section will be followed by an intermediary 
reflection, and the essay will end with a synthetic reflection.  
 
Habermas: The Theory of Communicative Action 
Habermas, in explicating the theory of communicative action, masterfully handled the 
tension between the positions of the philosopher and that of the social scientist. He describes  
The more I sought to satisfy the explicative claims of the philosopher, the further I 
moved from the interests of the sociologist, who has to ask what purpose such 
conceptual analysis should serve. I was having difficulty finding the right level of 
presentation for what I wanted to say; and, as we have known since Hegel and 
Marx, problems of presentation are not extrinsic to substantive problems. 
(Habermas, 1984, p. xxxix) 
With this tension in mind, and contrary to many of his counterparts who engaged with one or the 
other, Habermas successfully couched his theory with equal footing between social science and 
philosophy in a position that “holds that an adequate theory of society must integrate methods 
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and problematics previously assigned exclusively to either philosophy or empirical social 
science” (Habermas, 1984, p. vii). In what follows, I will present sketches of the distinction 
between communicative and strategic actions as he elaborated in his more recent works. I will 
also, to add clarity to these notions, explicate Habermas’s related theory on meaning and 
validity. 
Communicative Action and Strategic Action 
Habermas (1998) clarifies his conception of communicative rationality in his essay 
“Some Further Clarification of the Concept of Communicative Rationality.” Habermas 
distinguishes three main modes of language use: the noncommunicative use, such as 
intentional and propositional sentences, which are used only mentally as monological action 
planning or pure representation;6 the communicative use of language, whether in a weak 
communicative sense with an orientation toward reaching understanding, such as engaging in 
normatively nonembedded expression of will, or in a strong communicative sense with an 
orientation toward agreement, such as in completely illocutionary acts that embed expressive, 
normative, and constative aspects; and the strategic use of language with an orientation toward 
consequences in the pattern of perlocutions. In this discussion, I will not focus on the 
noncommunicative use of language and will instead detail only the two forms of language used 
in the context of social actions.7 
                                                          
6 Examples of noncommunicative use of language are linguistic expressions used monologically such as 
propositions (e.g., “It is true that Hamilton was the secretary of treasury when Washington was the president”) 
and intentional sentences (e.g., “I will go to work tomorrow”) uttered for the purpose of representation or 
mentally rehearsed plan of action. 
7 Here, Habermas refers to Austin’s distinction between locution, illocution, and perlocution. The term 
“locutionary” refers to the content of a propositional sentence (p) or a nominalized propositional sentence (that 
p). The speaker expresses the state of affairs and says something through locutionary acts. Additionally, the 
speaker performs an action in saying something through an illocutionary act. Habermas (1984) explains, “The 
illocutionary role establishes the mode of a sentence (‘Mp’) employed as a statement, promise, command, avowal, 
or the like” (p. 289). The mode is expressed in the first person present by means of performative verbs, so the 
action meaning can be understood such that someone can add “hereby” to the illocutionary component of the 
verb: “I hereby command you (confess to you, promise you, etc.).” Finally, the speaker produces an effect upon the 
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Habermas takes Weber’s definition of social actions as, “actions whereby actors, in 
pursuing their personal plans of action, are also guided by the expected actions of others” 
(Habermas, 1998, p. 326). Habermas distinguishes between communicative and strategic 
actions by saying 
We speak of communicative action where actors coordinate their plans of action with 
one another by way of linguistic processes of reaching understanding, that is, in such a 
way that they draw on the illocutionary binding and bonding powers of speech acts for 
this coordination. (p. 326) 
On the other hand, with regard to the other in a strategic action,  
The potential for communicative rationality remains unexploited, even where the 
interactions are linguistically mediated. Because the participants in strategic action 
coordinate their plans of action with one another by way of a reciprocal exertion of 
influence, language is used not communicatively, in the sense elucidated, but with an 
orientation towards consequences. (p. 326) 
Habermas also distinguishes communicative action “in a weak sense” in actions where 
reaching understanding applies both to the facts and to the actor-relative reasons for one-sided 
expressions of will but not to the normative reasons for selecting the goals. On the other hand, 
he uses the notion of communicative action “in a strong sense” in actions where reaching 
understanding applies also to normative reasons for selecting the goals themselves. Unlike his 
previous position where orientation to success was a sufficient and necessary condition for an 
act to be deemed strategic, in his modified conception, Habermas accepted that it can still be 
considered a communicative use of language, albeit “weak,” when the actor has an orientation 
toward success, provided that “the illocutionary aim dominates the ‘perlocutionary’ effects that in 
some circumstances may be striven for as well” (1998, p. 328). Now, “perlocutionary” has a 
distinct use and refers to “the effects of a speech act that, if need be, can also be brought about 
                                                          
hearer through perlocutionary acts. The three acts, locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary, can be 
characterized using the catchphrase “To say something, to act in saying something, to bring about something 
through acting in saying something” (Habermas, 1984, p. 289). 
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causally by nonlinguistic actions” (p. 328). Habermas further distinguishes perlocutionary effects 
into three classes of effects. 
The first class of perlocutionary effects is grammatically regulated and results from the 
content of the successful illocutionary act. In this class, the illocutionary aim rules the 
perlocutionary one. The second class of perlocutionary effects is, in contrast, not grammatically 
regulated, but like the first class, results from the content of the successful illocutionary act. The 
third class of perlocutionary effects is achieved only in an inconspicuous manner when it comes 
to the addressee. The success of the strategic action in achieving this third kind of effect 
remains hidden from the other party, although it still depends on the manifest success of the 
illocutionary act. For example, a hearer understands and accepts the illocutionary act of a 
request to give money to Y. The hearer gives money to Y (perlocutionary effect1). This action 
gives joy to Y’s wife (perlocutionary effect2). The speaker who requested the money achieves a 
wish she had of setting up Y for burglary with the money, an intention she kept hidden from the 
hearer (perlocutionary effect3).  
In strategic actions, language functions according to perlocution patterns. Linguistic 
communication is only subordinated to the conditions of purposive-rational action.  
Strategic interactions are determined by the decisions of actors in an attitude towards 
success who reciprocally observe one another. They confront one another under 
conditions of double contingency as opponents who, in the interest of their personal 
plans of action, exert influence on one another. . . . They suspend the performative 
attitude of participants in communication as they take on the participating speaker and 
hearer roles from the perspective of third persons. (Habermas, 1998, p. 332) 
 The relevance of illocutionary aims comes from their role as conditions for the intended 
perlocutionary effects and, thus, are not the unreserved pursuit of the interlocutors, as in 
communicative actions. 
Participants in strategic actions cannot assume truthfulness, and thus all their speech 
acts lose their illocutionary bonding and binding power. In addition to losing (as occurs also in 
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weak communicative action) the shared normative context and the associated claims to 
normative rightness, Habermas asserts,  
Even the claims to truth and truthfulness raised with nonregulative speech acts are no 
longer aimed directly at the rational motivation of the hearer but at getting the addressee 
to draw his conclusions from what the speaker indirectly gives him to understand. (1998, 
p. 332) 
 Here, presuppositions of communicative action are suspended, but the interlocutors continue to 
use them indirectly to allow or make the other understand what they believe or want. The 
decisions of strategically acting subjects are based on beliefs they hold to be true without 
transforming into truth claims those truth values that guide them individually from the point of 
view of their goals and personal preferences. Thus, these points of view do not receive the 
intersubjective recognition as they never get raised publicly with claims to discursive vindication.     
. 
Types of interaction, Habermas (1998) asserts, can be differentiated into communicative 
or strategic according the mechanism for linking up Alter’s plan of action with Ego’s. We can 
speak of strategic action or communicative action depending on whether the actions were 
coordinated by exerting influence or by reaching understanding, respectively. Similarly, these 
two mechanisms are distinguished from the perspectives of the participants in a mutually 
exclusive fashion. Alter or Ego cannot participate in the processes of reaching understanding 
with the dual intention of causally exerting influence on the other and at the same time reach an 
agreement about something. This is because an agreement cannot, from the perspective of the 
participants, be imposed externally, whether through intervention in the action or by influencing 
the proposition attitude of the other.8  
The child develops the competency to act communicatively and to have relations to the 
world in the form of subject–subject (as in communicative action) or subject–object (as in 
                                                          
8 From “Toward a Critique of the Theory of Meaning” (Habermas, 1998, pp. 298–299). 
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instrumental action) through socializing and taking in the position of the other. Habermas traces 
the distinction between these two attitudes back to our learning to anticipate a possible no from 
another person and internalizing that person’s position, saying no to our own action impetuses. 
When it comes to interacting with objects in a person–object relationship, the no is understood 
as a consequence of an undesired action. This no is different from the one carrying normative 
validity stemming from identification with Alter Ego or with a generalized other. We intuitively 
distinguish between communicating with another person and acting instrumentally to produce 
an effect on that person. Strategic action is only a special case of instrumental action. 
Clearly, in any action taken from an actual interaction, there would be a mix of empirical 
and rational motives, and participants can more or less tell the difference. Language use will 
thus represent a mix of strategic and communicative actions. Habermas asserts  
Generally, alter is moved to link up his actions with ego’s actions by a 
complicated mix of empirical and rational motives. Because communicative 
action demands an orientation to validity claims, it points from the start to the 
possibility that participants will distinguish more or less sharply between having 
an influence upon one another and reaching an understanding with one another. 
Thus, as we shall see, a generalized “willingness to accept” can develop along 
two lines: empirical ties forged by inducement and intimidation, on the one hand, 
and rational trust motivated by agreement based on reasons, on the other hand. 
(1987, p. 74) 
Participants in interactions master the competency to distinguish, when they come to an 
agreement with an other, whether the person has intimidated and inducted them or they were 
only rationally motivated. 
 
Meaning and Validity 
Habermas followed the formal pragmatic approach to meaning. This approach “begins 
with the question of what it means to understand an utterance—that is, a sentence employed 
communicatively” (1998, p. 131). Habermas traces understanding an utterance back to the 
knowledge of the conditions under which the hearer may accept the utterance as valid. He 
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asserts, “We understand a speech act when we know what makes it acceptable” (1998, p. 131). 
From the speaker’s standpoint, the conditions for acceptability are the same as the conditions 
for the illocutionary success of her act. Acceptability is defined in the performative attitude of the 
participants in the communication and not in an objectivistic sense from the observers’ 
perspective. A speech act, in the context of communicative action, can be contested or rejected 
by an addressee under at least one of the three aspects:  
The aspect of the rightness that the speaker claims for her action in relation to a 
normative context (or indirectly for these norms themselves); the aspect of the 
truthfulness that the speaker claims for the expression of subjective experiences 
to which she has privileged access; and finally, the aspect of the truth that the 
speaker, with her utterance, claims for a statement (or for the existential 
presuppositions of the context of a nominalized proposition). (Habermas, 1998, 
p. 141–142)  
A speech act has met its acceptability conditions when it satisfies the conditions 
necessary for the hearer to take a “yes” position on the validity claim raised by the speaker. 
These conditions have to be satisfied not one-sidedly, whether in relation to the speaker or the 
hearer, but have to be sufficient for the intersubjective recognition of the linguistic claims that, 
depending on the class of the speech act, ground an agreement with specified content related 
to obligations relevant to the interaction’s consequences. This standpoint provides an 
explanation of the mechanism relevant to how speech acts coordinate actions. Assuming the 
expressions employed in the speech act are grammatically well formed and that there is 
satisfaction of the general contextual conditions typical for a certain type of a speech act, 
Habermas asserts,  
A hearer understands the meaning of an utterance when . . . he knows those essential 
conditions under which he could be motivated by a speaker to an affirmative response. 
These acceptability conditions in the narrower sense relate to the meaning of the 
illocutionary role that (a speaker) in the standard case expresses with the help of a 
performative action predicate. (Habermas, 1998, p. 132) 
The yes or no response of a hearer to the validity claim, however, has a nuanced 
meaning to Habermas, building on the notion of “assent.” For Habermas, “under the 
presupposition of communicative action a hearer can reject the utterance of a speaker only by 
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denying its validity. Assent means then that the negation of the invalidity of the utterance is 
affirmed” (TCA II, p.73). To explicate this notion further, take, for example, an assertion p, a 
command q, and an avowal r. Affirming p implies negating “it is untrue that p.” Similarly, 
affirming q implies negating the sentence “It is not right that N,” assuming N is the norm invoked 
in uttering q. Finally, affirming r implies negating the rejection of the sentence “It is insincere that 
r.” This is particularly relevant in understanding the binding and bonding force of the illocutionary 
act. Habermas asserts, 
The binding effect of illocutionary forces comes about, ironically, through the fact 
that participants can say “no” to speech act offers. The critical character of this 
saying “no” distinguishes taking a position in this way from a reaction based 
solely on caprice. A hearer can be “bound” by speech-act offers because he is 
not permitted arbitrarily to refuse them but only to say “no” to them, that is, to 
reject them for reasons. (1987, p. 74) 
This nuanced notion of negating the negative becomes particularly relevant also when 
distinguishing communicative and strategic actions. Even with limit cases, the person can never 
come to a certainty about the truth, rightness, and truthfulness of an act. The best someone can 
claim is the negation of the untruth, un-rightness, and untruthfulness. Similarly, in affirming that 
an act is a strategic one, the best someone can say is that the claim “it is not insincere that r” is 
negated. The certainty of all empirical cases lies between these two limits and is open for 
vindication. 
 
First Reflection 
The distinction between communicative action and strategic action, whether in day-to-
day interactions or in research and social sciences, is particularly important. The reader may 
recall that Habermas characterizes strategic action as the social actions in which at least one 
actor is attempting to influence another person or the person’s conditions for a perlocutionary 
end in mind. The strategic actor uses language only as a tool, unlike communicative action, 
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where language is a medium for reaching understanding and agreement. She suspends her 
commitments to truthfulness and, potentially, to normative rightness and truth as she acts 
unilaterally toward her own ends. Habermas drew the distinction between communicative action 
and strategic action from the perspectives of the participants relying on the intuitive competence 
of interlocutors. There exists in every empirical situation, however, a tension when 
characterizing the act as strategic. This tension results from the essence of strategic action; that 
is, the suspension of the conditions of communicative rationality and using language relying 
parasitically on the language game of communicative action while unilaterally acting as if the 
rules of this game (i.e., commitment to intelligibility, truth, rightness, and truthfulness) do not 
apply.  
This tension imposes itself especially on the other person. In the absence of an I/you 
dialogue, Ego is pushed to the third-person participant position, which is not unproblematic. In 
the limit cases, the act is either communicative or strategic. If the act is communicative, Ego 
could, however, engage in a reflective communicative conversation with Alter about the latter’s 
communicative action, and she could get a truthful response that explicates Alter’s orientation: 
that she was truthful, rightfully holding a norm, and raising an objective truth claim. This 
dialogue and reflection can be unreliable if Alter is truly acting strategically. Just like we cannot 
trust the reliability of the truthful answer about truthfulness, Ego cannot ask Alter, who is acting 
strategically and thus being untruthful, whether she is truthful or not and trust that the answer is 
true. In the absence of a dialogue and authentic reflection, Ego may find herself left to a 
unilateral judgment, albeit a one-sided one that, even if it claims a privileged position, is 
meaningless if left unacknowledged. It is an impasse unless Alter comes to reflect on her act 
and makes a confession. 
Clearly, Habermas does not say that the distinction between communicative and 
strategic action with certainty is possible, even in the limit cases. The possibility of distinction 
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between communicative and strategic action ought to be understood analytically as it relates to 
an ideal speech situation. Although these situations cannot be achieved, they need to be 
accepted if the possibility of acting communicatively is to be understood. This is the same 
argument that can be raised when we think of interlocutors in a social interaction attaining 
identical meaning, although we can never be certain that two people understand an utterance in 
an identical way. For Habermas, the distinction between communicative and strategic action 
must be understood as a necessary idealization. We cannot claim that one can know whether 
an other is acting strategically or not although we know the difference between strategic acts 
and communicative acts. We know the difference analytically, yet we can never be certain in 
any empirical situation.9 
As participants in a lifeworld and in any empirical act, we accept that it is problematic to 
claim a distinction between a communicative and strategic action from the ego’s or the alter’s 
position alone. It takes critical dialogues and reflections to judge the action as such for both the 
participants, and it is not sufficient to rely on the position of one without the other. The two 
analytical schemas provide a powerful framework for interpreting social actions within the 
horizons of the actions’ possible meanings. Here appears the critical aspect of the theory when 
brought to the sphere of social science and methodology: as social scientists who are 
committed to the values and principles of the theory of communicative action, we ought to avoid 
describing the action as strategic without the participant’s confession. We could, however, 
engage the participant in a conversation about previous actions and, through a dialogue, move 
her position to recognizing her truth orientation, but we cannot unilaterally make claims to 
certainty about that orientation. We can clearly make inferences about the person’s objective 
claims by explicating possible reasons for her raised claims to truth. We can also make 
stipulations about the norms she is claiming entitlement to. We can further judge her explicitly 
                                                          
9 This paragraph is reconstructed from a conversation with Phil Carspecken. 
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claimed authenticity and the explicit claims to truthfulness as they take an objective existence in 
language (i.e. only after they are asserted explicitly). We cannot, however, make inferences 
about her subjective claims without her insight, ideally insight that is cultivated through critical 
reflection and dialogue with the other. We also cannot make claims to judge the norms she is 
committed to without her explicitly stating her commitments. By exploring this very thing more 
deeply, actions that can be judged as strategic, communicative, or a combination of both by 
participants or researchers, we move to Hegel’s moral dialectic in “Conscience: The ‘beautiful 
soul,’ evil and its forgiveness.” 
 
Hegel: The Beautiful Soul, Evil and its Forgiveness 
In Phenomenology of Spirit, under the title “Conscience. The ‘beautiful soul,’ evil and its 
forgiveness,” Hegel criticizes Kant’s moral worldview that “gets bogged down in insoluble 
contradictions, continually contraposing a nature whose laws are independent to a will and a 
pure duty which are then condemned to remain ineffectual” (Hyppolite, 1987, p. 492). Hegel 
transcended these contradictions dialectically, and that will be the focus of this section. But 
before we get to Hegel, it is called for to bring in a rough sketch of Kant’s moral theory as he 
constructed its argument in Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals (1998). 
Kant, as we know, developed the arguments for the synthetic a priori principle of 
causality. The law of causality, however, applies only to the phenomenal world, meaning the 
world as far as it is knowable. Contrasted with causality in the phenomenal world, autonomy and 
freedom come to be the uncaused cause in the noumenal world, the world of things in 
themselves, including the moral agency of the person. We belong to both the world of sense, 
thus following the laws of nature, and the world of understanding, and thus, we are autonomous 
and free. And because we are autonomous and free, we can act morally. Acting morally, to 
Kant, means to follow specific prescriptions. For him, to be morally good, it is not enough for an 
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act to “conform with the moral law, but it must also be done for its sake” (1998, p. 6). Kant 
distinguishes motives that can be represented completely by reason alone a priori, and thus 
count as moral, from merely empirical motives that follow the person’s preferences and express 
her interests in pursuing her own ends, such as happiness. 
Kant’s project was an attempt to construct a supreme principle of morality. This principle, 
the categorical imperative, is unlike hypothetical imperatives, which state what one ought to do if 
desiring a specific end. Categorical imperatives, instead, provide the form of every moral act. 
This is so because, for Kant 
an action from duty has its moral worth not in the purpose that is to be attained 
by it, but in the maxim according to which it is resolved upon, and thus it does not 
depend on the actuality of the object of the action, but merely on the principle of 
willing according to which … the action is done. (1998, p. 15) 
Kant arrives, in his explorations into the metaphysic of morals, at a single categorical 
imperative: “Act only according to that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it 
become a universal law” (1998, p. 34). After Kant develops the notion of human beings as ends 
in themselves and not merely as means, the categorical imperative took the formula, “So act 
that you use humanity, in your own person as well as in the person of any other, always at the 
same time as an end, never merely as a means” (p. 41). Kant also developed the notion of 
autonomy such that every rational being is viewed as “a will universally legislating through all its 
maxims” (p. 44). I will not go into detail to explicate a critique or defense of Kant’s moral theory; 
I will just follow through what Hegel had to say while developing his own position regarding the 
moral worldview. 
I will present in what follows three dialectical movements Hegel presented in 
“Conscience. The ‘beautiful soul,’ evil and its forgiveness,” starting with (a) exposing the 
antinomies of Kant’s moral theory to explicate the moral view of conscience. Then I will move to 
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(b) the doubts experienced by the self of conscience and by recognizing others, and then the 
abolition of doubt through recognition in language. Finally, (c) I will explicate conscience in 
action through presenting the contradictions and hypocrisy, unmasking the hypocrisy, and 
attaining reconciliation through forgiveness.  
 (a) Kant’s antinomies, and conscience. Hegel (1977, pp. 632–638) starts by calling out 
the contradictions in Kant’s moral theory as it becomes a worldview. It seems antimonial, Hegel 
asserts, to think of a moral consciousness that is free and yet not be able to think of that being 
in itself. It is also contradictory to assume duty lying beyond the self and yet expecting the self to 
be moral. To Hegel, attributing moral validity to the non-moral consciousness and moral 
responsibility to the will of a contingent knower both seem inconsistent with truth. Instead, at this 
stage of development of moral worldview, conscience rejected these ideas, reabsorbed the 
outside transcendent into itself, and took itself as a valid moral being. Conscience takes as truth 
reality and as harmony its immediate particular existence as an actual and, at the same time, 
pure duty and pure knowing. 
Before moving to explicate the essence of conscience, Hegel reminds us of the two 
previous stages of development for the moral worldview. First, there is the legal person who 
exists merely through being, acknowledged by others as being right. Second, there is the free 
self that is the product of culture. Between the two, moral self-consciousness oscillates. And 
then appears conscience as a self-assured immediacy and authentic existence. Here, self-
consciousness attains its truth and supersedes the division between the in-itself (for Kant, 
noumena) and the self. It transcends the breach between pure ends and nature. In this unity, 
consciousness does not rely, in its decision, on arbitrary standards. It is, rather, immediately 
moral as it acts. 
A moral action is an objective reality for consciousness as a knowing and acting 
consciousness. Consciousness knows it as such inwardly and immediately in a concrete 
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manner. When acting, consciousness does not dissect the case and examine the circumstances 
as a diversity of duties. If it examines the multiplicity of duties, then it will either not act in order 
to not violate some duties, or it will act and thus violate at least a few. Instead,  
in the simple moral action of conscience, duties are lumped together in such a 
way that all these single entities are straight away demolished, and the sifting of them in 
the steadfast certainty of conscience to ascertain what our duty is, simply does not take 
place. (Hegel, 1977, p. 386) 
Conscience renounces the thoughts of duty and reality as contradictory. Here is the 
paradox that is transcended by conscience: the person acts morally when she is aware of 
performing pure duty and nothing but pure duty. However, because pure duty is a mere 
abstraction of thought, and thus nothingness, the person only acts morally when she does not 
act at all. When the person acts, she is aware of a social body (an “other”), of the reality that 
exists already, and of the realities she desires to produce. She also has specific purposes and is 
fulfilling a specific, rather than universal and pure, duty. In acting, conscience brings unity out of 
this apparent contradiction. And here, the contradiction of pure duty and particular act is 
resolved. 
(b) Doubts, then recognition through language. Hegel (1977, pp. 643–644, 648–658) 
pushes the dialectical movement forward to bring out the doubt endured by conscience 
regarding whether other consciences truly endorse her determination. First, conscience must 
consider the different duties that come in concrete cases, although no one has authority for 
them. Conscience itself determines what would override this, and in this process, its own 
inclinations and impulses play a role. Here, conscience relies on self-certainty as the pure 
immediate truth in which it is immediately certain of itself. The content here counts as a duty and 
as a moral essentiality. However, once the duty is fulfilled as specific, and thus attains a specific 
content, it becomes removed from the knowing of the acting conscience and the identity with it. 
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As it attains being, the action becomes a specific action and loses the element of self-
consciousness, and it may not be acknowledged by the other as duty. Here, conscience 
oscillates again between its self-certainty and self-doubt derived from the reaction of others. It is 
true that the conscientious person trusts in her own integrity since she knows it immediately. As 
an other, and being free of the specificity of duty, just like everyone else, she cannot tell if others 
are being morally good or bad when they act. To protect herself, she comes to believe others 
are but the products of morally bad consciousness. Thus, for others, 
What conscience place before them, they themselves know how to ‘displace’ or 
dissemble; it is something expressing only the self of another, not their own self: 
not only do they know themselves to be free from it, but they must dispose of it in 
their own consciousness, nullify it by judging and explaining it in order to 
preserve their own self. (Hegel 1977, p. 395) 
Thus, to others, when it is no longer recognized as duty, acts are viewed, just like any 
ordinary reality, as an expression of personal preference and the fulfillment of the person’s 
desires and pleasure. It is only a moral act when it is known as the self-expression of 
conscientious individuality. This being known as such is what is acknowledged by others. What 
is acknowledged is only the person’s expressed self-consciousness in utterance and not the 
effect of the action. It is in language that social objectivity, or what Hegel calls “Spirit,” exists. In 
language, self-consciousness exists for an other and is immediately present and universal. 
Through language, Ego recognizes the ego status of another person, “which as pure ‘I’=‘I’ 
becomes objective to itself” (Hegel 1977, p. 395) and the two transcend their separate 
individuality through recognizing one another. 
With conscience, the content of the language is “the self that knows itself as essential 
being. This alone is what is declared, and this declaration is the true actuality of the act, and the 
validating of the action” (Hegel 1977, p. 396). Conscience announces its conviction of duty, and 
with that announcement, the action is duty. The action counts as duty only when the conviction 
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is declared as such. What matters is only that others are assured that conscience is assured of 
doing duty. Here, to question a man whether his act is duty is a meaningless demand because  
the self’s immediate knowing that is certain of itself is law and duty. Its intention, through 
being its own intention, is what is right; all that is required is that it should know this, and 
should state its conviction that its knowing and willing are right. (Hegel 1977, p. 397) 
If a person asserts that she is acting conscientiously, then she is. 
(c) Acting conscience, hypocrisy, and reconciliation. Hegel considers conscience in a 
specific act. Here, he points to two antitheses: first is the one between the doer’s individuality 
and the universal, and the second is one between the individuality of the doer and the 
individuality of another consciousness. The first antithesis, between the individuality of the doer 
and the universal10, comes from the fact that pure duty is a universal, while the specific 
individuality is exempt from the universal. It is consciousness of the actor that provides this 
empty duty with specific content. She gets the content from herself as a particular self, 
specifically from its natural individuality. With this individual consciousness, in the purpose of the 
action, she is aware of her particular self. Thus, here appears to this consciousness the 
antithesis of duty as a universality and its reflection out of universality into this particular self. 
In addition to this antithesis taking place in the inner being of conscience between the 
particular and the universal, there is also an external antithesis that exists between the 
particular individuality and another individual. There is a disparity between what the person is in 
himself and what is first expressed for an other. Consciousness holds firmly to duty and 
declares its action to conform with duty; however, because of the disparity between the 
universal and the inner being of the particular individuality, and as consciousness merely 
declares its action to conform with itself at the same time as being duty, it is judged from the 
position of universal consciousness to be hypocrisy. 
                                                          
10 The separation here is between the sense of self of the individual and the doctrine or rule-set or fixed method. 
(conversation with Phil Carspecken) 
60 
 
The acting conscience is hypocrisy and, thus, a bad conscience11; as a result, this 
hypocrisy must be unmasked. Resolving this disparity is not a fait accompli, because hypocrisy, 
Hegel explains, “demonstrates its respect for duty and virtue just by making a show of them, 
and using them as a mask to hide itself from its own consciousness, no less than from others” 
(Hegel, 1977, p. 401). Yet, acknowledging hypocrisy by the self does not in and of itself imply a 
correspondence or identity between the self as known and the self in itself, or one can say 
between the me and the I. This hypocrisy uses what is its essence only as a mere being for 
another and implies its disregard and contempt for that essence, exposing to others only its lack 
of any meaningful or substantial being. This is the essence of hypocrisy, that is, to let itself be 
used only as a show and as an external instrument while lacking any importance in its own self. 
The identity and correspondence between the self as known and the self in itself do not 
occur from the one-sided unrecognized persistence of the bad consciousness or from being 
judged by the universal consciousness, the other. They do not occur even through having the 
doer assert its bad attitude and announce her acceptance of being bad and in antithesis of the 
universal duty if this assertion does not yet correspond with what the other knows or 
acknowledge of her. She confesses that she is wrong because the hypocrisy would be 
abolished as she unmasks herself for the other. In her confession, she would admit to being bad 
by making clear that she is acting in opposition to her acknowledged universal, and she is truly 
acting in accordance with her own conscience’s inner law. This inner law of conscience is only 
the law of the single individuality and caprice, and that is what makes it peculiar to the acting 
person and specifically to her internally as opposed to being a universally acknowledged law. 
                                                          
11 Hegel uses words like “evil,” “wicked,” “base,” “vile,” and similar terms denoting extreme moral 
statuses. I chose to replace these words with less strong ones to maintain a voice the modern reader can 
relate to. The religious connotation in many of these words is clear. Also, there is clear reference to limit 
cases of being unable to access a good act or the desire to do harm to others in clear contrast with the 
state of being recognized as universally right. It may not be far from what Hegel is alluding to thinking of 
the existential conditions of our human agency as pushing away the possibility of being extremely bad 
and striving for, yet not attaining, the status of being absolutely moral. 
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When someone acts based on her own law as opposed to others’ laws, she is saying she is 
considering her law the right one and theirs the wrong one. But because the universal is only an 
element of the existence of actual conscience, the actual conscience does not continue to 
oppose this universal in its willing and knowing; on the contrary, language announces the action 
to be an acknowledged duty.  
The judgment and unmasking does not abolish hypocrisy, either. When the other 
consciousness denounces the hypocrisy of the acting conscience as bad and wrong doing, she 
is following her own law in this judgment, just like the judged bad conscience was appealing to 
her own law. The law referred to by the judging consciousness comes in direct opposition to the 
law the judged consciousness was following when she acted; thus, it is only another particular 
law and has no superiority over the first. As Hegel puts it,  
It passes off such judging, not as another manner of being wicked, but as the correct 
consciousness of the action, setting itself up in this unreality and conceit of knowing well 
and better above the deeds it discredits, and wanting its words without deed to be taken 
for a superior kind of reality. (Hegel, 1977, p. 405) 
On the contrary, as a particular law itself, it stands on the same footing with the law of the acting 
consciousness and gives it legitimacy. The judgment comes to show that the genuine and true 
duty that should be acknowledged as universal is not acknowledged. However, it does the very 
opposite because it only appeals to its particular law, and with that, she licenses the other and 
gives her the right to act in a way that appeals to her own law as well. 
Hegel points to another aspect of this judgment and explores the position of the other 
consciousness. The judging consciousness is aware of the universal (i.e., what is common 
between the two as beings) in her relationship to the bad consciousness; however, since she 
does not behave as the actual doer did, she is not entangled in the contradiction between the 
universality and the individuality every actor is trapped in. The judging consciousness remains in 
the universality of abstract thoughts and behaves only like a consciousness that apprehends. 
Her first action is that of mere judgment. In this judgment, however, she places herself 
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alongside the first acting consciousness, and through this similarity, she comes to view herself 
in the other consciousness. While the judging consciousness does not act and remains only in 
the passive attitude of apprehension, she is also in her own contradiction with herself as 
consciousness who determines for herself and as the absolute will of duty. It manages to stay 
pure because she does not act. Thus, it is hypocrisy, because she does not act, and instead, 
wants its judgment to be considered an actual deed; and instead of proving her moral 
correctness by acting, she does so by making judgment and uttering sentiments. The nature of 
the judging consciousness is the same as that of the doer—both make duty a matter of 
language and uttered words, the doer through having a selfish purpose for her actions, and the 
judge through not acting at all, although she recognizes that acting is essential in any duty 
because duty without an act is merely an uttered meaninglessness. 
However, judging is not exclusively a negative abstract but can also be looked upon as a 
positive act of thought, with positive content. Looking at judgment as a positive act of the 
apprehending consciousness makes the identity with the judged acting consciousness more 
clear. Here, we have the first acting consciousness announcing its specific action to be a duty, 
while the judging consciousness denies this because duty is a universal in its form and, as such, 
lacks any specific content, although any content can count as a duty. In a sense, any concrete 
action, with its many facets, contains a universal aspect that can be taken as a duty and also 
contains particular aspects that constitute the interests and the share of the acting individual. 
The consciousness that judges does not accept the universal aspect of the duty nor the position 
of the consciousness that acts although she recognizes that the acting one knows this as her 
duty and that is truly the status and condition of her reality. The judging consciousness, instead, 
looks only at the action itself and explains it to be the result of the intentions of the actor that are 
based purely on selfish motives. The judging consciousness omits the fact that every action can 
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be looked at from the viewpoint of its conformity to duty, just as it can be looked at from the 
viewpoint of its conformity with the particularity of the doer, that is, her motives and intentions. 
The judging consciousness takes what she can see of the act, which is the outer 
existence, and interprets the inner aspect of the act to be only that. For example, if the action 
brings fame to the actor, the inner aspect is judged to be purely a desire for fame. If the action 
raises the status of the actor, its inner aspect is judged to be ambition. If the action brings to the 
doer happiness or joy, those two become what drives the doer. This judgment applies to every 
action since  
No action can escape such judgment, for duty for duty’s sake, this pure purpose, is an 
unreality; it becomes a reality in the deed of an individuality, and the action is thereby 
charged with the aspect of particularity. No man is a hero to his valet; not, however, 
because the man is not a hero, but because the valet—is a valet, whose dealings are 
with the man, not as a hero, but as one who eats, drinks, and wears clothes, in general, 
with his individual wants and fancies. (Hegel, 1977, p. 404) 
No action can escape the judgment of the moral valet toward the agent, where the judging 
consciousness brings the universal aspects of the deed to oppose the personal aspect of the 
individuality. 
The judging consciousness, as she judges, is truly the bad one. She divides the action 
into its universal aspect and its particular aspect—meaning into the sides that are in conformity 
with duty and the sides that are in conformity with the person’s selfish motives—and she fixedly 
holds to the distinction between these two sides. She is the even worse morally than her 
counterpart and rather hypocritical herself since she makes these judgments while presenting 
herself not as a bad person who is merely judging out of spite but as the correct consciousness 
who knows the action better and takes a position higher than the deed, claiming a reality to her 
judgment and a status to her words without deeds that are above the act of the doer. The acting 
consciousness, on the other hand, comes to perceive the judging consciousness as the same 
as herself and not as an alien consciousness that is disparate from her. She sees the other as 
acting in accord with her own disposition and nature and, thus, identical to herself. As she 
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perceives this identity, she acknowledges it and confesses this realization (i.e., the identity) to 
the other, expecting equal recognition and confession. She does not make the confession out of 
a feeling of humiliation and does not throw herself away in relation to the other because of a low 
regard of oneself; her utterance of the confession about the perceived identity is not a unilateral 
act. Rather, she does so only because she realizes this identity with the other. As she makes 
the confession and gives utterance to this identity, she gives it an objective reality in language. 
When she confesses, she expects the other to contribute her part to this objective existence and 
utter a similar recognition of the common identity. 
However, when the acting consciousness, who sees herself as bad, acknowledges this 
and makes the confession to the other by saying, “I am bad!” she does not receive what she 
expects. She does not get a similar, reciprocal confession from her identical other. The judging 
consciousness has something completely different in mind. In judging, she has a notion quite 
contrary to identity; rather, she repels the community of nature and rejects continuity with the 
other, and thus actualizes the position of the hard heart.  
And here, the situation completely reverses! As the confessing consciousness perceives 
the repulsion, she judges the other as wrong. For her, the other has refused to allow her inner 
self to come into an objective existence in language and has instead kept to herself while 
denying throwing herself away for the other person. At the same time, the hard heart observes 
in herself only the self-knowledge and, in the opposition to the other, holds only thought, without 
allowing herself to have continuity with the other who, as she made the confession, gave up her 
separateness and transcended her particularity, positing herself as a universal into a continuity 
with the other. The hard heart, however, keeps for and within herself her uncommunicative 
being and continues confronting the confessing consciousness with the same uncommunicative 
being despite the fact that the confessing one has thrown her uncommunicative being away. In 
so doing, the hard heart does not realize the contradiction and continues to produce the 
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disparity, thus preventing the other from returning from the deed into an existence in language 
and into an identity in the communicative acknowledged continuity. 
Now, the beautiful soul, the one that clings to an image of itself as self-certain without 
actualizing herself in a deed, has no objective existence because she does not have the 
capacity to give up her idealized knowledge of herself, nor can she have access to an image of 
her unity in or achieve a state of identity with the other. The identity of beautiful soul, instead, 
only comes in a negative form, without recognition from the other and without continuity with the 
other. Hegel beautifully describes her, saying,  
The ‘beautiful soul,’ lacking an actual existence, entangled in the contradiction between 
its pure self and the necessity of that self to externalize itself and change itself into an 
actual existence, and dwelling in the immediacy of this firmly held antithesis—an 
immediacy which alone in the middle term reconciling the antithesis, which has been 
intensified to its pure abstraction, and is pure being or empty nothingness—this ‘beautiful 
soul,’ then being conscious of this contradiction in its unreconciled immediacy, is 
disordered to the point of madness, wastes itself in yearning and pines away in 
consumption. (Hegel, 1977, p. 406–407) 
She gives away her being-for-self as she confesses, but gets nothing in return except the 
uncommunicative lack of acknowledgment of the unity of her mere being. 
The true (i.e., the existent and the self-conscious) equalization of the two sides, the 
beautiful soul and the hard heart, is necessitated and contained in this surrender. The hard 
heart goes through the exact same movement the beautiful soul went through. The self in that 
act is only a moment of the whole, as is the knowledge on which the judgment is based that 
distinguishes and separates the universal and the individual aspects of the action. The bad 
consciousness, as it confesses, posits itself as it sees itself in the other, but when she does not 
receive the recognition, she “surrenders its one-sided, unacknowledged existence of its 
particular being-for-self” (Hegel, 1977, p. 407), and so the other similarly surrenders her 
unrecognized judgment. 
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The beautiful soul also gives up the thought that divides the two because she has 
already seen herself in the other. She has already superseded her particular consciousness and 
displayed herself as a universal, and thus, she returns into herself from her actual external 
existences as a universal consciousness that recognizes herself. This forgiveness is not limited 
to the self but extends to the other, and in this forgiveness, the consciousness renounces her 
unreal essential being that she puts on the same level with the other in the action and 
acknowledges that the action, that which was characterized as bad, is truly good. It even gives 
up the subjectively determined judgment as the other also gives up her subjective 
characterization of the act. For Hegel, “The word of reconciliation is the objectively existent 
Spirit, which beholds the pure knowledge of itself qua absolutely self-contained and exclusive 
individuality—a reciprocal recognition which is Absolute Spirit” (1977, p. 408).    . 
 
Second reflection 
Here, I will reconstruct a few of the main arguments presented in the section on Hegel 
with an eye to reconciliation and synthesis with Habermas’s theory of communicative action. I 
will reflect first on Hegel’s explication of the contradictions of Kant’s moral theory. Then I will 
move to elaborate on the act of judging. I will end with some thoughts on language and its 
special place for Hegel. 
Hegel writes his section on morality with reference to Kant’s critical philosophy in general 
and moral theory specifically. He starts with the insight that the person acts with awareness of 
performing pure duty, but quickly discovers that such an action for duty alone is not possible. 
There is no duty for duty’s sake. For Hegel, duty can only become real and actualized in a deed 
that is particular. Kant’s idea that the person acts with accordance to universal law, Hegel 
described, led to a contradiction. Thinking of duty as a universal contradicting with individuality 
led to the impossibility for the person to be morally good if the person acts, or led to the person 
67 
 
not acting at all. Solutions of the kind of projecting pure duty into a holy being or secularizing 
duty in the notion of the general will of the group left duty far beyond the individual. This 
externalization of duty made the person, before conviction, be recognized as moral only through 
an act of grace from an other (e.g., a transcendent God). Instead of these externalizations and 
contradictions, conscience comes to the scene of acts of conviction and is, thus, immediately 
moral. 
Rather than contemplating acting for duty and going through calculations and reasoning, 
conscience simply acts out of her own conviction. With conviction, knowledge takes the form of 
an immediate knowing, feeling, and being—an immediacy that is internal to the self-certainty of 
the individual. Conviction unites individuality with universality in an actual act not by reasoning 
and thinking about duty but by being and acting with self-certainty. In conviction, there is no 
longer an actualization of consciousness that can be separate from duty nor one that considers 
duty and individuality as contradictory. Instead, the self feels and knows itself in her existence 
and actualizes duty in particular acts. Conviction is pure knowing, the person’s own knowing. It 
is internal to the singular person who is the only one with privileged access to knowing and the 
experience. Conviction is not a state of existence prior to an action. Conviction is the form of 
being experienced as acting, the self-certain pure doing and pure knowing as if it contains an 
element of “mine.” The individuality of consciousness that acts is taken up as part of the 
universality of self-certainty. 
The universality of pure duty, for Hegel, should not be understood as some fixed rules or 
doctrines that prescribe what duty is nor as a method people can apply to judge their actions. It 
is true that this divide between the universal and the actual has been the characteristic of 
previous forms of being, which Hegel highlights in the phenomenology. For conscience, 
however, the universal is experienced in a different manner. The universal here is identical to 
self-knowledge and self-certainty. Knowledge is not about knowing something but is knowing in 
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the form of being. The person announces that she is acting of conviction, and thus, she is 
conscientious when the other is ensured that she is ensured of her acting conscientiously. Her 
moral act is thus recognized as such by others. 
When conscience acts with conviction, the self enters into existence as self. The self-
assured self-consciousness exists as self-assured for others. The immediate action is not what 
is acknowledged. What the other acknowledges is not the determinate aspect of the action nor 
the action’s intrinsic being. What the other acknowledges is the self-knowing self as self-
knowing. The element that lasts in the action is that of the self through acknowledgment. The 
element of lasting being cannot be the effect, because the effect cannot endure as a lasting 
being the way the subject endures when recognized in action. The effect acquires no 
permanence. Only self-consciousness that is acknowledged obtains lasting existence. 
Hegel examines two contradictions: one internally between the individuality and the 
universal, and one externally between the individuality of the person and other individual 
consciousnesses. The first contradiction is what convictions allow the person to transcend only 
to fall into the second if the self-certain self, assured of its conviction, is not acknowledged as 
such by another self-consciousness. The other self-consciousness, however, has the existential 
reason of preserving herself for not acknowledging the conviction of the other and for calling out 
her hypocrisy. 
Let’s look closely at judging. Because conviction is a state that is accessible only to the 
person herself while she is acting, after the act, the action attains an objective being on its own 
and separates from the person’s conviction. The action thus becomes an object of appraisal to 
the person herself and to every other. As an action, it carries the contradiction between what the 
person does for duty and what she does for her own pleasure and interest. Here, we have two 
options: the person can either not act, and thus preserve her purity, or act and thus fall into this 
contradiction. ‘Beautiful soul’ clings to an image of herself that is pure. She does not act and, 
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rather, progressively withdraws from acting into a contemplative mode. She becomes to herself, 
and herself alone, a divine worship and pure self-certainty. On the other hand, conscience acts 
and thus becomes bad conscience. 
Now the action is put to appraisal. The contradictions between the multiple duties among 
which the person needs to choose, on the one side, and the person’s desires and inclinations, 
on the other, come to be clear to herself and to any other person. The person raises a claim to 
acting of conviction and thus being moral. Yet, she knows that the content of the act is 
determined, at least to an extent, by the caprice of her individual existence and conditions. She 
realizes her hypocrisy. The other self-consciousness, having access and insight to her own 
inclinations, desires, and contradictions, knows that the other must be entangled in similar 
contradictions when she acts. Thus, to preserve herself, she judges the other as acting for mere 
empirical motives. 
According to Hegel, the motive for judging is preserving one’s own self. Alter judges 
Ego’s action and explains it as coming from empirical motives rather than from moral motives, 
and thus nullifies Ego’s claim to unconditional valid moral action. With this judgment, Alter 
preserves herself. It is as if the moral action of the other is actually a threat to the self of the 
other. Here, we see again remnants of the master and slave dialectics where the two self-
consciousnesses fight to death to attain the other’s recognition, the giving of which to the other 
means the annihilation of the self. Hegel gives the reason why, at this stage of dialectics, it is 
still a threat to the person to acknowledge the moral reasoning of the other. 
When someone acts based on her own law and convictions, as opposed to the other’s 
law, she is asserting that she considers her law the right one and the other’s the wrong one. For 
the other to judge her as wrong, she is preserving herself through that same assertion. The 
judging consciousness further protects her position by attacking the other’s doing/knowing/being 
and exposing her contradiction as a sign of hypocrisy and lower moral status. She also allows 
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the acting person no opportunity to judge her simply because she, as the judge, does not act 
but only utters judgments. Yet, the judging consciousness does not acknowledge that the same 
rules apply to her. The judging consciousness is on the same footing of hypocrisy as the one 
she is judging for two reasons. First, according to Hegel, at this stage of the dialectic, the 
judging consciousness wants her talk to be considered at the same level as the deed she 
judges, which is wrong; acting is not at the same level as talking about acting. Second, she 
judges the other based on her own laws, an act that only validates the acting person’s right to 
act on her own law as well and thus cancels the ground of judgment. Both of these points are 
denied by the judging consciousness, although they are clear to the one being judged. 
Clearly, for Hegel, judgment is viewed dialectically first as a talk, not a deed, and then it 
comes to be considered as a deed in itself. At first appearance, the person who judges seems 
to not be acting. But that is only a moment in the dialectical movement. She soon realizes that 
her judgment is an act and has an effect on the other even though it takes place only in 
language. Her judgment is an act by virtue of its susceptibility to being judged. Here is how 
language appears to be the space that constitutes acting and judging. Language, notably, has a 
special place in Hegel’s dialectic. Language is the existence of “Spirit,” or what we can call the 
social objectivity (using Hyppolite’s terms), culture, and self-moving collectivity. Language is the 
unfolding mind of society that is active and moves yet can be objectified. 
In language, self-consciousness is present immediately, and at the same time, it is 
universal. Language expresses the self and yet is expressed by the self. Language preserve’s 
the self’s universality and expresses its particularity. Everything in language is universal. We 
cannot come to the particular in language (as Hegel outlined very early in the phenomenology of 
sense-certainty), yet the subject does express her particularity in language. Here, in language, 
the self that separated from others comes to see itself in the other and finds in the other her 
equal, actualizing the “I”= “I.” With this recognition, the self gains objectivity, as opposed to only 
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universal existence as being. This objectivity preserves the particularity of the self while it 
comes to be a unity with the other person that is recognizing and as they come to form a we/us 
and realize their self-consciousness. Self-consciousness preserves itself and is preserved by 
others in language. This perceiving of the self by the other is self-existence and becoming a 
self. 
We see language and recognition come repetitively with conscience. First, conscience 
announces that she is acting from conviction. This announcement and the recognition of her 
announcement are what makes her act moral. Second, conscience becomes aware of her 
hypocrisy and confesses. Recognizing that confession would allow the self to form a unity while 
maintaining individuality. Both the announcement and the confession are made in language. 
Judging the self as acting for personal desires and inclinations (rather than being moral) and 
refusing to acknowledge the confession also take place in language. 
Here, at this stage of the dialectic, we see in language that the master–slave dialectic 
relation structure (i.e., the fight between two self-consciousnesses risking their lives to attain the 
other’s recognition) is potentially resolved in recognition or continued in a new medium without 
annihilating the opponents when denying recognition. Language is the medium for recognition 
and for denying recognition. Language is therefore the existence of the spirit, the group, the 
we/us, the coalesced self-consciousnesses that preserves the self of the individual. Thus, 
language resolves contradictions between persons. For Hegel, our actions claim the validity of 
our essence as universality. Actions resolve in language the existential contradictions of pre-
linguistics. When we speak, our individuality determines what we say. What we say also speaks 
of our individuality and who we are. What we say and who we are have meaning only when 
acknowledged by possible hearers. And this is how the spoken “I” gains a universal existence 
while maintaining a link to the individual “I.” This is also how pure duty, the universal that here 
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also takes the form of the experience of one’s true being and knowing, becomes actualized with 
acknowledged speech. 
Final reflection 
Habermas distinguished between communicative actions, oriented toward 
understanding, and strategic actions, oriented toward consequences. The aim of this paper has 
been to explore some of the themes presented by Hegel’s explication of morality in order to add 
to the conversation on this distinction and to elaborate on related concepts. Hegel employed 
what can be viewed as parallel distinctions when exploring actions and judgments. There is also 
elaboration on self-certainty and intersubjective recognition; both concepts are salient for 
Habermas. Language as a medium of asserting oneself and as the medium for recognition are 
notions present for both. Bringing in Hegel enriches the conversation around the existential 
aspects of acting, knowing, and being. 
To put it simply, for both Habermas and Hegel, it takes two consciousness for any social 
action; that is, for knowing things in the world, acting normatively, and expressing oneself 
authentically—or in other words, for an act of conviction that brings together knowing and being. 
For Habermas, a single consciousness cannot bring about resolutions: one person cannot by 
herself come to know, cannot act normatively, cannot express an authentic self. It is the same 
thing for Hegel, who shows that it takes two self-consciousnesses to resolve the paradoxes of 
our existence. The other self-consciousness is a necessary condition, yet, as we found, it is not 
sufficient by itself. It also takes the language being employed by the two communicatively. The 
ideal situation is where Alter and Ego are confronting one another as hearer and speaker of a 
language they understand. They conscientiously act with conviction; they communicatively act, 
which means they actualize their particularity and the universal. They assert their knowing and 
doing to one another; in other words, they raise criticizable universalized validity claims to truth, 
rightness, and truthfulness that are vindicated for one another. The other is ensured that they 
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are self-certain, or essentially, they comprehend the act, accept the validity claims, and take it 
that the acting person is credible to vindicate these claims discursively when necessary. When 
errors occur or irrationality ensues, they are confessed, and the other acknowledges the 
confession to allow a unity to form again. 
Many of the Hegelian notions can be relevant to enrich those of Habermas. The concept 
of conviction is not unrelated to the notion of raising universal validity claims in illocutionary acts 
that are binding and bonding. The subject acts with conviction if she actualizes her self-certainty 
in the act. She knows as she acts. She raises claims to a rightness that is universal. She 
announces her self-certainty of her authentic and truthful self and asserts that her knowing is 
true universally, as far as she knows. Acknowledging this conviction of an other is not a mere 
passive use of words. Acknowledging a conviction can also be viewed as a parallel act of 
conviction. This can be translated to Habermas’s language by referring to an agreement that is 
reached by achieving mutual understanding and accepting the validity conditions of the act’s 
truth, truthfulness, and rightness. When Alter is moved by reason to link up her commitments to 
those of Ego, the rationally motivated agreement between the two comes to be binding and 
bonding to both. Alter makes judgments and take positions. Her position has consequences for 
her acts and her whole being. That is also why Alter could come, according to Hegel, to 
perceive Ego’s communicative act as a threat at first and, thus, attempts to explain it away. I will 
elaborate this point after explicating the notion of judgment. 
Alter’s judgments, looked at from the perspective of the participants, are also acts. Let’s 
take first three speech acts and their corresponding affirmative responses from a hearer. A 
speaker makes a request with, “You are requested to stop smoking,” and a hearer, judging the 
request as normatively authorized, responds, “Yes, I shall comply.” A speaker makes a 
confession with, “I confess to you that I find your action loathsome,” and a hearer, judging the 
confession as truthful, responds, “Yes, I believe you do.” A speaker makes a prediction with, “I 
74 
 
can predict that the vacation will be spoiled by rain,” and a hearer acknowledges its truth by 
saying, “Yes, we’ll have to take that into account.” The announced judgments, the 
acknowledgment of the normative rightness of the first claim, truthfulness of the second, and 
truth of the third, become themselves speech acts of their own. Similarly, a negative judgment is 
also an act. Let’s now take the hearer’s negative responses to the request “Please bring me a 
glass of water,” criticizing its normative rightness with, “No, you cannot treat me like one of your 
employees,” or its truthfulness with, “No, you only want to put me in a bad light in front of other 
participants,” and its truth with, “No, the next water tap is so far away that I could not get back 
before the end of the session.” In her announced judgments, the hearer is also performing an 
act. Judging is acting. Any judgment can be raised with a claim that can be thematized as “I 
hereby judge your act/utterance as truthful/untruthful, right/not right, true/untrue.” This judgment, 
as an action, can itself be judged by a hearer as adequate or inadequate, sincere or insincere, 
and its truth grounds as true or untrue.12  
Hegel, however, did not always see judging at the same level as acting. He criticized the 
judging consciousness for wanting her judgment to be considered at the same level as the 
deed, thus being hypocritical, implying that judging is a mere utterance of words and not a true 
action. He, however, quickly comes to assert that because the acting consciousness heard the 
judgment of the judging consciousness, she treated her as an equal, implying that a person who 
acts and a person who judges do similar things and thus stand on equal footing. He also raises 
claims to the equality of the two sides by announcing that the essence of acting morally and the 
essence of judging are nothing but asserting via words the conviction and the judgment, 
respectively. Further clarification might be called for to find out if reconciling the two positions is 
possible. I will not dive into how, from the perspective of consciousness as an object-knower 
and then as actor, judging can be thought of as a moment in a dialectical movement, thus taking 
                                                          
12 The examples are taken from Habermas’ Theory of Communicative Action (1984), pages 296 and 306.  
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different meaning at different stages. This is true and relevant to the multiple positions of 
knowing, but I would like here to invite Habermas’s distinction between the illocutionary act and 
the perlocutionary effect to shed some light on this matter. Inviting Habermas’s speech act 
explications allows us to move back to the distinction between communicative action and 
strategic action, to which we will bring some Hegelian insights. 
It is well known by now that Habermas distinguished between the content of the speech 
act (locution), the mode of the speech act (illocution), and the speech act effect (perlocution). 
Austin’s catchphrase “to say something (locution–p, or that p), to act in saying something 
(illocution–Mp), and to bring about something through acting in saying something (perlocution)” 
is still relevant. Habermas, in his more recent work, further clarified the concepts of 
perlocutionary effects and distinguished three types: effect1 results grammatically from the 
content of a successful illocutionary act (e.g., executed command, kept promise, realized 
declared intention, etc.); effect2 is grammatically nonregulated and only contingently appears as 
a consequence of the speech act, yet it occurs only as the result of the illocutionary success 
(e.g., a piece of news frightening a hearer, resistance encountered after an announcement, 
etc.); effect3 can only be achieved in an inconspicuous manner when it comes to the hearer and 
from whom its success remains latent (e.g., an unannounced yet intended promotion achieved 
for an agent as a result of her persuading a customer to buy a product, etc.). This distinction is 
relevant to Habermas as he defines communicative action as that in which interlocutors pursue 
their illocutionary actions without reservations. It is also relevant to distinguishing strategic 
actions in which language use acquires the pattern of perlocution, meaning that it follows the 
actors’ unilateral orientation to consequences. Strategic actions, however, are only possible if 
actors feed parasitically on common linguistic competency learned in the context of 
communicative actions. 
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This brings us again to the issue of acting and judging. When Ego acts, she asserts that 
she is acting with conviction. An alter ego can take the participant position, and with a 
performative attitude, acknowledge the assertion and accept the moral act as right and 
normatively authorized. When she does that, she also acknowledges the person as being 
authentic, truthful, and self-certain. She can also maintain the same performative attitude and 
judge the act as wrong or coming from personal motives. Such negative judgment can then be 
offered to Ego, who can accept it, and thus reflect on her authenticity and truthfulness; adapt 
her normative commitments, acknowledge the contradiction, and amend it; or deny the 
judgment and give reasons to support her claim for the moral rightness and truthfulness of her 
act. Ego is also entitled to take a critical attitude regarding Alter’s judgment. Ego can question 
the validity of the judgment, a critique that Alter then comes to defend her (judging) position 
against. As mentioned above, because the act is that of conviction, Ego and Alter both know 
that when they acknowledge as valid the acceptability conditions of the other’s act, they are 
both obliged to accept the offered claim as true, right, and truthful and oblige its consequences. 
This obligation demands of them both to sometimes change commitments and modify 
convictions and, thus, leave the position of self-certainty and potentially change as a subject. 
With an orientation toward understanding, the discourse continues until the two succeed in 
arriving at mutual understanding and agreement. 
However, Alter Ego, rather than taking the performative attitude of a second person, 
could take the perspective of the third person and strategically judge the act. Alter comes with 
the end in mind of preserving herself. She knows that acknowledging the normative rightness of 
the other’s act demands she question and change her own commitments. Recognizing the truth 
claim of the other’s demands means changing her epistemic position. Recognizing the 
truthfulness of the other puts to question Alter Ego’s own truthfulness and sincerity simply as a 
mere other finite being. Thus, instead of having a dialogue with an orientation to understanding, 
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she comes with an orientation to success (i.e., achieving her ends of preserving herself). She 
explains the moral act of Ego as coming from empirical motives. She judges Ego as inauthentic 
and her acts as morally wrong. She denies Ego the acknowledgment of her asserted 
authenticity by playing the role of the valet toward the moral agent. No direct mutual 
understanding or agreement can be achieved with this attitude of preserving oneself even at the 
cost of injuring the other. To avoid such judgment that questions her convictions as a self, 
meaning her commitment to truth, rightness, and authenticity, Ego can simply resort to not 
acting, because anytime she acts, she is vulnerable to similar judgment from every other. The 
only time she is not judged is when she does not act. Or Ego can choose to act. When acting, 
Ego can quickly realize that Alter is also hypocritical for playing the role of the judge, which was 
only normatively authorized in a communicative action framework. This is so because, in a 
communicative rationality framework, which is the grounds for judging, the judge is demanded 
to surrender her critique to similar vindication. Holding a stiff-necked position takes the license 
for judging off the hands of the judge. Ego can choose to call out Alter’s hypocrisy and invite her 
to return to the communicative action grounds. It could happen, however, that Ego stays 
oblivious to Alter’s act, and Alter herself may not know that she is acting from spite. Alter’s 
motives could remain concealed from the other and even from herself. Here, learning from 
Hegel, Ego still has the option of acting communicatively and forgiving the other. 
Instead of holding to acting communicatively, Ego can also move to a strategic 
framework of action. In actuality, in every empirical act, there is a degree of this and a degree of 
that. There are also degrees of Ego or Alter being in the dark about what the other or the self is 
doing. This being in the dark, whether taking the form of being a victim of the other’s latent 
strategic act or simply being unaware of one’s own motives, is also part of the condition of our 
existence. We will never know for certain if a specific act was communicative or strategic. 
Humans develop the intuitive competency to act communicatively. They also develop the 
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competency to call out hypocrisy, both in themselves and in an other when they are treated 
strategically. Just as they have the competency to seek being unconditionally moral, they also 
have the competency for what Hegel calls being “evil.” But whether acting or judging, the person 
always does that with and to an other. 
For Habermas, we come to know how to form subject–object relations and subject–
subject relations through internalizing the no others raise to our speech acts. This does not 
simply mean the no we receive as a consequence of our empirical acts in an external world. 
Yes, there is that, which is how we learn to form relationships in the objective world, raising and 
testing truth claims. This is also how we understand simple imperatives. More importantly, it is, 
rather, the normative no that we learn to take in as we interact with social others and learn to 
take the position of a generalized other. Internalizing the position of an other who says no to our 
claims is what makes possible not only anticipating the reaction of another person in a social 
interaction but also reflecting on our own commitments in internal dialogue-like reflections with 
this internalized other. Hegel presents us with something similar in the dialectic of moral 
conscience. When the subject acts with conviction, she is enacting the universal in her particular 
act. She is only moral when her conviction is recognized by an other. Furthermore, in dialogue 
with an other, she calls out the hypocrisy in her own act and comes to criticize the critique by 
calling out the other’s hypocrisy. Even later, when the confession is not acknowledged, she 
attains a unity with the other indirectly through forgiveness. This movement, however, is not 
merely an existential relationship between subjects. Acting, judging, and recognizing can only 
be attained in the medium of language. 
Language has a special place for both Hegel and Habermas. It is the existence of Spirit 
and the objectivity of self-consciousnesses. We cannot exist outside language, although we are 
not simply determined by language. We are shaped by language, and we shape language. 
Language comes to provide resolutions to the existential intra-personal conflicts by taking the 
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conflict outside the mere subject, not to project it into a transcendent but to leave it between 
self-consciousnesses as they oscillate between the dependent and acknowledging roles. 
Language also comes to provide resolution of existentially contradictory inter-personal relational 
structures of a kind similar to the master–slave struggle. Here and there, however, while 
language does not resolve the existential divide once and for all, it provides ways out. It is for 
the person to genuinely take up the path provided by language and participate in its original 
form, that is communicatively, or choose to use language only as another tool for the person’s 
own ends, only to fall back into the many antinomies within the self and with others. 
But even those who use language strategically cannot exist outside language. Language 
resists its use as a mere tool. The hypocrisy, using the communicative structure of language for 
latent interest, is called out and unmasked in language. Unmasking this hypocrisy is not a 
matter of calling the person “wicked” or “evil,” but is an act of forgiveness that brings a unity for 
the self and the other. This forgiveness and the love that is attained thereafter, however, are 
only accessible to those who act, those who fall in hypocrisy. 
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The Second Paper: Critical Dialogues and Reflections in Medicine and Medical 
Education 
 
Introduction  
Video reviews have become an essential tool in medical education. Educators have 
used such tools for evaluation and learning for decades. Since the first report on the use of 
videotapes in education, published in the late 50s, video reviews have proliferated into many 
forms and shapes. The present study contributes a theoretical framework for the use of video 
reviews and offers a working model. Both the theoretical framework and working model are 
situated within the traditions of critical social theory.   
Modern medicine has been viewed as a technical discipline. By “technical,” I do not 
mean the use of technology to diagnose an illness, determine a cause, or treat a disease. I 
mean that the scope of the discipline has been reduced largely to instrumentally solving or 
managing health problems, and thus the working of the medical professional has been reduced 
to the application of technical skills. In parallel with these reductive views of the discipline, 
medical education has been reduced to the acquisition of technical skills, defined as medical 
reasoning, communication, and procedures. Learning within this narrower framework has 
become the taking in of feedback provided by a more skilled person and the changing of 
behaviors demonstrated to an observer.  
The limitation of this framework for learning, educating, and practicing is not that it is 
ineffective in treating health conditions and discovering the true cause of diseases, nor that it 
fails to train doctors who are competent in performing these tasks. The limitations exist precisely 
in being too focused on this effectiveness, taken for granted as constituting the objective 
aspects of our existence, while being blind to the subjective domain, to which only the person 
has privileged access, and social domain, in which we negotiate the norms and values that also 
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define who we are. Because we are in such despair for an alternative view, this project comes 
to explore just that.  
This project advances a dialogical and reflective framework, or more simply, a 
communicative framework, for understanding medicine, education, and learning. In this 
framework, dialogue is the paradigmatic mode of interaction, and language is the medium of 
dialogue. Success is achieved when at least two interlocutors engage in dialogue, using the 
medium of language to achieve understanding and agreement.  
Dialogue can take place between the two interlocutors or as a conversation with an 
internalized other in the form of reflection. This reflection can then be brought to bear on an 
external conversation with another participant. It is a practicing of medicine when the dialogue 
takes place between a patient and a doctor to understand the experience of the patient, come to 
a mutual agreement on the ends in mind, and together develop strategies to attain these ends. 
Reflection takes place to go beyond the describing of what takes place into what is felt, desired, 
and intended by the two subjects, the doctor and the patient; into the values and norms that 
authorize these ends; and into the reasons that make the named strategies a good fit.  
It is education and learning when the dialogue takes place between a learner and a 
more competent learner (or a so-called teacher) to understand what the learner is doing when 
she performs an action and comes to an agreement on judging the performance as adequate or 
inadequate based on rules, and if needed, how to learn to do it right and avoid pitfalls in a 
specific social context. Reflection comes to mean advancing the conversation to explicate the 
person’s identity positions, feelings, and desires and into the conditions that have shaped the 
person’s individuality. Reflection also means criticizing the rules that are being followed in a 
specific context by exploring the conditions of their truth and rightness.  
Finally, in this framework, medicine, education, and learning are not separate: medicine 
is practiced, as it is taught, by learners who are learning from and teaching other learners, who 
in turn are practicing as they are learning from and teaching their teachers. Practicing medicine, 
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educating, and learning become a contextualized unity.  In the following pages, I attempt to 
bring these notions to life as I discuss an exemplary form of this kind of learning: the use of 
video recordings of patient–doctor interactions for the purpose of reflection and dialogue 
between peer learners. This project will first engage critically with the literature and then present 
an empirical work using a theory-based model. I attempt to make theoretical, methodological, 
and empirical contributions with my project.  
The theoretical value of this project is its explication of the metatheoretical and 
theoretical foundations of doctor–patient interactions and the work of appraisal by attending 
physicians, peers, and the self, based on the framework of the theory of communicative action. 
The project’s methodological value is its reflective use of a critical qualitative research approach 
that allows access to first-, second-, and third-person perspectives on doctor–patient 
interactions and the education of residents. The empirical contribution of the project is its 
identification, from the perspective of residents and attending physicians, of what doctors should 
and should not do in a doctor–patient interaction. This ambitious project may result in a shift in 
thinking not only in the field of medical education but also in medicine at large by achieving its 
fourfold aim: 
1) Explicate a theoretical framework within communicative rationality for 
thinking about using video recordings in medical education. 
This aim will answer the following questions: What are the theoretical and 
metatheoretical foundations of previous work in the area? How did the use of video 
reviewing develop over time in medical education? What is the empirical evidence 
regarding the acceptability, effectiveness, and feasibility of working models? What would 
a communicative-action-based framework look like?  
 
2) Define, from the perspectives of learners and supervisors, what should 
happen in a resident–patient interaction.   
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This aims will answer the following questions: What actions are considered right 
or adequate in these sessions? What is valued? What should happen during the visit? 
 
3) Characterize, again from the perspectives of learners and supervisors, 
what should be avoided in a doctor–patient interaction.  
This aim will answer the following questions: What actions are considered 
erroneous or inadequate in these sessions? What is devalued? What should be avoided 
in a doctor–patient interaction?  
 
Literature review 
This critical review has the overarching goal of reflecting on 70 years of the use of video 
in medical education to pave the road for an alternative theoretical framework and for the 
empirical work. The review will move between theory, history, and evaluation and achieve the 
following tasks: (1) Critically explore the theoretical and metatheoretical foundations of previous 
work in medical education at large and in evaluation specifically. This reflective section will help 
develop the background concepts within the framework of communicative rationality, to which I 
will return periodically and on which I ground my work. (2) Reconstruct the historical evolution of 
video reviews in medical education. This chronological presentation of the articles will bring to 
light the development of thinking on the specific topic of video reviews in medical education. 
Through a critical gaze, I will expose some of the underlying tensions that have characterized 
the movements in medical education. (3) Examine current views on the comparative evaluation 
of different modalities of the use of video reviews. The summary of evaluative studies will bring 
to the light successes and pitfalls in previous work and provide insights into the methodological 
limitations of current frameworks, which this project will address. 
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 Theoretical and Metatheoretical Discussion 
The first section of this review critically explores theoretical and metatheoretical aspects 
of the educational and research work in the area. I will first (a) present and problematize the 
reduction of the workings of a doctor to the technical aspects of clinical reasoning, 
communication, and procedural skill. Previous research, as we will see in the following sections, 
has rested on the assumptions that these constitute the essential workings of the doctor and 
that they can be evaluated in isolation. I will then (b) explore the assumptions behind the body 
of research that has relied on using feedback as a method of improving the performance of 
these technical skills. I will problematize adapting the notion of feedback itself from systems 
theory and using it uncritically to understand how learning takes place. I will then (c) reflect on 
the limitations of the research that has focused on the inadequacies of faculty evaluation and 
self-assessment by targeting the issue of accuracy and reliability. Finally, I will (d) explicate 
what judgment means dialogically, relying on the notion of criticizing “following a rule” from the 
performative perspective of a participant.  
 (a) Using video reviews to teach clinical reasoning skills takes for granted assumptions 
that need to be problematized. The work that attempted to further clinical reasoning assumes 
that these are trainable sets of skills that can be isolated. Higgs and Matthewes described 
clinical reasoning as the process “that enables practitioners to take wise action, meaning to take 
the best justified action in a specific context” (McBee et al., 2015). McBee distinguished 
between diagnostic and therapeutic reasoning, where diagnostic reasoning reflects processes 
the clinician uses to arrive at or establish a diagnosis, and therapeutic reasoning reflects 
processes the clinician uses to decide upon plans of action tailored to the patient’s unique 
circumstances. McBee et al. criticizes the dual processing framework derived from information 
processing that assumes nonanalytic and analytic reasoning and emphasizes the role of the 
physician and her knowledge without explicitly accounting for the social context of care. Instead, 
McBee built on previous empirical research to argue that contextual factors need to be 
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considered when understanding clinical reasoning. McBee draws on the theory of situated 
cognition to explain the notion of context “by accounting for the dynamic interactions that occur 
between the physician, patient, and environment during a clinical encounter” (2015, p. 1227). In 
the framework of situated cognition, the clinical outcome depends on a complex interaction of 
physician factors (sleepiness, well-being, burnout, and expertise), patient factors (emotional 
volatility, authenticity of presentation, and English proficiency), and encounter factors (setting of 
encounter, appointment length, and functionality of EMR). While considered to be more 
developed in relation to Higgs and Matthewes, McBee’s position does gets much closer to 
explicating the complexity of the interaction because it focuses only on cognitive processes. 
One cannot help but notice that McBee et al. (2015) chose a different set of terms for the 
patient (volatility, inauthenticity, proficiency, etc.) than for the physician (sleepiness, well-being, 
burnout, etc.). This choice raises concerns for an implicit denial of the reciprocity of emotional 
states that both the provider and the patient can experience and bring to bear on the interaction. 
Similarly, authenticity, the validity criterion for the expression of the self, is given as a variable 
solely to the patient and not to the doctor, as if it is assumed that the doctor is always authentic 
while patients may not be.   
What is particularly troubling, however, is that McBee et al. (2015) selected a 
combination of factors with a vague relation to one another besides being attributable to one 
factor-holder. It is assumed that there is a dependency of outcomes on these extraneous factors 
without similarly accounting for what the provider or the patient, as two conscious agencies, do 
to remediate the conditioning effect of each of these items. An emotionally volatile patient can 
stimulate the doctor to take the in-charge role, and an inauthentic presentation can stimulate 
curious investigation and dialogue to achieve higher and more reflective authenticity. I question 
the assumption that each and every so-called “factor” is a fixed attribute. Clinical reasoning can 
be better understood when the patient and doctor are viewed as working cooperatively to come 
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to an intersubjective understanding rather than as the work of a doctor that is determined by her 
attributes and extraneous factors.  
Like the assumptions about medical reasoning, the learning of communication skills is 
taken out of context and thought of in isolation as mere set of tasks. I argue that the strategy of 
using video reviews to teach specific communication skills and assessing the impact on that skill 
using a checklist is based on some problematic assumptions. Wouda and van de Wiel (2013) 
presented a similar critique. They first tackled a specific dilemma of communication skills, that 
is, inconsistency of performance. They identified “inconsistency” as accounting for “45.5% of 
variance in residents’ communication performance” (p. 579). They further concluded that the 
performance of the physician should be not only of high quality but also consistent regardless of 
complexity and type of consultation. Thus, skills are not taught or learned once and for all. They 
also present another, more interesting aspect of the critique when they problematize the 
assumption that there exists “a set of generic or transferrable communication skills that show a 
high level of stability and are applicable to a wide range of encounters” (p. 580). This notion, 
according to Wouda and van de Wiel (2013), was criticized by many researchers based on the 
argument that “communication skills are too case specific to be assessed in different cases with 
the same instrument” and further, “there is no homogenous set of communication skills” (p. 
580). Rather, the performance of the doctor depends primarily on the encounter. These 
arguments by Wouda and van de Wiel (2013) speak to the challenges presented in the work I 
will summarize later, in which the problem is not just the consistent use of skill but is a problem 
of context and complexity. 
I argue, however, that Wouda and van de Wiel’s (2013) critique does not go far enough. 
I agree with their claim regarding to the context dependency of the action of the resident, 
meaning there is a context in which acting in one way or another can be judged as appropriate 
or inappropriate. I also agree that residents may not be consistent in acting according to a 
specific pattern in the right context and that this consistency can be judged as maintained or not 
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maintained. I argue, however, that a different framework is needed to understand the action of 
the resident itself. Understanding the meaning of an action by accepting or rejecting its validity 
conditions can be achieved only by a participant, not by an observer. Similarly, judging the 
adequacy of application and the consistency of the adequate application of a rule of action 
cannot be performed by a nonparticipant observer from a third-person perspective. It is only 
through a dialogue that leverages the second person’s position as the judge and engages the 
first person’s position as the actor that we can understand and judge the act. Thus, it is 
meaningless to speak of an adequacy of application of skill from a third-person perspective, 
because what determines the goal of the action and the means used is truly the actor herself. It 
is also meaningless to speak of consistency of application from an observer’s position, because 
that assumes having the same end in mind and having the same means available. The actors in 
an interaction take a performative attitude and express an authentic self in a dialogue with 
another actor. The two are bound by the intersubjective norms that guide the interaction. Neither 
the subjective nor the normative aspects of the act are readily accessible to an observer without 
taking the position of the actors. Finally, understanding can only be verified by engaging in a 
conversation with the actor herself. 
 (b) The unproblematized belief that feedback improves performance proves insufficient. 
The work on feedback builds primarily on the theoretical framework suggested by Ende (1983). 
“We are training a group of physicians who have never been observed.” Jack Ende took this cry 
of Ludwig Eichna and wrote a special communication that became a foundational statement in 
the literature on feedback. It had been referenced 1,077 times as of January 8, 2018. Ende 
accepts Eichna’s observation as “accurate” though he asserts that it identifies only part of the 
problem. Eichna, Ende (1983) quotes, argues, “Not only are clinical skills infrequently observed, 
but when they are, the information so obtained does not get to where it can be most helpful—
back to the trainees themselves” (p. 777). Ende then draws on the literature of education, 
organizational psychology, and business administration to write an article explicating the 
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concepts of feedback, analyzing barriers to feedback, and finally, providing practical guidelines 
for offering feedback. I will focus here primarily on the notion of feedback. Ende (1983) traces 
the concept of feedback to rocket engineering in the 1940s. It was Norbert Weiner who 
extended the concept to social sciences, and Ende quotes Weiner saying, “Feedback is the 
control of a system by inserting into the system the results of its performance. If these results 
are merely used as numerical data for criticism of the system and its regulation, we have simple 
feedback of the control engineer. If, however, the information which proceeds backwards from 
the performance is able to change the general method and pattern of the performance, we have 
a process which we may very well call learning” (p. 777). 
Ende (1983) claims the importance of feedback in acquiring clinical skills is founded on 
the nature of clinical methods. He asserts, “As a compendium of cognitive, psychometric, and 
affectual behaviors, clinical skills are easier demonstrated than described” (p. 777). Feedback 
takes place when the learner is offered insight into what they actually did and the consequences 
of her or his actions. As the insight highlights the discrepancy between the actual result and the 
intended result, it provides an impetus for change. Ende complains that evaluation and 
feedback are used interchangeably, which he argues is a mistake that accounts for the 
confusion around feedback. He explicates this distinction as follows: “Distinct from evaluation, 
feedback presents information, not judgement. Feedback is formative. As an integral part of the 
learning process, it allows the student to remain on course in reaching a goal. Evaluation, on the 
other hand, is summative. It comes after the fact and presents a judgement, usually the 
teacher’s, about how well or poorly a student met a given goal, often in relation to the 
performance of peers. Evaluation is expressed as normative statements, peppered with adverbs 
and adjectives; feedback is neutral, composed of verbs and nouns” (p. 778). 
Ende’s (1983) foundational theoretical study has multiple limitations that are worth 
explicating. The first limitation is the focus on the doctor’s work as a technical skill. I object to 
this reduction and argue that the work of a doctor is not only the application of technical skills 
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but also the normative following of rules and the expressing of authentic selves. Focusing on 
technical skills obscures the importance of the normative “ought” and the subjective “I/me.” Not 
only does the technicizing of medicine have limited explanatory power with respect to the work 
of the doctor, but the cost of its reductionistic sacrifices is intolerable.  
The study’s second limitation is its misleading adaptation of the notion of feedback from 
systems theory into social theory at large. The work of a teacher is just like that of a doctor, and 
this work is better explained by action theory than by systems theory. Thus, it is not feedback 
that is provided but rather the judgment of the correct application of a rule. The “no” or “yes” 
given after an action is better viewed not as the consequence of an undesired or desired action 
but as the rejection or acceptance of the action as either not fulfilling or fulfilling intersubjectively 
recognized validity conditions. Focusing on the intersubjective relation between two participants 
rather than the subject–object relation opens up a conversation on the social aspects of 
intersubjectivity and on the subjective domain (what belongs to the world of the subject to which 
only she has privileged access) that is present in every action. Limiting the framework to 
systems theory privileges the position of the evaluator and attributes to it unquestioned 
objectivity, both of which are problematic in any social interaction.  
The third limitation is the study’s confusion of the normative/evaluative with the objective 
in the act of evaluation and the act of sharing the evaluation with the learner. Making a claim 
about the rightness or accurate application of a rule is an evaluative claim, not an objective one. 
The teacher not only provides the facts but also makes a judgment. Confusing the two is 
dangerous in education as in any social interaction. The issue of how to let the learner know 
about a mistake is different from evaluating the learner’s work. Evaluating the work is an act of 
judgment, whereas letting the person know is an act of sharing information that follows the 
social norms of the place and the type of educational contract established. The person could 
argue that it is more right and better (a normative/evaluative claim) to be kind when giving a 
judgment. The person could also argue that it is probably more effective (an objective claim) to 
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give a judgment in a kind way. These are two different types of arguments and have to do with 
how to make a judgment. The act of judging is an evaluative/normative action that is itself 
subject to being judged as adequate/right, authentic, and based on truth.  
(c) The problematic of self-assessment has been recognized as essential to errors and 
also essential to learning. The person who errs, at least on certain occasions, is someone who 
fails to assess her competency and thus assumes to know what she truly does not know and 
fails to seek help from a more knowledgeable person who can provide support until the 
competency is developed. The competency for self-assessment is essential, and it is developed 
just like any other competency. Because of its relation to the self, the “I,” a relation that is 
problematic in the subject–object framework of knowing, self-assessment has often been 
inadequately theorized and examined. The question of accuracy and reliability have doomed 
self-assessment since the 1980s. Comparing self-assessments to being evaluated by an other 
has filled education literature with studied that suffered from significant methodologically flaws 
due to the taken for granted assumptions about the homogeneity of the two activities. Studies 
have shown, not surprisingly, poor correlation between other observer ratings and the person’s 
self-assessments. Based on these results and within frameworks that give privilege to assumed 
“objective” observer assessments, some researchers recommended relying more on 
assessments by others and less on self-assessment. I agree with Plant, Corden, Mourad, 
O’Brien, and van Schaik (2012) that many studies seem to have used activities resembling 
“guess your grade” to operationalize self-assessment, and this operationalization oversimplifies 
the construct. Self-assessment is not purely an individualistic activity but rather a complex social 
process that is context specific. Self-assessment is not purely the work of the subject; instead, 
the learner utilizes teacher and peer perspectives, whether remembered or imagined, to 
determine the outcome and the characteristics of good work in a complex way that yet to be 
unpacked. 
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Methodological issues have contributed to the judgement of self-assessment as 
inadequate. Martin, Regehr, Hodges, and McNaughton (1998) noted the agreement among 
medical educators that the ability to self-assess in an accurate way is essential to self-directed 
learning processes. However, they points out the challenge that “the accuracy of self-
assessment is poor at best” (p. 1201). They blame the failure of previous studies to demonstrate 
appropriate self-assessment to methodological issues leading to systematic underestimation of 
the ability of learners to self-assess. The experiments in the field, Martin et al point out, have 
similar methodological designs. The learner performs a task (e.g., interviewing a patient) and 
then completes a self-assessment form. The form evaluates a number of dimensions (cognitive, 
behavioral, etc.) of the performance. An expert observes the performance and then completes 
the same form. The scores of the participant’s self-assessment and the evaluator’s observations 
are compared, and high correlation indicates adequate self-assessment, while low correlation is 
used to indicate that the participants cannot self-assess effectively. Martin et al. (1998) identified 
three categories of reasons for the poor correlation of a participant’s self-assessment score and 
an expert’s observation score. First, participants may be evaluating themselves on dimensions 
of performance that are different from the ones the expert is using. Second, participants may be 
using different scales. To the learners, the scores are pools of numbers with little meaning 
compared to the expert evaluator. Third, the learner has had little opportunity to observe varying 
levels of competency in any specific domain, and as a result, their benchmark or template of 
quality may be different from that of the expert. Previous research, Martin argues, has shown 
that when learners participate in constructing evaluation tools, their self-assessment scores 
correlate better with those of the experts. To address the issue of the benchmark, Martin 
provided learners with training exposure to different benchmarks so they could develop skill in 
using assessments through practice. In this model, residents were shown videotapes of four 
performances of the same scenario with different quality. They evaluated their own performance 
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on communication skills before and after the training. After the training, correlation with experts’ 
evaluations improved significantly although they continued to score as only moderate. 
Martin et al.’s (2009) critique is particularly instructive because it hints at the dialogical 
nature of learning how to self-evaluate. The person takes in the position of the other, whether 
critically or at face value. Critical dialogues and reflections come here to present an opportunity 
for learning not only how to do but also how to justify what the person does. This takes me in 
the final point in this section to explicating ‘judging’ or assessing building on the notion of 
following a rule.  
(d) Judging and following a rule: In contrast to previous work stuck in the medley of 
distinction between the notions of feedback, evaluation, and self-assessment, all as defined 
from the observer’s position, this work aims to provide a new framework, which lays the 
foundation for the main process of assessment on the notion of “following the rules.” This work 
represents a discontinuity with the literature founded on observers’ perspectives and connects 
with work founded on the perspectives of the participants. The root of this process of appraisal 
is explicated by Wittgenstein in the working of the meaning of “following a rule.” Wittgenstein 
argued against the possibility that a subject follows a rule for herself alone. An actor cannot be 
certain if she is following a rule unless her behavior is exposed to the critique of another, a 
critique that is open, in principle, to consensus. According to Habermas,  
Wittgenstein wants to show that the identity and the validity of rules are systematically 
interconnected. To follow a rule means to follow the same rule in every single case. The 
identity of the rule in the multiplicity to its realization does not rest on observable 
invariants but on the intersubjectivity of its validity. (Habermas, 1984, p.18) 
For Wittgenstein, to judge or evaluate a rule, two different roles are presupposed for 
participants. Let’s call them here “the student” and “the teacher.” The student needs to have the 
competence to follow the rules to avoid systematic mistakes and the teacher needs to have the 
competence to judge the student’s behavior as governed by the rules. The teacher’s 
competence to judge presupposes the teacher’s rule-competence. In other words, the teacher 
needs to point out the mistakes and, when needed, to bring about an agreement regarding the 
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correct application of the rule. With that, according to Wittgenstein, the teacher then takes over 
the student’s role in order to show him what he did wrong. When the teacher takes the role of 
showing rule-governed behavior, the student then assumes the role of the judge and with that 
he, as the judge, can justify her behavior and show the teacher that she, as the actor, is 
applying the rule incorrectly. Wittgenstein argues, “Without this possibility of reciprocal criticism 
and mutual instruction leading to agreement, the identity of rules could not be secured.” (p.18) 
Thus, a rule must possess intersubjective validity at least for two subjects for one subject to 
follow the same rule.  
The history of video reviews and working models 
Video reviews have achieved an important status in medical education since they were 
first utilized in psychiatry in 1958. Over the past 70 years, video technology has evolved 
dramatically. Today, video reviews are widely used in education. Important theoretical work has 
been developed to synthesize and explain the learning that takes place and a significant body of 
empirical education research supports their use. This brief historical review will trace the 
evolution of video reviews from their early days until today before moving in the following 
section to present some of the empirical work focused on evaluation of this approach. 
(a) Early explorations: The use of video technology in education can be traced back to 
1958. The work of Stoller and Geertsma (1958) and, two years later, Geerstma and Stoller 
(1960) are referenced as the earliest uses of videotapes in medical education. They attempted 
to develop an innovative approach to the summative assessment at the end of a clerkship in 
psychiatry. They videotaped two 30-minute psychiatric interviews. The tapes were viewed by 
psychiatrist evaluators, and each of some 300 patient statements was judged on a scale from 0 
to 6, where 0 represented “not characteristic” and 6 represented “very characteristic.” The 
statements were categorized along multiple domains such as descriptive (e.g., “overtly anxious,” 
“circumstantial,” etc.), evaluative (e.g., “ambivalent,” “delusional,” etc.), and theoretical (e.g., 
“defending against unconscious impulse,” “guilt provoked by blame,” etc.), among other 
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categories. Statements that had high inter-rater agreement among psychiatrists were used to 
test the students in the final exam. The students were presented with the videos and asked to 
rate the selected statements. The psychiatrists’ evaluations were used as the standard criteria. 
The work by Stoller and Geertsma (1958 & 1960) set the stage for the future use of videotapes 
in research, evaluation, and education. 
Soon after, videotapes came to be used as a tool in learning and not just for constructing 
summative assessments. Among the early exploration of video use is the work by Schmidt and 
Messner (1977) in a study describing the use of videotapes in training family physicians. The 
goal of this model was twofold: “(1) development of a library of video recordings which contain 
illustrative examples of psychiatric syndromes and management problems that appear 
frequently in family practices; and (2) use of videotape recordings of the trainee during routine 
medical encounters and during counseling sessions for later review with supervising faculty” 
(Schmidt and Messner, 1977, abstract). Here, we start to see the explicit recognition of the 
value of this tool for both teaching of residents and for evaluation. Video reviews gained 
momentum fairly quickly in graduate medical education. One such implementation was for the 
teaching of interpersonal skills, which has now become a focus of attention. Khan , Cohen, and 
Jason (1979), noted that the majority (88%) of family medicine residencies had implemented 
formal programs for interpersonal skills. These skills were identified as information gathering, 
demonstrating empathy, psychological intervention, and information giving. At that time, 88% of 
the programs also reported using video technology, and 77% were planning to increase use of 
video recording. 
Among the earliest work on video review is an important illustrative study by Benedek 
and Bieniek (1977) that did not receive the recognition it deserves. The study is instructive 
because it points to an explicit model of video review that focuses on learning through engaging 
the authentic self rather than focusing on tasks. Benedek and Bieniek (1977) presented a model 
for interpersonal recall with the goal of accelerating the learning process. The course was taught 
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as a retreat over 14 two-hour sessions delivered in two units. A brief introduction to the course 
included the statement, “The basic purpose of the lessons you are about to engage in is to 
teach you to listen more closely, to become more deeply involved, and to respond to another in 
such as a way as to encourage that person to go further, to explore deeper, to cooperate, and to 
change. We will help you achieve these skills through a series of specific learning experiences, 
each of which is designed to help you achieve a certain dynamic interviewer developmental 
task” (p. 940).  The second unit was introduced with the statement, “This next unit is designed to 
help you further tune your third ear. The ability to help a client know some of his more subtle 
messages, moods, and feelings . . . is determined by two factors. First is practice at labeling 
feelings, especially interpersonal feelings—finding words for . . . the general characteristics of 
gut-level emotion. Second is the ability to overcome your own resistances to becoming involved 
in a psychologically intimate and meaningful way with another human being” (p. 940). 
The course used a series of filmed simulation exercises in which every trainee was 
instructed to imagine herself alone with the person on the screen, letting that person have an 
impact on them. In following units, learners were asked to interview other participants, and the 
interviews were taped. At the end of the taped interview, an instructor encouraged the learner–
interviewer to relive the experience of the interview in detail and in-depth. The instructor 
attempted to avoid conveying criticism or being judgmental. When residents reviewed their 
tapes, they observed their interview strategy and explicated their goals. They were also 
encouraged to recognize subtle messages they did not receive or react to out “of fear of 
involvement with their peer–client” (Benedek and Bieniek, 1977, p. 941).  As they engaged 
through the exercise, resident groups, the author asserted, developed unity; they became eager 
to come to the group and explore personal concerns, feelings, and anxieties. There may be a 
need to liberate video reviews from the regimented way of doing the reviews and move to a 
more open-ended style of reflection.  The focus here is the person of the doctor. 
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Reflecting critically on this early work, one can expose a hidden tension between 
focusing on the doctor as a person, on the one side, and focusing on her work as a set of 
technical tasks, on the other. Benedek and Bieniek (1977) sought to teach the doctor to be 
deeply involved with and responsive to the patient. They wanted to recognize the feelings—and 
hence the personhood—of doctors, name them, and overcome the resistance to being 
intimately and meaningfully involved. By contrast, other studies from the same period focused 
on the doctor’s behaviors, the patterns of syndromes to be recognized in the patient, and, upon 
evaluation by faculty, how the resident performed her task. This tension in the early research 
developed in favor of the second group as medicine and medical education became 
overwhelmingly technicized. Being humane was reduced to a demonstration of communication 
skills, as in expressions of empathy and the gathering of information. The “I” of the doctor who 
feels, engages, and is engaged was lost to the “me” of the professional. This “me” was given all 
the how-to instructions for appearing professional and playing the role of the doctor as a 
technical expert. 
 (b) Video recordings taking a momentum. Early reports in the family medicine education 
literature acknowledged the origin of this method in psychiatry, yet recognized its value for their 
discipline. Jackson and Pinkerton (1983) points out that family medicine utilized videotape 
teaching in a number of different ways as a sign of commitment to teaching behavioral aspects 
of illnesses. Education experts’ efforts then focused on defining how to make the experiences of 
video reviews successful. In addition to pointing out the logistic factors, Jackson referred to two 
distinct human factors that are essential to any videotape teaching program. The first is the 
faculty who, he emphasized, may benefit from workshop training on the use of this program and 
need uninterrupted time to lead the review process. The second is the residents, who have 
initially demonstrated anxiety and resistance. The situation was helped, Jackson and Pinkerton 
suggested, by employing a confident faculty with teachers who had personal experiences and 
by creating a supportive learning environment. 
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Almost 40 years after the start of the use of these methods, video reviews had become a 
more and more valuable tool with many recognized benefits. The explicit notion of using video 
reviews for feedback started to appear on the scene. Beckman and Frankel (1994) pointed to 
the many advantages of using videotapes in residency training when they said, “By paying 
attention to the power of the medium and the method of feedback, videotaping programs can be 
a remarkably successful teaching and research tool. Learners can view their performance, 
review feedback on their own behavior, knowledge, and displayed attitudes, and develop plans 
to change behavior that can be followed up on subsequent tapings. In addition, trainees can 
share important experiences with each other and valued teachers. Interviewing skills can be 
documented and preserved, creating a video library that allows trainees to actually visualize 
improvements in their own performances over time. An archive of many such performances 
allows trainees, faculty, and researchers alike comparative access to the complex challenges of 
the medical interview” (1994, abstract). 
The turn of the century marked an increased awareness of the value of doctor–patient 
relationships with a shift in the care paradigm toward patient-centeredness, affirming the role of 
interviews. Edwards et al. (1996) attested that, despite advances in diagnostic and procedural 
techniques, medical interviewing continued to be considered by most physicians the most 
valuable component in clinically evaluating a patient. Medical interviewing forms the foundation 
on which the doctor–patient relationship is built. Thus, training residents in interviewing skills is 
essential. Videotape reviews present a great option for achieving this goal. Edwards et al. lists 
the empirical studies showing improvement in different interviewing behaviors or technical skills 
based on objective assessments. They presented the process and structure of the videotape 
review program that had been used for 15 years, explored the themes of review sessions, 
presented the perspectives of the residents, and identified potential barriers to videotape review 
programs in order to understand the process better. Also brought forth was the finding that most 
residents deemed this method helpful and enjoyable despite the fact that some admitted feeling 
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anxious and were threatened by the intrusion of the camera and the vulnerability inherent in the 
reviewing process.  
Just as there was an obscuring of the subjectivity of the doctor outside of the doctor–
patient interaction, there was also, when using the same critical gaze, an obscuring of the 
subjectivity of the patient. One can trace a second kind of tension, one related to what is 
considered essential among the technical skills of a doctor. Many doctors and medical 
educators came to consider medical skills as encompassing only the reasoning, diagnostic, and 
therapeutic skills of the doctor. They considered interpersonal interaction and communication 
“soft skills.” By contrast, a great deal of research argued for the value of interpersonal and 
communication skills and called for the continued defense of the importance of this work. This 
battle for valuing the nonmedical aspects of doctors’ work was lost at times, despite the many 
papers that called for holding them in high esteem. The patient was turned into a set of signs 
and symptoms to be identified. Once the illness is named, a faceless and objective physician 
does the reasoning associated with the diagnosis and develops a plan for the patient to follow. 
In order to gain legitimacy, researchers advocating for not reducing the patient to mere 
numbers had to use the same framework and also reduced patients. Arguments of the kind “if 
we listen to patients, maybe they will do something to improve their outcomes” were made. The 
artificial separation of communication and interpersonal relationship skills from technical skills 
and then claiming the legitimacy of the former on the grounds of effectiveness represents the 
second lost battle in the history of medicine and medical education. The “I” of the patient’s 
subjectivity was replaced by the “it” of a mere object. Some of those, one may call, 
“communicationalists” who sought to rescue this “I” only further contributed to its loss. 
(c) Current working models. Educational programs that used video reviews proliferated. 
Cassata, Conroe, and Clements (1997) described a communication program at the University of 
Minnesota to enhance family practice residents’ medical interviewing skills in a clinical setting. 
The program used videotape feedback stressing the integration of psychosocial and biological 
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data in addition to the establishment of a therapeutic relationship. Chou and Lee (2002) 
developed a curriculum to improve patient-centered interviewing skills at an internal medicine 
residency program, motivated by concerns that “residency training programs typically 
emphasize biomedical learning, but relatively few provide opportunities for residents to improve 
outpatient interviewing skills or to address challenging patient encounters. Even fewer programs 
provide resources to assess patient–resident relationship skills” (Chou & Lee, 2002, p. 744). As 
part of this curriculum, second- and third-year residents had small-group seminars where they 
presented videotapes of interviews with their patients. These review sessions gave residents 
the opportunity to reflect on their interviewing encounters, observe other residents’ interviewing 
techniques and styles, and provide support to peers after some emotional interviews. According 
to Chou and Lee (2002), “Residents consider this learning experience to be one of the most 
positive of their residency and valuable for their professional development. Residents report that 
this small-group seminar series has markedly improved their communication with patients, and 
they now clamor for the opportunity to present interviewing dilemmas” (Chou & Lee, 2002, p. 
744). Chou and lee went on to recommend similar curricula be instituted at other residency 
programs. 
Video review continued to also be used in its home discipline of psychiatry. Abbass 
(2004) described a program of small-group videotape training for the development of 
psychotherapy skills, detailing the structure of the program. Residents recorded their weekly 
psychotherapy sessions. Then, a training group consisting of a supervisor and two to six 
trainees would meet for 1.5- to 3-hour weekly supervisory meetings. With this model, the 
supervisee had an opportunity to supervise themselves in a supportive environment. They also 
received feedback about the therapy process, including the therapist’s functioning within a 
specific treatment model. Other trainees observed both the videotapes as well as the 
supervisory process. They asked questions and provided comments in a supportive and 
constructive manner. They also shared parallel learning experiences. Abbas suggested the 
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benefits of this model in two domains: the advantages of small-group learning and the positive 
effects of the video recordings. Abbas argues that “therapist self-observation and self-
awareness are enabled by having one’s own videotape to review. Seeing oneself on tape allows 
for a more objective period of self-observation, free of any in-session pressure and distraction. 
This allows trainees to ‘self-supervise’ while anticipating feedback from the supervisor and the 
group. Thus, tape review allows self-monitoring and self-supervision skills acquisition that may 
facilitate ongoing professional growth” (p. 153)  
Abbass (2004) asserts that video allows for observations of a patient’s behavior, 
appearance, and even emotional states. Furthermore, videos allow for examination of 
observable therapist behavior and the ability to focus on therapist activities. Videotapes also 
allow assessment of treatment outcomes, including observable changes, even if not reported in 
the therapist’s notes. Additionally, group learning lets the trainee follow other participants’ 
cases, which gives access to broader ranges of patients in a relatively shorter period of time. 
Learning in a group provides ample opportunity for cohesion, universality, support, reality 
testing, and modeling. Furthermore, in this model, the trainee can observe the supervisor giving 
feedback and teaching, and thus, the program provides ample opportunity for education on how 
to teach and supervise. Finally, the model helps trainees become acquainted with openly 
discussing their work and giving and receiving feedback in a supportive and respectful fashion. 
Such feedback becomes increasingly insightful as time passes and experience develops. 
Abbass’s (2004) observations were confirmed by Funkenstein, Kessler, and Schen (2014), who 
described the benefits of videotaping in psychiatry training programs. According to Funkenstein, 
“Videotaped interviews provide a window into the psychotherapeutic exchange, demystifying the 
process and capturing verbal and nonverbal interactions, facial expressions, and tones of 
voice—which can illustrate therapeutic elements such as the alliance and resistance” (p. 216). 
Video reviews became a standard of practice. Edwards and Frey (2007) proposed a 
comprehensive, competency-based curriculum for family medicine residency, with the paper 
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describing the outcome measures, implementation, and design of such a curriculum. Video 
reviews were organically integrated into this curriculum, and videotaped review sessions took 
place quarterly. The tapes were reviewed with the program’s behaviorist using a scoring sheet 
that parallels the defined competencies. The video reviews are also integrated with the 
assessment of new residents, who have to conduct a video-recorded history taking and physical 
exam. These interactions are also graded using checklists reflecting the standards of the 
department and the named competencies in the field. Residents are expected to demonstrate 
an acceptable performance level before they begin their supervised patient care activities. 
Edwards explicated where video reviews can serve in the assessment of the Accreditation on 
Counsel for Graduate Medical Education (ACGME) competencies. For patient care, he noted 
that video reviews can help identify different competencies. For patient care and medical 
knowledge competencies, videos can help identify skill in developing a hypothesis and an action 
plan. For interpersonal and communication skills, videos help identify determination of the 
reason for the visit, supporting the primacy of patient needs, and fostering of a relationship of 
care. For professionalism, videos can help identify time efficiency. 
Interviewing skills and doctor–patient interactions are not the only uses of this method; 
surgical specialties have also used these methods. Rogers et al. (2010) surveyed 86 of the 102 
trauma centers in the country to determine trauma video review (TVR) practices for education 
and quality improvement. The study documented that TVR was used by 20% of the centers and 
found that all these programs reported perceived improvement in trauma processes as a result 
of TVR. 
With cultural shifts around centeredness on learners, video reviews became less and 
less a tool to show what the residents did not do well and became more and more a tool for 
collaborative learning. Muench et al. (2013) described a working model of video reviews by 
residents at the Oregon Health State University Family Medicine Residency Program. Resident 
groups of three (one from each year) and two attending physicians meet periodically to review 
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videos and discuss recorded encounters. Recordings are made using cell phone video 
cameras. The viewing takes place using a large-screen TV. Every review meeting takes about 
2.5 hours, allowing 50 minutes to review each resident’s encounter. The ground rules are 
established to emphasize coaching and the non-evaluative nature of the sessions. A checklist 
based on the Medical Interview Skills Competency Evaluation is passed around to remind 
participants of the essential components of encounters. This checklist allows an evaluator to 
check Yes, Needs Practice, No, or Not Applicable with regard to different elements on a list with 
seven areas: greeting, establishing visit focus, gathering information, understanding the 
patient’s/family’s perspectives within the psychosocial context, sharing information, 
collaborating/agreeing on final diagnosis and treatment plan, and providing closure. The 
reviewed resident gives a brief context for the visit and is asked if they would like the 
participants to focus on any specific component of the visit. They hold the remote control and 
are advised that participants may ask to pause and discuss different sections, but they control 
the process, and they can skip over certain portions or stop the process altogether if they 
choose. Muench et al. (2013) argued that reviewing recorded videos of resident–patient 
encounters is a particularly effective method for coaching partly because it allows for feedback 
to be given on specific behavior within a particular context. Further, the behaviors are not limited 
to interpersonal and communication processes, but extend to medical decision-making and 
office efficiency skills. 
Approximately 70 years after the first utilization of videos in education, Jansen and 
Rosenbaum (2016) documented the current practices in communication curricula in family 
medicine residency programs in the United States and assessed the prevalence of video review 
use. They sent a survey to all family medicine program directors, and out of 458, a total of 204 
programs completed and returned the survey for a response rate of 45%. Among the currently 
used teaching methods, video reviews of resident–patient encounters came third (71%), 
following small-group work and direct observation of resident–patient encounters. Residencies 
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allocated 62% of the time dedicated for communication education to experiential learning 
approaches such as video reviews, small group, direct observation, and simulated patients. The 
open-ended responses were summarized by saying, “Interestingly, the most frequent responses 
to the question ‘What is the best aspect/component of your program’s communication 
curriculum?’ were having a formal curriculum and using video review” (Jansen and Rosenbaum, 
2016, p. 449). Jansen and Rosenbaum’s study and others show with no doubt that video 
reviews continue to occupy an important place as a valued educational tool. 
 A critical examination of aspects of the working models reveals an opportunity to move 
the needle toward a more engaging and less hierarchical style of learning. Medical education 
has grappled for the past two or three decades with the debate surrounding the question “How 
do residents learn?” Some educators believe attending physicians should teach residents and 
make sure they are competent before sending them out into the world. Others maintain that 
residents would learn best through engagement, alone or with other learners, with the matter at 
hand. The first group’s position is that learning occurs through instructions given by an expert; in 
this case, the attending physician tells the resident what she did wrong so she will stop doing it 
and tells her what she did right so she will continue to do it. The emphasis is on the evaluator, 
assumed to be the master of knowledge, who passes judgment on the learner, viewed as 
actually or potentially lacking competencies and the skills to either perform the task at hand or to 
judge their own performance. The second group argues that when we learn, we develop our 
capacities and talents. The emphasis here is on the learner. While it is true that residents may 
not perform the tasks to the standards they themselves acknowledge as legitimate, they do 
have the capacity to name the standards and judge themselves and others on following the 
rules.  
Part of this debate centers on the issue of power, of who should call out errors and 
whether the attending physician’s power can pass over to the resident herself. This debate is 
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not yet over, and for that reason, there is hope that we can reflect on past actions, learn from 
them, and make more rational decisions as we move forward. 
 
Video Reviews: Feasibility, Acceptability, and Effectiveness 
In the first section of this review, I presented a critique of the theoretical frameworks 
dominating research in medical education. In the second section, I offered a chronological 
presentation of the medical literature to demonstrate the evolution of the use of video recording 
in education. Taking a critical approach, I exposed hidden tensions related to the technicizing of 
medicine, the privileging of medical reasoning over communication, and the negotiation of who 
owns the learning. In this third and last section of the review, I summarize some of the empirical 
evidence that has dominated the literature on evaluating the use of video recording in medical 
education. The focus of the research summarized in this section is feasibility, acceptability, and 
effectiveness. By presenting the diversity of findings and exposing the limitations of some of the 
studies, I make the argument for my empirical project, which will be presented after some 
reflective remarks on the literature review.  
Video reviews, as presented above, have been used in a number of formats for varying 
educational purposes. In order to examine the evidence regarding their effectiveness, feasibility, 
and acceptability, we can classify their use into five models: (1) learners reviewing their videos 
primarily for self-assessment, with no faculty or peer feedback, (2) learners reviewing their 
videos with faculty feedback, but no peer feedback, (3) learners reviewing their videos with peer 
feedback, but no faculty feedback, (4) learners reviewing their videos with peer feedback and 
faculty feedback, and (5) faculty reviewing resident videos for evaluation. The great majority of 
the research has focused on (2) and (5). In the subsections below, I present a narrative of the 
studies corresponding to each of these models, and I conclude the section with a reflection that 
highlights assumptions and hidden positions relevant to education and evaluation theories. 
106 
 
Notably, I maintain truthfulness to the researchers’ theoretical frameworks in my presentation of 
their studies, although I return to my own theoretical grounds in my reflective remarks.  
1. Learners reviewing their videos, no faculty coaches or peer feedback 
When studied alone, self-assessment appeared to be a valued and effective tool for 
learning as presented in the following four studies. The first two works falls in the literature on 
communication and doctor–patient relationships, while the third and the fourth fall under 
learning technical skills in surgery. 
Among the lead researchers in the areas of communication and doctor–patient 
relationships, Roter et al. (2004) developed an interactive video review platform that links taped 
video to interaction analysis software. A study was designed to assess the acceptability of this 
method among residents and faculty. It also attempted to evaluate the impact of this feedback 
approach on communication skills of residents in pediatrics. To achieve this goal, Roter 
delivered a 1-hour role-play and didactic teaching linked to the use of her feedback approach 
with a simulated patient. Residents’ pre-intervention interactions in a simulated interview were 
videotaped in week 1. Residents then completed a communication skills self-assessment 
survey. Next, residents had a role-playing and didactic session focusing on four core skill areas: 
data gathering techniques utilizing open-ended questions, talking less and listening more, 
responding to the patients’ emotions, and building a therapeutic partnership for clinical problem 
solving. Residents then completed a 1-hour review session of coded videotapes within the 
software platform with a focus on areas of communication highlighted in the didactics and role-
playing session. A post-intervention interaction with a simulated patient was video recorded. 
The pre- and post-intervention videos were coded and analyzed using the coding system 
developed by Roter herself. 
The majority of the residents found the feedback session to be helpful and productive in 
improving their clinical skills. The study also reported an average of 2 more minutes per visit of 
the physician listening more and talking less. The study also reported an increase across 
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multiple domains of communication categories, including asking open-ended questions, asking 
closed-ended questions, providing reassurance, providing empathy, asking the patient’s 
opinion, asking for understanding, back-channeling, probing to problem solve, providing 
assistance to solve problems, and building a partnership and support. This work, while showing 
the value of engaging learner, can be criticized from at least three angles: first, it can be looked 
at as “training to the test.” In a sense, residents underwent training that was focused on what 
the coding schema is designed to capture, and then they were tested using outcomes they were 
specifically trained for. Second, while some aspects may be good in themselves, such as being 
empathetic, it is not convincing that merely talking less or asking open-ended questions 
indicates better patient care. Third, the intervention was a combination of modalities of learning 
that included video reviews, role-playing, and didactics. Little can be concluded about which one 
really played the main role in creating the effect. 
Few years later and acknowledging the role of self-assessment plays in the formative 
process of learning, Zick et al. (2007) examined the content of medical students’ self-
assessments of their communication skills development. The study compiled self-assessment 
forms of 674 first-year medical students that were completed as students reviewed their 
videotaped interactions with standardized patients. The forms were open-ended and thus 
provided ample opportunity for students to document the observed weaknesses and strengths. 
The contents of the completed forms were coded by two independent researchers using a 
content analysis methodology. On average, learners identified 2.8 areas for improvement and 
five areas of strengths. Areas for improvement included having challenges with covering 
important topics and eliciting information; using paralanguage, especially in rate, tone, volume, 
and disfluencies; discussing health risks; paying attention to transitions and conversational flow; 
and the student’s comfort/preparation/organization. Areas of strengths included covering 
important topics and eliciting information; making a personal connection and establishing 
rapport; being helpful, supportive, and encouraging; attending to transitions and conversational 
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flows; and ensuring the patient’s comfort. The study highlighted the informative value of self-
assessment not only for the learners but also for faculty. Identifying areas of improvement helps 
in developing strategies for improving in those areas. The study concluded that “an open-ended 
approach to self-assessment of communication skills can serve as one important component of 
a systematic education and evaluation program” (Zick, 2007, p. 165). 
Without being entangled in the comparison of accuracies, Jamshidi et al. (2009) focused 
on the accrued learning and thus evaluated the effect of using videotapes of residents’ suturing 
skills on their acquisition of these skills. Residents were recorded performing the skills (suturing 
and tying knots), and half of them were given the videos to review. Then they repeated the 
attempts in 7–10 days. The knots were evaluated mechanically, and the videos were assessed 
in a blinded fashion. The study showed better improvement in suturing and knot quality in the 
video review group and concluded that video review can augment the development of suturing 
skills for surgical residents. 
Similar to Jamshidi et al (2009) and within an expanded understanding of self-
assessment, Plant et al. (2012) examined the processes of informed self-assessment in a 
specific educational context in order to understand why, how, and to what extent residents 
adjust their self-assessments according to external information. The study used an approach of 
mixed methods. Residents from pediatrics led videotaped simulated resuscitation and rated 
their management skills on a six-item validated instrument. Three observers also rated the 
videos on the same instrument. In semi-structured interviews, residents then reviewed the video 
and discussed their self-assessment and interpreted the observers’ scores and feedback. The 
major themes emerging from the qualitative analysis of the interviews are that (1) residents 
found self-assessment important and useful in certain contexts and conditions; (2) residents 
varied in their self-directed learning behaviors after the simulated resuscitation; (3) quantitative 
observer assessment had limited usefulness; (4) video review was difficult but useful; and (5) 
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residents focused on their weaknesses and felt a need for constructive feedback to enhance 
learning (Plant, 2012, p. 181). 
After reviewing these studies, one cannot help but recognize the challenge of looking at 
self-assessment in isolation. The learner never acts in a silo. This is the case not only because 
learners always perform in front of an explicit other, but also because in every study there is an 
implicit other present in the processes of evaluation and learning, an other that has been 
internalized from previous experiences. Thus, a dialogue, whether explicit or implicit, with this 
other is always present. It is true that the learner observes herself and takes a third-person 
perspective when she reviews her own videos. But that is not the only position she takes. The 
learner maintains the implicit and always-present position of the “I,” the first person, as she 
judges and evaluates and as she learns. Furthermore, as she enacts a dialogue with the 
relevant other(s), whether the one internalized from previous learning experiences or the one 
implicit or explicit in structuring in the learning exercise in the form of guidance and instructions, 
she also takes a second-person perspective towards herself. To put it simply, even when the 
learner is learning/evaluating alone, she is actually learning with many others and taking in their 
points of view.  
Interestingly, learners valued the qualitatively reported judgments of the evaluator over 
those reduced to numbers. Learners seem to find comments more helpful than numerical 
scores, especially if the comment relates to an action they can learn to perform differently. 
Numbers that present an abstract comparison between the learner and other learners may not 
be as relevant, especially in the formative process of developing competency. The report on the 
student’s experience using qualitative methods reflected a similar position, which makes me 
wonder if learners privilege the open-ended over the numerical whereas researchers and 
occasionally teachers do the opposite. This tension is relevant when considering adult learners’ 
positions on how they should be learning, because those positions are particularly relevant to 
their engagement.  
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2. Learners reviewing their videos with faculty feedback, no peers 
As the roles in residency have been historically defined, ‘the faculty teaches and 
supervises, and the resident learns and performs’, so it is not surprising that the bulk of the 
literature falls under the category of video reviews with faculty supervising or coaching and 
providing feedback to the residents. The literature is rich with examples of this model, and its 
evaluation varies in sophistication between engagement survey studies and robust video 
analysis. Some studies suffered from significant methodological or theoretical flaws, while 
others showed without doubt the effectiveness of this method. Acceptability was also assessed. 
Jackson and Pinkerton (1983) presented some of the earliest work of reviewing videos with 
faculty. They surveyed residents to gauge their perception about the video review program they 
had implemented and reported that 75% of the residents considered videotape teaching highly 
beneficial, while 20% considered it moderately beneficial. Only 5% considered it non-beneficial. 
Residents valued the opportunity to see themselves interact with patients and appreciated 
suggestions from faculty members, whether behavioral or medical faculty. 
One of the earliest studies on effectiveness, and probably the most important landmark 
in the literature, came from the UK. Majuire, Fairbairn, and Fletcher (1986) demonstrated in a 5-
year follow-up study that those who had received video feedback training as students 
maintained superiority in interviewing skills when compared to those who did not receive this 
feedback, even after they went into practice. Eighteen doctors who received video feedback 
training and 18 doctors who did not receive the training were randomly selected from a group of 
148 participants who agreed to participate in the study. All participants were asked to obtain 
three histories of presenting problems. Two of the patients were simulated, and one was a real 
patient. The 108 videotapes were then evaluated by a trained psychologist who was blinded to 
previous student training. The rating used a checklist of 24 behavioral items, and each item was 
assessed in a binary way (present/absent). The two groups had similar baseline scores. After 
the initial video feedback training (five years prior to this experiment), it was found that both 
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groups improved their performance over time, but the trained group had improved their score 
significantly more than the untrained one. However, the trained group retained superiority over 
the untrained group along nearly every domain. With the exception of “avoiding use of jargon,” 
trained doctors had a statistically significant (p<0.05) superior performance in clarification of 
patients’ statements, using open questions, noticing verbal clues, inquiring about psychosocial 
problems, preventing needless repetition, keeping patients to the point, verbal and visual 
encouragement, getting precise information, and using brief questions.  The study concluded, 
“Given these lasting benefits, all medical students should have feedback training in interviewing 
skills” (Majuire, 1986, p. 1573). As a landmark in the literature of video reviews, this study 
established not only the effectiveness of the model but also the general standards for doing 
such work (Muench, 2013). 
After the work of Majuire et al. (1986), multiple studies showed consistent findings along 
the lines of acceptability and effectiveness of video reviews. McCormick et al. (1993) used 
videotaped health supervision examination for evaluation of residents and for training. 
Residents were videotaped, and the tapes were rated by two blinded raters on a 51-item 
instrument that was derived from the guidelines on health supervision. Residents also reviewed 
the videos with their faculty. Compared to pre-intervention tapes, residents in post-intervention 
demonstrated a 14% improvement in performance. Since the intervention and training was part 
of a six-month ambulatory rotation, the study could not evaluate the effects of the video 
reviewing sessions in isolation from the effect of the clinical practice training. The study 
indicated, however, that videotaping this kind of visit provides a reliable method for evaluation. 
Edwards et al. (1996), who described a model for a videotape review program that had 
been in use for 15 years, explored the themes of review sessions, presented the perspectives of 
the residents, and identified potential barriers to videotape review programs. In this model, 
residents were videotaped four times per year, and the videos were reviewed with a faculty 
member. In the feedback they provided, faculty attempted to encourage self-reflection, reinforce 
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effective behavior, and be sensitive to the needs of the learner. The study reported on a sample 
of 160 summary tapes of videotaped review sessions between 1990 and 1994. The main 
themes examined during these sessions were (1) the organization and structure of the office 
visit, (2) communication skills and interactional issues, (3) data gathering and clinical decision-
making, (4) challenging or difficult situations, and (5) personal issues related to the resident. 
This thematic analysis was applied to 453 issues, and the previous five themes were present 
54%, 30%, 9%, 5%, and 2% of the time, respectively.  
The theme of organization and structure covered the broad issues of eliciting concerns, 
setting an agenda, setting a time limit, and helping patients focus, among others. The 
communication and interactional theme covered issues related to nonverbal behaviors, 
psychosocial concerns, establishing a caring and trusting relationship, and clarifying 
communication. This theme also included issues related to the questioning style and assessing 
a patient’s belief about symptoms. The theme of data gathering and decision-making included 
issues related to assessment and management of clinical problems and topics related to the 
completeness of data gathering or adequacy of physical exam procedures. The theme of 
difficult situations covered a variety of challenging encounters such as a patient with anger, a 
patient with multiple concerns, or a patient seeking disability. Finally, the personal issues theme 
included issues related to a resident’s anxiety about the review process, issues related to 
fatigue and workload, and other stressors. Most of the surveyed residents found the process of 
videotaped reviews to be helpful in learning about different matters. It was particularly helpful for 
provider–patient communication, general patient care issues, and structure of the visit. In terms 
of comfort, only 4% of the residents reflected that they felt comfortable with the process at the 
beginning of the year compared to 55% feeling comfortable at the time of the survey after some 
rounds of video reviews. While the study provided important insight into what is covered in these 
sessions, it relied on the documentation produced after the session rather than on exploring the 
interactions that took place in the sessions themselves. 
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Considering the relative ease in characterizing what constitutes a surgical skill, the 
literature in surgery education is rich with examples of educational research experiments using 
video reviews. Birnback et al. (2002) conducted a randomized blinded study to determine the 
effectiveness of teaching with video review on epidural anesthesia skills at an anesthesiology 
residency. The study randomized 22 residents to video or no video groups. The video group 
residents reviewed their tapes two times per week with a supervisor anesthesiologist, while the 
other group of residents never saw their recordings. The study documented a statistically 
significant improvement on the scale used to determine overall skills (range of 0–40) and on 13 
predetermined criteria for quality performance (p<0.05). In addition to concluding that video 
reviews resulted in greater improvement, the video reviews helped identify specific skills that 
needed attention as well as helped provide specific teaching feedback. 
However, studies in the surgical literature were, for varying reasons, not consistent in 
showing positive effects. For example, Backstein, Agnidis, Regehr, and Reznick (2004) 
assessed the utility of videotaped feedback in learning technical orthopedic skills. The study 
video recorded 29 residents as they performed three surgical skills. Residents were divided into 
three groups: no feedback, watching the video alone, or watching the video with feedback from 
an expert surgeon. The surgical tasks were repeated twice in a pre- and post-study design. The 
study failed to show any statistically significant difference between the groups. The study 
attributed failing to identify a difference as potentially due to multiple factors, including 
combining experienced residents with junior ones, applying the experiment to a smaller number 
of residents, and the use of onetime video review as opposed to repeated views. The study also 
acknowledged the limited sensitivity of the measure, which had never been used to assess 
performance before videotaped feedback. One year later, Backstein, Agnidis, Sadhu, and 
MacRae (2005) attempted to address the limitation of having only one exposure to the video 
review process from their previous study (2004). They evaluated the benefits of repeated video 
review feedback for surgical residents performing a vascular procedure. They followed a 
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randomized controlled study design in which the study group had three weekly video feedback 
sessions, while the control group received no video feedback. The skills were assessed on 
week 4 by a vascular surgeon using a technical checklist form and a global rating scale. The 
study also found no statistically significant difference between the scores of the residents from 
the two groups. The study acknowledged limitations related to the outcome measurement as 
well as to the rigid process of giving feedback in a standardized rather than individualized way.  
Hamad, Brown, and Clavijo-Alvarez (2007) also failed to show meaningful improvement 
in a study evaluating the effects of video review debriefing on performing complex laparoscopic 
procedures. Residents were videotaped performing procedures, and half the residents 
underwent a post-operative video debriefing. In the debriefing session, residents and attending 
surgeons appraised the performance and discussed errors and successes. They also identified 
strategies and skills that could improve. The process was repeated weekly over a four-week 
period. While the study reported no difference in outcome performance indicators (minor errors, 
knot-tying time, and anastomotic time), the adverse events from technical errors were less 
frequent in the debriefed group. The study acknowledged the limitations related to the small 
number of subjects (six per group) and the lack of randomization since residents all desired to 
be in the debriefing session! 
However, using a more robust experimental methodology, meaningful improvement was 
shown in the gain of specific technical skills as a result of using video reviews. Nesbitt, Phillips, 
Searle, and Stansby (2015) conducted a randomized controlled trial to compare the 
effectiveness of three methods of feedback on students learning technical surgical skills. The 
students were videotaped performing a suturing technique, and then they were randomized to 
receive feedback in one of the following three forms: standard lecture feedback where learners 
received a generic lecture; unsupervised video-enhanced feedback (UVF), where learners went 
to private rooms where they watched their video, a video of an expert performing the technique, 
and a video of an expert giving hints and tips on the areas the learner had challenges 
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performing; or individualized video feedback (IVF), a one-on-one individual analysis of 
performance where the learners watched their videos unedited and were given real-time one-
on-one feedback about their performance from an expert. Learners then performed the same 
exercise again, and videos were blindly analyzed by two experts. The study demonstrated the 
superiority of UVF (p=0.047) and IVF (0.001) over traditional lecture feedback. The study 
concluded that “Video feedback can facilitate greater learning of clinical skills. Students can 
attain a similar level of surgical skills improvement with UVF as with teacher-intensive IVF” 
(Nesbitt, 2015, p. 697). 
Findings from Nesbitt et al. (2015) were confirmed by two other studies. Soucisse et al. 
(2017) evaluated the effectiveness of a video-based coaching technique on residents’ surgical 
skills measured by a global rating scale. Residents were filmed doing surgeries on a cadaver, 
and then the videotapes of the study group were played back in a debriefing and coaching 
session with a surgeon and constructive feedback was given. The control group did not undergo 
the feedback sessions. Both groups had follow-up videotaping of the same procedures. All the 
videos were rated on a seven-item global rating scale, and the score on the rating scale 
improved significantly more in the study group than in the control group. The study concluded 
that video coaching and feedback are efficient and effective methods for improving residents’ 
technical skills. Rindos, Wroble-Biglan, Ecker, Lee, and Donnellan (2017) conducted a 
randomized controlled trial to determine if adding video coaching improved resident suturing 
skills in laparoscopic obstetrics and gynecology. Residents were video recorded weekly while 
performing suturing tasks on simulation models. Residents in the experimental group received 
coaching and video reviews, while residents in the control group had a standard curriculum. 
Competency outcome was assessed using an eight-category measurement tool. Coached junior 
residents showed greater improvement after the coaching and video reviews compared to their 
peers in the control arm. The study concluded that video coaching provides another useful tool 
for training curricula that use simulation. 
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More insight can be gleaned by looking at these experiments from the participants’ 
perspectives. One would expect such perspectives to indicate that the dialogue with the other, 
here a more knowledgeable person, would support the participant’s competency to perform the 
task at hand. The principle is simple. The person performs a task following a rule. A more 
knowledgeable person, a teacher, shows the learner whether or not she followed the rule 
appropriately. The learner then changes the way she performs the task to produce a behavior 
that exemplifies the rule. One would expect that a person who is not receiving such coaching 
will rely primarily on her capacity for self-judging, and of course on other contingent 
opportunities for reflection. Thus, it would be reasonable and called for to employ coaching that 
involves dialogues between the learner and the more knowledgeable person. But it is not that 
simple. Instead of an authentic conversation that is open to mutual critique, the dialogue is 
sometimes coached in a “strategic” framework of interaction and thus loses its binding power. 
Let’s take concrete examples.  
A self-doubting teacher may criticize the learner to belittle her and support the teacher’s 
own self-certainty. Thus, the learner, coming to perceive the teacher as unknowledgeable, 
uncaring, or inauthentic, ignores the critique as irrelevant. Similarly, a learner, fearing 
vulnerability and to protect herself, may close to the conversation and thus miss the opportunity 
to learn. The teacher, in this case and perceiving the learner as disengaged, loses interest and 
avoids the difficult conversation. In reality, any learning dialogue likely falls somewhere on a 
continuum of openness, trust, and shared vulnerability. The agency and freedom of participants 
determine, to a large extent, whether they will be open or guard their vulnerability, whether they 
will trust or maintain a hard-hearted position, and whether they will communicate or act only 
strategically. Here also, critical dialogue and reflection come to support self-awareness and 
awareness of the other to foster authentic conversations. The studies reviewed often failed to 
capture such variations in learners’ agency and critical attitudes. This may explain some of the 
inconsistencies in the study findings.  
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3. Learners reviewing their videos with peer feedback, no faculty 
It is only in recent years that the notion of resident-as-teacher has become a mainstream 
concept. Many forces support the idea that peers can be leveraged to systematically lead the 
teaching of one another, which was the center of Carter et al.’s (2015) study. This study 
examined the feasibility and outcome of a novel method of video-based peer feedback, 
delivered through a social network, to facilitate the acquisition of robotic surgical skills. The 
study followed a randomized controlled study design and had 41 resident participants. The 
intervention group received peer feedback of their video-recorded performance through a social 
network webpage, while the control group did not receive feedback. Outcome data included 
exercise score, time to completion, satisfaction, and comfort with simulation. The intervention 
group scored higher than the control group (p=0.019) and took less time to complete the tasks 
(p=0.004). The intervention group also reported greater satisfaction (p=0.014) and comfort 
(p=0.021) compared to the control group. A majority of participants in the intervention group 
(85%) found the feedback useful, and 100% found it effective. The study concluded that “video-
based peer feedback through social networking is a novel and effective paradigm for improving 
robotic simulator training and may be an effective tool for continuous surgical education for 
practicing surgeons and trainees alike” (Carter et al., 2015, p. 874). 
The concept of recognition sheds light on peer dialogue. The learner sees in the other 
learner an equal “I.” She recognizes herself in the other. Upon this recognition, the person 
opens her subjective world to the other and allows this other to offer a critique. She also allows 
herself to receive care from the other. Moreover, the other occupies a reciprocal position. The 
peers shift back and forth between judging and acting positions; they allow themselves to be 
vulnerable. One party knows by looking inward what the other experiences and thinks. She also 
knows how to judge not only from a third-person perspective but from that of a person who can 
take the position of the other. She judges as though she were judging her own actions. Here, 
reflection as the essence of authentic dialogue comes to the fore. She talks to the other, from a 
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second-person perspective, while reflecting inwardly on her own learning experience. She also 
takes a third-person perspective on what the other person has performed while enacting her 
first-person role by making claims of the kind “I believe,” “I judge as right/wrong,” and “If I were 
there, I would have done it in this or that way.” From a value standpoint, peer dialogue is the 
best place to actualize the self and develop authenticity with the other.   
4. Learners reviewing their videos with peer and faculty feedback 
Having residents review videos with peer and faculty feedback has also been evaluated 
in medical education. This method leverages a combination of peer feedback and faculty 
feedback in addition to and implicit or explicit self-assessment. Premi (1991) presented a 15-
year experience of using videotape review at a family medicine residency program. Residents 
routinely videotaped clinical encounters with their patients and selected tapes they thought 
would be useful for their learning. The tapes were reviewed in 1-hour sessions with groups of 
two to four residents and one or more faculty members. The faculty helped learners explore 
issues that arose in the tapes and subsequent discussions. Premi explicated how residents 
reflected on clinical experiences as they learned from them because “videotapes allow the 
viewer to ‘replay’ the experience and yet stand outside it. Thus, in addition to the data that were 
directly observable by anyone viewing a tape replay, the residents, in reviewing their own tapes, 
found that these acted as a powerful stimulus to their memories as to what they were thinking 
and feeling during the consultation itself” (p. 56). The videotapes reminded residents of the 
underlying motivations behind their behaviors and what they were trying to achieve for the 
patient from a medical standpoint. Faculty attempted to help residents examine their 
performance objectively, achieving it by attempting to distinguish between what the residents 
felt and thought, on the one hand, and what they observed, on the other hand. To enhance 
objectivity, faculty also attempted to explicitly distinguish between what is observed and what is 
inferred from the observation. 
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Abbass (2004) evaluated the program he implemented, which was small-group peer 
review of videotapes for the purposes of training and development of psychotherapy skills. The 
experience was coached by a senior supervisor. The trainees provided written feedback on a 
quarterly basis, and over the five years of assessment, the ratings of the supervisor averaged 
4.9 on a scale of 1 to 5. In a pilot evaluation, 26 participants completed a pre-training 
assessment and a 6-month post-training assessment, and a 7.5-point improvement (on a scale 
of 20 points) was documented, which represents a two standard deviation improvement. The 
course’s rating was 4.6 out of 5 over 16 offerings. 
Jain, Schwarzkopf, and Scolaro (2017) developed an educational program for orthopedic 
residents to receive feedback from peer and faculty on the technical skills used in a procedure. 
Then participants were surveyed to assess the perceived benefit and usage of this program. 
The residents performed closed manipulative reduction of fractures and were videotaped during 
the procedure. The videotapes were reviewed by faculty and peers for analysis and gave 
feedback on the reduction technique. The survey showed that 100% of faculty and 97% of junior 
residents reported they would use the program again. Faculty and residents strongly agreed 
(scored >8/10, on average, in all categories) that this educational program improved resident 
preparation for fracture care in the emergency department, that this technology would improve 
patient care and outcomes, and that video reviews are more useful in education than other 
methods. Faculty members wished the technology had been available when they learned about 
fracture reduction. 
The presence in the room of a more knowledgeable, authoritative person in addition to 
the peer may shift the nature of the dialogue. Here, in a communicative pattern of dialogue, the 
conversation can take the form of judgment regarding whether someone follows the rule. The 
fact that the teacher is more knowledgeable does not change the essence of the essence of the 
conversation, which is a judgment and a critique of judgment between two participants. The 
teacher is normatively authorized to coach the conversation. The more knowledgeable person 
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has better access to reason and can exercise the capacity to select the rule that fits the context. 
Yet, if the dialogue is coached in a way that reflects the power difference between teacher and 
learner, it can also take the shape of implicit coercion. From the perspective of the learner, such 
an interaction turns into a performance that aims to satisfy the teacher’s expectations. This type 
of interaction relieves the teacher of the burden of proof. However, it runs the risk of sacrificing 
the need to bring in the better argument for the sake of efficiency. In reality, every interaction 
between a learner and a teacher falls somewhere on a continuum between purely 
communicative and dialogical and purely power laden and coercive.   
5. Faculty reviewing resident videos for evaluation 
By far, the most common form of video review was with faculty reviewing residents as 
they performed different functions. Studies in this area varied enormously since what is 
evaluated is an unlimited set of behaviors and skills. Some studies attempted to develop or 
validate assessment tools or checklists. Other studies assessed a resident’s performance of a 
task. Finally, some studies explored aspects of a resident’s interaction with the patient or with 
the computer. An important theme was the frequent disappointment with the reliability of these 
methods and the inconsistent achievement of improving reliability by training. 
Edelstein and Ruder (1990) developed a system of videotaping and rating called The 
Northwestern Evaluation & Training System (NETS) to evaluate residents’ performance during 
an interview and physical examination. A class of 25 interns evaluated two standardized 
patients, one male and one female, and the interactions were videotaped. The rating scale was 
comprised of 33 sections for both the interview and the physical exam. The author suggested 
that the new tool could be used to provide feedback and to assess the quality of training. No 
assessment of effectiveness was conducted.  
Rosenzweig, Brigham, Snyder, Xu, and McDonald (1999) also developed an observation 
instrument for use in evaluating communication behavior. In their study, they also reported on a 
process for evaluating the communication skills of residents in emergency medicine. The 
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process involved video recording actual resident–patient encounters. The instrument they used 
was based on reviewing the literature and analyzing 12 resident–patient encounters. The 
investigators identified 32 communication behaviors (nine undesirable and 23 desirable) and 
classified these behaviors into six categories: introduction, information gathering, contracting or 
informing, conflict management, rapport building, and nonverbal communication. The checklist 
instrument focused on communication processes and not on the medical content to indicate if a 
behavior was noted or not and whether the behavior was of poor, good, or excellent quality. 
After developing the instrument, three investigators independently reviewed a convenient 
sample of 11 patients’ videotapes. Agreement between raters was limited to 11 out of the 21 
items. The study noted that “there was excellent agreement for eight items: asks or states 
patient’s name; greets family or friends present; explains immediate plan for evaluation or 
treatment; discusses expected waiting time; makes false promises; positions self closer to 
patient’s head than to feet; makes appropriate eye contact; and has posture oriented toward 
patient. There was moderate agreement for two items: introduces self by name; tries to 
negotiate with patient. There was poor or no agreement for behaviors relating to establishing 
rapport, gathering information, and contracting or informing” (Rosenzweig, 1999, p. 357). The 
study acknowledged the limitations of using a small sample of resident–patient encounters, but 
it acknowledged that an alternative model can leverage multiple faculty members reviewing 
video at the same time and arriving at a consensus after discussing interpretations. They also 
pointed out the importance of focusing on communication processes only and avoiding content 
assessment such as the completeness of gathering information or thoroughness of performing 
the physical exam. 
Holmboe, Huot, Chung, Norcini, and Hawkins (2003) investigated the construct validity 
of a commonly used evaluation rubric called the mini-clinical evaluation exercise (mini-CEX). 
The tool was developed and adopted by the American Board of Internal Medicine to facilitate 
direct observation. The researcher constructed nine videotapes of standardized residents 
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interacting with standardized patients to enact different quality performances, and the 
videotapes were presented to 40 individual faculty members from 16 residency programs. The 
study found faculty members were able to distinguish between the three levels of performance 
as characterized by the tool. However, there were wide variations in ratings of performance, 
with ranges on some videos spanning from unsatisfactory to superior on four out of the nine 
tapes. Holmboe et al. (2003) found his study to be congruent with previous research highlighting 
serious problems in the accuracy of faculty observations. They also pointed out two main 
limitations. First, faculty members were recruited from a faculty development program, meaning 
they potentially represented highly motivated faculty members and not the whole faculty body. 
Second, the ratings took place in a classroom setting rather than in a clinical practice, which 
may pose another challenge for generalizability. 
Later, Cook, Dupras, Beckman, Thomas, and Pankratz (2009) evaluated whether a rater 
training workshop would improve the reliability and accuracy of raters using mini-CEX. The 
study used a randomized controlled study design with the intervention consisting of a workshop 
on rater training, behavioral observation training, performance dimension training, and frame of 
reference training. The instruction used videos, lectures, and facilitated discussions. The study 
used ratings from mini-CEX at baseline and four weeks after the training, and actual resident–
patient encounters were used for assessment. No statistically significant difference was 
detected between the pre-intervention and post-intervention correlation coefficient scores. 
Confidence in rating improved for all participants, but the difference between groups was not 
statistically significant. The study concluded that there was no improvement in inter-rater 
reliability or accuracy. The study acknowledged limitations related to being a single-site study 
and with all participants being internists. Similar to this was the disappointment of Schuh et al. 
(2009) in the performance of local raters compared to national ones. Their study documented 
poor inter-rater reliability for the Neurology Clinical Skills Exam (NEX), a newly adopted tool for 
resident evaluation in neurology. Videotapes from four residency programs were evaluated by 
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national examiners and local faculty. The inter-rater reliability for a pass versus fail 
determination was poor (Kappa 0.32) between local and national examiners, and national 
examiners were more likely to fail residents than were local faculty. This study acknowledged 
the limitation of having a small number of participating residency programs (only four). 
In an attempt to evaluate residents’ performance compared the institution’s standard 
protocol, Olson, Gurr, and Hughes (1999) used videotaping of residents performing rapid 
sequence intubation in the emergency room. Videotapes of 33 residents were reviewed by the 
study investigators, and of the 45 videos reviewed, deviations were identified in a significant 
number (45% for one specific maneuver, and 34% for another maneuver). The second aim of 
the study was to compare residents’ performance on the video with their immediate recall of 
their performance. The study reported that residents frequently misperceived their performance, 
even immediately following the procedure. This provided evidence for the utility of videotape 
analysis as an objective measure. A few years later, Matthewes, Kaleida, and Lopreiato (2004) 
evaluated the performance of residents’ interpretive skills of otoscopic findings in pediatric 
residency using videotaped otoendoscopic exams. The study documented the feasibility and 
reliability of this method in distinguishing the skills levels of novice, resident, and expert 
providers. Similarly, Grant et al. (2012) created and evaluated a tool to assess all elements of 
pediatric resuscitation for the team leader. The 26-item tool was derived from the literature and 
refined using Delphi methodology. It was then used to evaluate the performance of 30 residents 
on videotapes of two standardized resuscitation scenarios. The study demonstrated the validity 
and reliability of the instrument based on the work of four pediatrician evaluators. 
Videotapes were used by Collins, Schrimmer, Diamond, and Burke (2011) to examine 
verbal communication during learners’ interactions with standardized patients using a checklist 
consisting of items such as body lean, body position, posture change, and more. The verbal 
communication aspect was evaluated by a trained actor playing the standardized patient. The 
study concluded that maintaining adequate nonverbal communication has a positive effect on 
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the perceived quality of the interviews. A few years later, Asan, Kushner, and Montague (2015) 
explored and compared residents’ interaction with computers by year of training using a field 
study. The study video recorded 12 residents during 38 patient visits. The videos then were 
analyzed for gaze behaviors of both the physicians and the patients at the computer and at 
each other. Using an established coding scheme, the study found that third-year residents spent 
a greater proportion of time looking at the computer than did more junior residents. The third-
year residents also spent more time inputting information or typing during the visits than the 
more junior residents. The study concluded that computer use varied by year of training and 
attributed it to either increased workload or increased electronic health record proficiency. 
When video reviews are used for resident learning in the absence of the residents 
themselves, we are left with nothing but a group of individuals evaluating the actions of others 
from a third-person perspective. Clearly, an evaluator’s third-person position is not isolated from 
her other positions, yet she has no direct access to the other as a conversant. As I argued 
above, position taking is a process in which the person switches frequently between first-, 
second-, and third-person positions. When an evaluator makes a judgment claim, she occupies 
a first-person position. She also performs before an audience that is constituted by learners (in 
absentia here) and her peers. In this performance, she oscillates between the person who acts 
(first person) and the person who engages in a dialogue with an internalized other (second 
person). However, the limitation of the observer’s position of the evaluator is that she does not 
engage in direct dialogue with the person being judged. She engages only in implicit dialogues, 
with little access to verification and little need to vindicate her positions.  
The person making a judgment is a subject, and she judges another subject. She 
functions within a normative context that is constituted by her social world, which is shared with 
the recipient of judgment. The judgment is fallible, because the evaluator is conditioned by the 
knowledge she has acquired and limited within her competency to judge. In her judgments, the 
evaluator makes subjective claims in support of her authenticity, truthfulness, and honesty. All 
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these claims are open to criticism by others, including the recipient of judgment. Clearly, the 
evaluator could orient her actions within a communicative framework of dialogue and thus be 
accepting of the critique. Alternatively, she could orient her actions within a strategic framework, 
in which is she is more likely to have in mind her own contingent ends, such as humiliating the 
learner, appearing intelligent, or merely hiding incompetency. She may be aware of or oblivious 
to these ends. Evaluating others is a complex social action and should not be reduced to its 
objectivated domain.  
Unfortunately, some studies have been bogged in with the contradictions of the 
framework of subject–object mode of knowing. It is as if a checklist and a recorded interaction 
are all what it takes to magically allow a group of people to understand a social phenomenon in 
the same way. This idea is based on the troubling assumptions that knowing a subject is 
equivalent to knowing an object and that such knowledge can be accessed immediately and in 
the same way by multiple knowers. The framework of much of the research on developing 
evaluation forms is as follows: an evaluator can arrive at valid and “objective” judgments even 
while ignoring what the learner brings to the process of understanding and ignoring what the 
judge brings to the action of judging. I have already argued that judgment is better understood 
as an intersubjective endeavor that is undertaken, from the participant’s perspective, according 
to the concept of following a rule. Without reflection and a critical dialogue between participants, 
the position of an observer, if clung to tightly, can only lead to, and may conceal, many 
contradictions.  
Comparative Evaluation 
The literature presents examples of comparisons of every possible combinations of 
video reviewing modes. In the following paragraphs, I provide a few examples of such 
comparisons.  
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1. Self-assessment versus faculty evaluation 
The comparison between these modes of engagement were primarily around accuracy. 
For example, Sadosty et al. (2010) used videotaped recordings of standardized patients for 
learners to evaluate, review, and reflect on their own performance. Their study aimed to assess 
the accuracy of resident self-assessment of performance and evaluate the effectiveness of 
video-assisted performance review on self-assessment accuracy. After residents completed a 
videotaped simulation-based assessment, they evaluated their own performance. They 
repeated the assessment after reviewing the video of the session. Ratings completed by the 
residents themselves were compared to those of faculty observers. Before observing the 
videos, residents graded their performance accurately in 73.7% of the items. After reviewing the 
videos, residents were accurate in 73.6% of the items, which was not significantly different. 
Interestingly, residents with high scores were accurate in their self-assessment in 83.0% of the 
items versus only 62.2% of items for residents with low scores. The study concluded by saying, 
“This study suggests that abilities of residents to self-assess vary across residents, and that 
performance quality may influence the ability of a resident to self-assess. Video review did not 
significantly increase self-assessment accuracy” (p. 684). The author suggested two 
hypotheses to explain these results. First, after a “bad” or “good” performance, residents may be 
in a worse or better frame of mind to engage in a self-assessment exercise. Second, “the 
presence or absence of performance insight may be linked to ultimate performance quality, and 
thus, high-scoring residents accurately self-assess performance because it is part of the skill set 
they utilize to achieve their high scoring status . . . poor self-assessment skills may be what 
relatively impede the success of low-scoring residents, as residents without insight may not 
identify areas in need of improvement” (p. 683). Sadosty et al. (2010) went further to 
hypothesize that the development of self-assessment skills may enhance practice as clinicians 
become more able to identify areas of improvement and develop strategies to remediate 
deficits. 
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Moving from communication skills in the doctor–patient relationship into the technical 
surgical skills, Vyaza et al. (2017) conducted a study to explore self-assessment for surgical 
residents with three goals: (1) to examine the accuracy of self-assessment, (2) to investigate if 
accuracy improves with practice over time, and (3) to compare the efficacy of three different 
interventions on self-assessment accuracy. These interventions were expert observation, 
practice only, and self-observation. The pre- and post-test assessment consisted of completing 
a colonoscopy exercise on a simulator. The study showed “improvement” in discrepancy scores 
(the difference between the self-assessment scores and the “actual measurement”) for some 
items in the groups that watched their videos and the ones that observed the expert, but not for 
those who were in the practice only group. The study concluded that “novice trainees are 
inaccurate self-assessors of their endoscopic skills. Allowing trainees to watch videos of 
themselves or an expert performing an endoscopic task enhanced performance” (Vyaza, 2017, 
p. 23).  
Another comparison in the area of performing of surgical skills is the work Hu, Tiemann, 
and Brunt (2013). They video recorded knot tying and basic suturing procedures. These 
procedures were assessed by the learner and then by a senior surgeon instructor. The study 
showed that self-assessment scores were higher than those given by the instructor. In this 
study, the use of the instructor’s assessment was solely as a comparison and not for education. 
A similar difference in assessment was captured by Herrera-Almario et al. (2016), who also 
documented that resident self-assessment and attending assessments differed when evaluating 
laparoscopic skills using video reviews. 
In the area of communication, the comparison also took place. Stuart, Goldstein, and 
Snope (1980) acknowledged the value of self-assessment as a central task for the growth of a 
family physician during and after residency. They asked residents to evaluate themselves 
performing interviewing skills with standardized patients recorded on videotapes. Self-
assessment was then compared with multiple faculty evolution. The study found that “means 
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for resident evaluations were lower and showed greater variations than faculty ratings but 
correlated significantly in several areas. Inter-rater reliability coefficients were highest when 
criteria were most specific. Residents benefit from the opportunity to compare and discuss their 
perceptions with those of objective and competent raters” (Stuart, 1980, abstract). 
Wittler, Hartman, Manthey, Hiestand, and Askew (2016) attempted to identify whether 
self-rating correlated with performance. This randomized controlled study used video-
augmented feedback to promote more accurate self-assessment and facilitate procedural skill 
acquisition in comparison to verbal feedback alone. The study used a 30-point checklist for the 
specific procedure and six points for a global rating scale. Improvement was similar in the two 
groups. Resident self-assessment ratings diverged from faculty scoring, and the divergence 
increased after the feedback. Residents who were rated more poorly by faculty overestimated 
their performance. On the other hand, residents who were rated highly by faculty 
underestimated their performance. Defining accuracy as matching the scores of the faculty, and 
based on a sample of 15 interns divided into a control arm and experimental arms, the study 
concluded that video-augmented feedback did not improve the accuracy of self-assessment. 
Further, this modality did not enhance skill acquisition in comparison to standard feedback. 
Despite not questioning the validity of the tool used, the study acknowledged multiple limitations 
related to convenience of sampling; providing global feedback to both groups, which may have 
mitigated the effect of the video reviews; and the use of novice learners, where any feedback 
would likely result in improvement. 
Schneider, Verta, Ryan, Corcoran, and DaRosa (2007) explored the relationship 
between resident self-assessment and faculty evaluation using a standardized patient 
examination tool that is used to assess management skills. Nine senior residents were 
examined in these patient scenarios. The videotapes of the interactions were rated by the 
faculty and by the residents themselves. Correlation between the two ratings was tested 
statistically. The study found that only ratings for physical examination skills competency to be 
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correlated between the two groups of evaluators. Fifteen other competencies had poor 
correlation. The study concluded that even senior residents do not self-assess in a way that 
resembles faculty’s evaluation. The study acknowledged the limitations related to 
generalizability since the study was conducted in one institution only. It also acknowledged the 
possibility of bias considering the previous interactions between the faculty and the residents. 
The studies mentioned above demonstrate the complex nature of evaluation, whether 
done by the self or by an other. A comparison between the two forms of evaluation is not 
uncalled for. There is no doubt that once an action is performed and gains an objective 
existence, it becomes susceptible to appraisal. Interestingly, the studies emphasize the link 
between the competency for judging oneself and the competency for performing an act. The link 
is clear if we view the performance of an act as a knowing how and the judgment of that act as a 
position that explicates this knowing how by turning it into a knowing what. A person who 
cultivates the competency to judge is a person who knows how to explicate her own actions, 
how to give reasons for what she did, and how to explain why things went wrong when in fact 
they went wrong. A person who can judge her own actions is a step closer to modifying them, if 
needed.  
The other important distinction is that between competency and performance. When a 
person is competent in following a rule, she has the capacity to perform an act that an observer 
can take as an example of that rule. For many contingent reasons, however, this person may 
not be able to bring her competency to bear in every act. Observing another’s action does not 
allow the observer access to the rule that is followed. It is only the agent herself who can 
explicate the rule she is following. This may explain the substantial variation between self-
assessments and assessments made by the other. Comparing the two assumes that the 
evaluators (both self and other) know what rule is being followed. The actor, however, is the 
only party with privileged access to the rule she is following. It is true that she can follow a rule 
only on the basis of conventions shared with others, but an other can know that the actor is 
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following a rule only if she says she is doing so. On the other hand, there is no such thing as 
following the rule alone. It is recognized, since Wittgenstein, that following a rule can only be 
taken for an other.  
Disagreement can take place if judgment is done alone. An evaluator can judge the 
actor as violating rule N1 with act A even while the actor judges herself as successfully following 
rule N2 by performing act A. The other will judge the act as inadequate, whereas the self will 
take the opposite position. As a result, an evaluator and a learner using the same evaluation 
form can produce significantly different scores. Determining which rule ought to be followed in a 
specific context is a decision each person makes for reasons known to her and have legitimacy 
for an other. There is evidence that a more knowledgeable person may have an advantaged 
position in selecting which rule ought to be followed. However, her decision is not infallible. In a 
doctor–patient interaction, the doctor has a privileged position in relation to the patient. Yet, to 
better understand a medical situation, a doctor must turn to critical reflection and dialogue, 
which sometimes require abstracting herself from the I–Thou interaction and taking a third-
person perspective. For reflection, a third-person participant position is of great value. All these 
positions are socially grounded. All are constrained within the normative space. In addition, they 
all work within the subjective conditions of access to objective truth and normative rightness 
without having any immediate access to truth or the absolute right.  
2. Self-assessment versus peer feedback 
The tone of assessment, positive or negative, the content, and correlation were topics of 
comparison in this area. Hulsman and van der Vloodt (2015) analyzed the characteristics of 
self-assessment and peer feedback of medical students on video-recorded interaction with 
simulated patients. The videos of 24 medical students were uploaded into a web-based 
platform, and the videos were then marked and annotated for negative and positive events. 
Peers reviewed the video and the self-assessment and provided feedback. The topics of the 
annotation and their specificity were coded for qualitative analysis. The study identified that 
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students annotated fewer positive events than negative events. Peer feedback, on the other 
hand, was more positive, and the positive annotations were less specific than the negative 
ones. Topics focused more on the structure of the consultation. Peer feedback was less specific 
than self-assessment, and the two correlated. 
Reviewing videos with a peer cannot be understood outside the high-stakes culture of 
medical education: the person is expected to perform competently and is expected to care for 
others. Learners judge themselves with an awareness of their own uncertainties, and they often 
observe the actions of more knowledgeable learners. Consequently, they tend to be overly 
critical of themselves. At the same time, learners are aware of their own vulnerability and that of 
others. They expect themselves to care for others; in the end, they are doctors. Because of this 
reflection and this norm, they tend to be more forgiving of others. These contradictory 
orientations may give rise to an unspoken norm: the learner is expected to be both overly self-
critical and kind to others. Violating this norm, whether by being easy on oneself or hard on 
others, would result in others being critical of the learner or permissive with respect to their own 
mistakes. This normative reality in medical education can be a hindrance to authentic and 
reflective conversations. When errors are normalized with statements like “it is OK; I have done 
that before” and when compliments are offered without specificity, the learner may not have the 
opportunity to engage with errors in order to turn them into learning opportunities.   
3. Faculty feedback versus peer feedback 
One exceptionally interesting study in this area is the work of Vaughn et al. (2016). They 
developed a home video assessment of a surgical procedure, namely knot tying and suturing. 
Then, they compared the effectiveness of faculty-provided feedback and peer-provided 
feedback. Both the peers and faculty used a checklist, global ratings, and comments to depict 
the outcomes comparing the pre- and post-intervention video recordings of the participants 
performing the procedures. In the peer feedback group, participants received deidentified videos 
of peers performing procedures and provided feedback using the checklists and global scores. 
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Similarly, faculty received deidentified videos for rating using the same checklist and global 
scores. Experts then assessed the video recordings of the procedures taken before and after 
the training. The study showed an improvement in baseline in both groups; however, the peer 
feedback group performed better than the faculty feedback group on the final assessment. Of 
interest, the scores given by peers using the checklists were not significantly different from 
those given by the faculty. The study concluded that “with the checklist as a guideline, peers are 
comparable raters. The Peer Feedback group performed better at the final assessment, 
suggesting a potential advantage of reviewing another’s performance. Peer Feedback can be 
used in a surgical skills laboratory setting to supplement faculty instruction” (p. 359). Vaughn et 
al. (2016) explained the findings, relying on Fitts and Posner’s theory of the three stages of 
learning when saying, “it is possible that a better understanding, it is possible that a better 
understanding” (pp. 258–259). Vaughn et al. also suggested that the repeated watching of video 
clips of another’s performance may have improved cognitive understanding of the task. 
This study is particularly interesting because it problematizes the taken-for-granted 
notion that compared to a peer, an attending physician is a better teacher for the learner. In 
some situations, a peer may have better access to how learning takes place and how errors are 
made. An attending physician may be so distanced from the conditions of learning that she can 
relate only weakly to the experience of learning and making mistakes. Furthermore, a peer may 
choose a way of speaking couched in care and support rather than belittlement and 
dismissiveness. Such a choice may derive from the norm of treating others as one wants to be 
treated, as an end (to use Kantian reference), or may be a strategic means of encouraging the 
peer to use the language of care and support if the two should ever switch positions.  
It is not untroubling, however, that attending physicians, who have years of experience in 
performing and teaching clinical tasks, have underperformed residents,  who just started 
learning the how and explicating their learning in a what. Attending physicians should develop 
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sophisticated teaching skills in order to coach learners in the effective use of critical dialogue 
and reflection so they can grow into competent and authentic practitioners.  
Reflection and aims 
I followed three complementary approaches in my review to identify the main gaps in the 
literature on video reviews. I first presented a critical exploration of the theoretical underpinning 
of the use of this tool, focusing on the problematic of technicized medicine, the unfitness of 
systems theory as grounds for learning appraisals and delivery of appraisals to learners, and 
the futile emphasis on the disparity between self-assessment and assessment of others. 
Second, I traced the evolution of the use of this method. I reported how it started as a method to 
construct assessments and quickly became a valuable tool for education and evaluation. Third, I 
reported on some of the evidence for feasibility, acceptability, and effectiveness of this model. 
Despite some inconsistencies, the clear majority of work asserted that the tool can be adapted 
for educational use, is accepted by educators and learners, and is mostly effective for attaining 
the intended goals. In the evaluative work, I also presented some of the literature that points out 
some assumed limitations of this tool, namely, the problem of reliability and validity. 
In the previous three sections of the literature review, I moved between theoretical and 
empirical work, developing my critique along the way. The explicated critical positions are the 
ground of the empirical work I have conducted. This work, which is the topic of the rest of the 
dissertation, is meant to exemplify critical educational work that engages learners in critical 
dialogue and reflection within a communicative rationality framework. This theoretical framework 
can guide not only the educational experience itself but also the qualitative research that 
explicates that experience. As noted above, this ambitious empirical project may result in a shift 
in thinking not only in the field of medical education but also in medicine at large by achieving its 
twofold aim: 
1) Define, from the perspectives of learners and supervisors, what should 
happen in a resident–patient interaction.   
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2) Characterize, again from the perspectives of learners and supervisors, 
what should be avoided in a doctor–patient interaction.  
 
Methodology 
Theoretical framework. 
In what follows, I will present (a) an excursus on the theory of communicative action as 
the framework of this study, and (b) a reflection that adapts this theoretical framework to the 
context of medicine and medical education.  
(a) An excursus of the theory. Habermas presents the Theory of Communicative Action 
as a framework for addressing the classical question of how social order is possible. Since 
Hobbes, the question of social order has been framed as, “how norms with trans-subjectively 
binding normative validity claims can develop out of the interest positions and individual profit 
calculations of actors who make decisions in a purposive rational way and who encounter each 
other only haphazardly” (Habermas, 1998, p. 234). Habermas argues that only communicative 
action has the structural constraints for language, which is shared intersubjectivity, to impel the 
actors to step out of the egocentricity of their purposive-rational orientation toward success and 
to give themselves in to the public criteria of a rationality that is communicative. This trans-
subjective structure of language provides a basis for answering the classical question of social 
order. 
Habermas continued to take Weber’s definition of social actions as, “actions whereby 
actors, in pursuing their personal plans of action, are also guided by the expected actions of 
others” (Habermas, 1998, p. 326). Habermas distinguishes between communicative and 
strategic actions by saying,  
We speak of communicative action where actors coordinate their plans of action with one 
another by way of linguistic processes of reaching understanding, that is, in such a way that 
they draw on the illocutionary binding and bonding powers of speech acts for this coordination. 
(p. 326) 
He adds this with regard to the other in a strategic action,  
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The potential for communicative rationality remains unexploited, even where the interactions are 
linguistically mediated. Because the participants in strategic action coordinate their plans of 
action with one another by way of a reciprocal exertion of influence, language is used not 
communicatively, in the sense elucidated, but with an orientation towards consequences. 
(p. 326) 
Habermas replaces Popper’s ontological concept of world with a 
phenomenological one and adopts the two concepts of “world” and “lifeworld.” Societal 
subjects employ the concept world implicitly when they participate in cooperative 
processes of interpretation. The lifeworld, on the other hand, constitutes cultural traditions 
shared by the community and that have already been interpreted for members of the 
society. Cultural traditions, or what Popper refers to as “the products of the human mind,” 
can either be the topic of the intellectual endeavor or can itself function from behind as a 
“cultural stock of knowledge from which the participants in interaction draw their 
interpretations” (Habermas, 1984, p. 82). As the lifeworld is intersubjectively shared 
between the participants, it forms the background for communicative action. 
Phenomenologists speak of the lifeworld as “the unthematically given horizon within which 
participants in communication move in common when they refer thematically to something 
in the world” (Habermas, 1984, p. 82). This lifeworld can be brought to the fore equally by 
societal members and by research scientists in daily interactions and in any dialogical 
attempts to understand. 
Habermas then combines the perspectives from the action theory that befits the lifeworld 
and the systems theory that befits social systems to avoid the limited and one-sided 
perspectives of each one when taken alone. Habermas explains,  
From the participant perspective of members of a lifeworld it looks as if sociology with a 
systems-theoretical orientation considers only one of the three components of the lifeworld, 
namely, the institutional system, for which culture and personality merely constitute 
complementary environments. From the observer perspective of systems theory, on the other 
hand, it looks as if lifeworld analysis confines itself to one societal subsystem specialized in 
maintaining structural patterns (pattern maintenance); in this view, the components of the 
lifeworld are merely internal differentiations of this subsystem which specifies the parameters of 
societal self-maintenance. (Habermas, 1987, p. 153) 
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 A systems theory of the society, however, cannot, based on methodological grounds, be self-
sufficient since the structures of the lifeworld can only be gotten at using hermeneutic 
approaches that take into consideration members’ pretheoretical knowledge. This inner logic of 
the lifeworld places significant internal constraints on the maintenance of a system. In addition, 
Habermas asserts, “the objective conditions under which the systems-theoretical objectification 
of the lifeworld becomes necessary have themselves only arisen in the course of social 
evolution. And this calls for a type of explanation that does not already move within the system 
perspective” (Habermas, 1987, p. 153). 
The process of societal rationalization appears, within the framework of the Theory of 
Communicative Action, as contradictory from the start. According to Habermas,  
The contradiction arises between, on one side, a rationalization of everyday communication that 
is tied to the structures of inter-subjectivity of the lifeworld, in which language counts as the 
genuine and irreplaceable medium of reaching understanding, and, on the other side, the 
growing complexity of subsystems of purposive-rational action, in which actions are coordinated 
through steering media such as money and power. Thus there is a competition not between the 
types of action oriented to understanding and to success, but between principles of societal 
integration—between the mechanism of linguistic communication that is oriented to validity 
claims—a mechanism that emerges in increasing purity from the rationalization of the 
lifeworld—and those de-linguistified steering media through which systems of success-oriented 
actions are differentiated out. (Habermas, 1987, p. 342–343) 
This contradiction represents a paradox of rationalization. As the rationalization of lifeworld 
makes possible the systemic integration, the latter enters into competition with and disintegrates 
the principles of social integration of the lifeworld that are founded on reaching understanding. 
As the societal subsystems differentiate out via the steering media of money and power and 
make themselves independent of the lifeworld context, according to Habermas, the lifeworld 
gets shunted aside into the system environment and technicized. 
The theory of communicative action is the right meta-theoretical frame here for many 
reasons, and I will mention just three. First, in this work, participants engage in dialogues; that 
is, they use language as a medium to reach an understanding regarding what is in the objective 
world, social world, and subjective world of these participants. Second, what is examined in the 
videos, from the participants’ (residents and attendings) perspectives rather than observer 
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perspectives, is the interactions between participants (doctors and patients) who are also using 
language to reach an understanding. Third, participants take the evaluative attitude of 
themselves or one another regarding not only the technical aspects of what took place (i.e., the 
means used to reach the ends) but rather the many aspects of truth and effectiveness, 
normative rightness, and authenticity. Leveraging the rather complex and elaborate theory of 
Habermas is, in my opinion, the right fit for examining the complex and intricate workings of both 
the physician and the patient as well as of the learners and evaluators. 
(b) Reflections and adaptations. This reflection is grounded in my understanding of the 
Theory of Communicative action and advances the thinking on the three tensions presented 
previously when reviewing the evolution of video-recording as an approach for education. I will 
hereby, first, attempt to resurrect the “I” of the doctor and acknowledge the dialectics of the 
identity between the “I” and the “me”; second, attempt to resurrect the “I” of the patient and 
frame knowing as the process of coming to an intersubjective understanding between the doctor 
and the patient; third, shed light on the double nature of learning in residency as the formative 
experience of cultivating an authentic subject who will adhere to the norms of the profession. 
The doctor is a subject, a person, an “I” who acts and reacts. The doctor is an agency 
and freedom, yet is conditioned with experiences in the world around her. The “me” in the 
doctor, the part that is directed toward the others, is what the doctor perceives herself as and 
what she wants others to perceive her as. The “I” works on the “me” and shapes it within the 
conditions of the given experiences, which are in turn also shaped to an extent by the working of 
the “I.” The doctor, as a subject, has a subjective world to which only the doctor herself has 
privileged access, and as a subject, the doctor acts, expressing her identity as an “I/me.” The 
doctor acts in a social context, and thus, her acts ought to be normatively authorized or else she 
would be merely raising claims to power. The acts of the doctor that are normatively authorized 
bind and bond her with other social actors, such as patients, who also perform normatively 
authorized acts. In contrast, claims to power raised by the doctor can be either accepted or 
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contested arbitrarily by others, thus have no binding or bonding capacity. The doctor, who is a 
subject, and the other actors, who are subjects as well, are all acting within an objective world in 
which they are oriented toward understanding and coming to an agreement about shared goals. 
The working of the doctor, as a subject, can be judged from any or all of the subjective, 
normative, or objective aspects. 
Any of the doctor’s actions can be judged as a subjective performative action and also 
as being either authentic and truthful or as lacking both authenticity and honesty. Doctors can 
share the truth, and yes, doctors can lie. Doctors can make authentic representations of their 
subjective worlds when they share in a patient’s concerns, joys, and dissatisfactions; they can 
also make disingenuous representations when they fake any of these expressions. The action 
of the doctor can also be judged as normatively right or as normatively wrong. Doctors ought to 
adhere to the norms of the society, and when they do not, they ought to be judged as being bad 
or as doing wrong. Doctors sometimes also raise claims to power without the normative ground 
for their legitimate authority, and when they do, their claims to power should be met with 
deliberate rejection by exposure of their claim’s illegitimacy. The action of the doctor, as a 
teleological one, can also be judged as safe and effective or as harmful and ineffective. These 
objective teleological assessments rely on multiple people having access to the doctor’s work 
for review and determination of whether or not the stated goal is being achieved. 
The patient is also a subject, another “I.” While a similar explication of the subjective, 
normative, and objective worlds of the patient can be carried out, for the purpose of this paper, I 
will leave that task to the reader and focus only on the intersubjective understanding between 
the doctor and the patient. A doctor and patient coming to an understanding means achieving a 
linguistically articulated agreement about a criticizable validity claim that can be a fact about the 
objective world, a norm in the social world, or a feeling or state in the subjective world. 
Understanding the meaning of a claim means taking a yes or no position on its validity 
conditions. When a patient says, “I feel a slight headache,” she is raising a subjective claim in 
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regard to her own subjective world. After judging the authenticity and truthfulness of the patient, 
the doctor can reply by saying, “Yes, I believe you do!” or “No, I think you are lying; you just 
want pain medicine to get high!” or something else. The doctor can also, in judging the 
normative rightness of the claim, say, “Yes, you have the right to complain about that today” or 
“No, you should not complain about this feeling when you have more important problems that 
need to be addressed!” As for judgment of the claim’s objective truth, the doctor could say, 
“Yes, that is possible since you always have headaches,” or “No, that is impossible because you 
just took 20 mg of morphine!” Only when the doctor and the patient assent to each other’s 
validity claims and come to an agreement can they understand one another and their actions 
become intersubjectively binding and bonding to both. 
Residency training is, for a resident, a formative experience with a dual nature. It 
cultivates the authenticity and truthfulness of the resident’s “I” and also cultivates the “me” to 
both fit the norms of the discipline and develop the technical skills to achieve the goals of the 
work. Residents’ commitments/entitlements are not just to self-actualization but also to 
performing purposively and in accordance with current norms. On the other hand, attendings’ 
commitments/entitlements are not just to support a resident’s self-actualization but also to 
ensure their fulfillment of their roles in acting purposively and in accordance with current norms. 
Only when looked at from the three essential aspects can the residency training be judged as 
acting in accordance or not with the norms of society and achieving or not the ends ascribed to 
it.  
The same explications carried out above regarding the interactions between the doctors 
and the patients apply to those between the residents and the attendings. Because, as paper 
comes primarily to demonstrate, the normative   
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Research Methods: Critical Qualitative Methods 
I use critical qualitative research methods in this study. Qualitative research investigates 
human phenomena that do not lend themselves, by their nature, to quantitative methods 
(Carspecken, 1996, pp.3). The word “critical” marks one of the genres of inquiry and refers to 
the researcher’s value and concern about social inequalities and directing the work toward 
positive social change. It also involves sharing concern with social theory and awareness of 
social structure, culture, power, and human agency (Carspecken, 1996). Furthermore, as 
Kinchloe and McLaren defined, a criticalist type of researcher attempts to use his work as a 
form of cultural and social criticism and accepts the following basic assumptions: 1) thoughts 
are mediated by power relations, which are historically and socially constituted; 2) facts can 
never be isolated from value domains; 3) the relations between object and concept, and 
between signifier and signified, are never fixed or stable; 4) language is central to subjectivity 
formation; 5) certain groups in a society are privileged over other groups and oppression is 
reproduced when subordinate groups accept the normality of their social status; 6) oppression 
has many facets that interact with each other; and finally, 7) mainstream research practices are 
implicated in reproducing the systems of race, gender, and class oppression (Carspecken, 
1996). 
The qualitative approach is a good fit for my research questions because I am focused 
on the processes and development over time of a complex phenomenon that is difficult to 
capture using scales, measures, or any other quantitative methods. Furthermore, qualitative 
methods allow the inclusion of multiple perspectives, such as the resident, faculty, and the 
researcher himself. In addition, qualitative methods provide opportunities to triangulate multiple 
methods of data collection, such as video analysis and focus groups. The critical flavor of the 
method is a good fit because I am examining the development of learners who are in a structure 
where power and hierarchies are deeply imbedded. Learners, on the one hand, engage in a 
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faculty-resident relationship that is lopsided. These learners, on the other hand, are also 
medical doctors who care for patients engaging in a doctor-patient relationship that is likewise 
lopsided. Patients, residents, and faculty come from diverse racial and ethnic backgrounds and 
bring widely diverse values and assumptions into their interactions. Finally, I am using 
discursive analysis of interactions between and among different groups since language is the 
main medium of interaction.  
Setting 
The study is conducted at a university-based family medicine residency program. In this 
program, residents undergo three years of supervised training within an apprenticeship model to 
become family physicians. Residents and attending physicians provide full-scope family 
medicine services at an outpatient clinic site, located in the heart of a metropolitan area. The 
ACGME requires residency training to conduct direct observation of their residents’ interactions 
with patients. The residency implemented a process for video reviews. Resident interactions 
with their patients were video recorded. The videos underwent evaluation by faculty members 
who later complete an online feedback form. Residents received the written feedback online. By 
the time of this study, the residency program had been using faculty video reviews of resident 
evaluation for nearly one year. These videos were only occasionally viewed by the residents.  
In the 2016-2017 academic year, the residency continued its tradition of conducting 
video reviews. Between August and November 2016, 30 resident-patient interactions were 
videotaped. New style of review was implemented. Now, these video recordings were first 
reviewed by groups of two to four faculty members and then by groups of residents. Each 
resident group consisted of three residents, one from each year of residency. Each review 
session lasted two hours and each group reviewed three videos, one of each resident. The 
interactions among the faculty member and resident groups were all audiotaped.  
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Participants 
All residents at the residency program were included in the process of recording since it 
was conducted for educational purposes. For each resident, 1-3 videos were recorded, one of 
which was selected for review based on the quality of the recording. Residents were informed 
on the day they would be video-recorded. All adult patients with chronic or acute medical 
conditions who spoke English and were willing to be video-recorded were included. I used 
liberal inclusion criteria for the patients to assure findings could be generalized to other clinical 
settings and specialties. I excluded video recordings that were extremely short (< 7 minutes) 
and ones with poor visual or sound quality. To assure separation between the educational role 
of this tool and the research, data analysis took place independently and after the primary 
instigator (PI) finished his role as a faculty member at the residency.  
I selected 15 residents from a population of 31 reviewed residents. The method of 
selection intended to include a diversity of clinical cases and to include a few residents from 
each year of training (five per class). For a resident to be included, recordings from both the 
attending physicians’ sessions and the residents’ sessions had to be available and of good 
quality in terms of content and duration.   
Data collection 
Interactions between residents and patients were video-recorded and one recording per 
resident was selected for review. These recorded observations were reviewed by both faculty 
and resident groups. Each faculty group consisted of two to four faculty members and each 
resident group consisted of three residents, one from each class. A faculty facilitator (the PI) 
moderated the discussions. The role of the facilitator was not to act as an instructor, but rather 
as a coach, moderating conversations to ensure participants stay on task. Facilitating in some 
session was supported by a behavioral health intern in addition to the PI. The facilitator 
underwent periodic peer-debriefing by the behavioral health intern to assure consistency and 
fidelity of facilitation. 
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Each review session lasted approximately two hours, during which one video per 
resident was reviewed. Each session followed the same pattern: videos were presented in two- 
to three-minute segments and were paused for discussion after each segment. The discussion 
was moderated using opening questions or specific prompts, which were based on the purpose 
of the action shown in each segment. Examples of opening questions include: “What did you 
see?”, “What do you think?”, and “What else could or should be done?”. Examples of specific 
prompts include: “How was the health condition managed?”, and “What else in the management 
of this health condition could or should be done?”. At the end of each session, participants were 
debriefed in a focus group format where they shared their assessment of how the session went, 
how they viewed the strengths and weaknesses of this model, and how it had impacted their 
learning and practice. All interactions within faculty groups and within resident groups were 
audiotaped and transcribed verbatim. 
Analysis 
I followed the systematic analysis strategy outlined by Carspecken (1994), which 
includes five steps: 1) low level coding, 2) meaning field, 3) validity reconstruction, 4) high level 
coding and determining the scope, and, 5) the final writeup.   
1) Low level coding: According to Carspecken (1994, p. 146), low-level code is “coding 
that falls close to the primary record and requires little abstraction.” I kept in mind that “since 
every social act is unique, any category you construct to name the type of interaction will involve 
some abstraction. But low-level codes abstract very little and aim to reference mainly objective 
features of the primary record.”  For Carspecken, “low-level codes are sometimes going to be 
primarily objective in nature, [although there are] codes that use participants speech acts of 
repeated use.” “Other low-level codes introduce some interpretations supportable through 
horizon analysis [these are] still ‘low’ in terms of the abstractions and inferences involved, but 
are more than purely objective categories.”  
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The low-level coding strategy included three steps. Step one: I opened the word 
processing file containing the portion of the record after combining the faculty section and the 
resident section. Step two: I began reading through the data file on the screen. Whenever 
something in the primary record was deemed worthy of a code, I typed the phrase, “Low-level 
code:”. Since the code was written underneath the text, I did not always use yellow highlighting 
to indicate the section to which the code belonged; I only used highlighting for long utterances. 
Step three: I used peer debriefing in a coding sample of four sessions to check for the inference 
level of the code and question the choices of the codes. I avoided using high-level coding at this 
stage.  
The code aims to present the illocution of the speech act that is, using Austin’s 
catchphrase, “what we do with the speech act.” If a speaker says an utterance, I coded it by 
referring to the mode of the speech act. For example, if an attending pointed out that a resident 
used his first name while introducing himself to the patient, I would code this as “attending 
pointing out that resident used patient’s first name.” Similar codes often got shorter over time, 
such as “attending pointing out resident using patient’s first name.” The code consisted of three 
parts: the status of the person speaking (i.e., attending, resident, or facilitator), the mode of the 
action, or, in other words, the illocutionary act (e.g. pointing out, judging, criticizing, asking), and 
the locution to provide further specifications to characterize the action. I intended to list only the 
illocutionary and locutionary parts of the speech act. I omitted the perlocutionary side, although I 
took note of possible alternative modes of language use. I made the assumption that people 
mean what they say in conversations and are oriented toward understanding. The assumptions 
that people mean what they say and that they only mean what they say were difficult to maintain 
when the context indicated other modes of language use, such as humor or subtle critique. In 
these cases, I took research notes and aimed to address alternative meanings in high-level 
coding and in secondary analyses. I included between 100-120 low-level codes per reviewed 
session. 
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The unique nature of this project lent itself to a complexity in coding. On occasions, as 
the researcher, I took notes about an attending making observations about a resident denying a 
patient’s request for something (three acts!). I did not code sentence by sentence. After I 
became familiar with the flow of the conversation, I attempted to code representations of every 
action and function in the reviewing sessions. For example, if the facilitator asked a question 
(e.g. “What are some causes of this problem?”) and different participants listed answers, I only 
coded one of these answers as “participant giving answer.”  
2) Meaning field: After completing low-level coding for every session, I completed the 
meaning fields as a preliminary reconstructive analysis, which had “a play between low-level 
coding, initial meaning reconstruction, and horizon analysis” (Carspecken, 1996, p. 94). 
Meaning field articulations of possible meanings are “meanings that other people in the setting 
might themselves infer, either overtly or tacitly.” According to Carspecken, since we cannot 
know the intention of an actor with her act, we cannot know the impressions of the meaning that 
were received by the witnesses; we can only specify possibilities. “A meaning field is such a 
range of possibilities” (p. 96). I articulated the meaning field from tacit to discursive as much as 
possible. I kept in mind that my reconstructed meaning field may not be the same as the 
meaning fields experienced by the subjects of the study. I used “or” statements, “and” 
statements, and “and/or” statements to indicate the ambiguity that meaningful acts possess for 
all parties involved.  
I relied on the low-level codes to help me mentally note “both recurring patterns and 
unusual, revealing events.” I used this kind of analysis framework to identify recurring and 
unusual patterns and events and to construct the meaning fields for horizon analysis. With 
meaning field reconstruction, I moved from understanding meaning holistically and tacitly, which 
is the initial holistic mode of understanding, toward a more explicit and delineated mode of 
understanding, which, in turn, modified my holistic understanding of meaning. I used the initial 
low-level coding to mark both routine events and unusual ones, which then became here the 
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subject of the meaning field reconstruction. I used the same word document file and selected 
several segments for this explicit initial meaning reconstruction. I intended to have the segments 
selected presenting the action patterns. I selected representations of anomalies in patterns as 
well since these would reveal the norms underlying more routine events. Some of these 
segments were used later for validity reconstruction.  
I went through these segments line by line and at discursive articulation of tacit modes of 
meaning that underlie the interactions recorded. I viewed meaning reconstruction as preliminary 
and subject to error. I attempted to keep meaning reconstruction to low levels of inference. I 
resisted the temptation to make high-level meaning inferences and left that to the horizon 
analysis procedure. The basic purpose of the initial meaning reconstruction was “to put more 
words onto the actions as if the actor had tried to convey the entire meaning of her act verbally 
rather than through the complexity of vocal tone, posture, gesture, facial expression, timing, 
prosodic form, and so on.” (Carspecken, 1996, p. 97). I used the help of peer debriefers to 
check the validity of my analysis in a sample of my analyzed records. The peer debriefers 
attested to the adequacy of the pragmatics of my work and to the use of low-inferences. The 
meaning reconstructions themselves were then subject to horizon analysis. To preserve the flow 
of the records and the organic connections between primary records segments, I wrote the 
meaning field analysis in a separate line, which was color coded underneath the identified 
segment. I intended to do this selectively and I included about 20-25 meaning fields per 
reviewed video.   
3) Validity reconstruction: Validity reconstruction helps identify the tacitly referenced validity 
claims constituting the meaningful act. According to Carspecken (1996)  
validity reconstructions are efforts to articulate components of meaning that one normally 
understands without much explicit awareness. In the case of a disagreement or a 
misunderstanding, the tacit validity claims underlying meaningful act will be articulated by 
the actors themselves to defend their position or to clear up the misunderstanding. To 
understand another person, we understand how they would explain themselves to others 
who either disagree or misses their point. (p. 111) 
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I used the division of validity claims in three categories: objective claims, subjective claims, 
and normative evaluative claims. I then simultaneously did horizontal analysis and vertical 
analysis. Horizontal analysis is the articulation of validity claims following the three 
categories: objective, normative, and subjective. Vertical analysis, on the other hand, 
involves distinguishing between highly foregrounded claims and highly backgrounded claims 
and intermediate cases. I included identity claims under the subjective claims and assigned 
them a background status.  
4) High level coding to determine the scope or “adequacy analysis”: I used a deductive 
form of high-level coding to determine the scope of the data that would be included in the final 
analysis and write-up. I coined the term “adequacy analysis” for this schema, which has a binary 
code: adequate and inadequate. This coding schema was designed primarily to exclude 
conversations that did not apply directly to what took place in the videos. By casting a broad net 
to capture acts of judgment in the broadest sense, I was able to exclude tangential 
conversations and discussions that took place as the facilitator directed the conversation 
towards reflecting on a specific act. I use the word “adequate” to refer not only to the learner’s 
relation to the objective world (i.e., “this is true,” “this is effective”) but also to the learner’s and 
evaluator’s relation to the shared social world (i.e., “that was good,” “it was not right,” etc.). 
This coding schema applied to utterances made by participants after they observed the 
videos in reference to specific actions. The decision to apply the code on an utterance was 
made if the illocution of the action (often implicit) was of the kind of judging, evaluating, 
assessing, and the like (e.g., “I think that was bad.”), or if locution was related to content that 
was presented in the video (e.g., “He did [an] adequate exam of the foot.”), or if I could, based 
on the context, judge that the participant was obliquely criticizing, even though the foregrounded 
speech act appeared to mean something else (e.g., “The patient kept the conversation going, 
she is [a] funny lady,” hinting that the resident was not engaged at all.). I used the third kind of 
comments very carefully and only after multiple readings of the texts and relying on extensive 
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validity reconstruction and thoughtful consideration of alternative modes of speech acts. After 
determining the scope of the adequacy analysis, I used techniques similar to the above 
mentioned low-level coding to explicate the action or the function that was judged or praised. 
This code looked like the following (e.g., adequate: prescribing the right medication; inadequate: 
resident not being engaged; etc.). These codes were generally similar to the low-level codes in 
terms of the their proximity of inference with the utterances, although I exercised more diligence 
in reading sentence by sentence and coding every utterance that related to judgment than I did 
initially in the open-coding process, in which I included some but not all of the utterances and 
was not aiming to capture a specific focus.  
5) Thematic organization: After completing the adequacy analysis, which built on the 
previous phases of analysis from low-level coding to validity reconstruction, I pulled the raw 
codes out into a long list in Excel. They were “raw” because no effort had yet been made to 
organize them into a tight hierarchical scheme. Single statement recorded in the primary 
records were often listed under many different codes. Codes developed very close to the data 
were redundant and intersecting. “If your codes do not display redundancy and intersection, 
then something is wrong” (Carspecken, 1996, p. 150). I then developed themes in a systematic 
process of thematic analysis that aimed to organize the codes. This resulted in a hierarchical 
scheme, with some of the codes subsuming others. Certain codes were grouped together into a 
few large categories. These large categories were suggested from the codes I had already 
developed, but I had on occasions to choose from many possibilities. It was important to decide 
how to focus my study and group the codes accordingly.   
6) The final writeup: Writing up the findings included first sketching out the main themes. 
After I finished the coding, I grappled with the analytical angle to present the data. I selected to 
focus on identifying the norms and the errors and classify these based, first, on a primary 
reconstruction of the visit aspects which focuses on what takes place from doctor’s perspectives 
and, second, on secondary reconstruction of the visit aspects which focuses on evaluation 
149 
 
based on the positions of participants in the video reviewing process. I developed themed 
categories that organized codes hierarchically to match my chosen analytical angle. The 
analytic angle attempted to match the data close to the coding scheme. The angle matched my 
interest and values, which lie specifically in the issue of norms and how to make sense of erring. 
I was motivated, after extensively reviewing the literature, to highlight the normative aspect in 
the conversation around appraising performances. After sketching out my major themes, I 
returned to the primary records and pulled out all representations of the themes. This resulted in 
50 pages of findings. I then attempted to reduce the number of examples to leave two to three 
examples per paragraph. Finally, I developed video reviewing guide based on the themes 
identified in this study.  
Validity and Reflexivity 
To enhance the validity of the study I have used the following strategies: 
1) Practice prolonged engagement: This strategy, as described by Carspecken (1996), is 
to “reduce Hawthorn effect by returning to the field frequently and spending a lot of time there” 
(p. 88). The data is obtained from multiple sessions. The data analysis extended over four 
months of long hours of reading over and over. The multi-step process allowed multiple returns 
to the same segments from different angles and from different levels of analysis.  
2) Use a low inference vocabulary: The primary records included what is said verbatim. I 
avoided using overtly subjective-referenced or overtly normatively referenced terms. I used the 
terms “as if” to make off the high-inference portion (Carspecken, 1996). The proximity between 
the content of what is being analyzed (reviewers judging) and the schema of analysis (adequacy 
of performance) allowed for low-inferences to get to the heart of what is meant.   
3) Peer-debriefing: I used this strategy to check possible for adequacy of the of the 
research methods. I asked peers to read some notes to see whether I have ignored certain 
people or paid too much attention to others or whether I have used high inference vocabulary.  
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Findings 
I present in the following both the primary and secondary reconstruction of the visit 
aspects. and the analytic themes. There are 9 and 5 themes in the primary and secondary 
reconstructions, respectively.  
Primary reconstruction of the visit aspects  
A medical visit, from the perspectives of providers, is expected to follow a predictable 
pattern and include essential types of actions. These functions often follow a chronological 
order. Before the visit, the resident reviews the patient's record. The visit should start with self-
introduction and the gathering of history information from the patient. Then, the resident 
proceeds with the physical exam. After the resident performs the exam, they start developing 
their ideas for the diagnosis and makes plans with the patient for management. After the visit, 
the resident should complete documentation of her notes. The note is concluded with 
determination of the bill for the provided services. With their evaluations, the residents and 
attendings set the norms and called out errors.  
1. Preparing for the visit before entering the room 
Both residents and attendings valued residents who performed chart reviews prior to 
visits so they would be familiar with their patients. Some residents favorably considered looking 
at a patient’s chart the day before to review past medical history and past notes. Making it clear 
to the patient that the resident had reviewed her information and referencing the paper slip the 
patient filled out prior to the visit was also valued. For example:   
“I always look at least at one note that says, maybe, their past medical history, just to 
have an idea going in. For him, specifically, I looked at vaccination quickly and I think I’d 
done allergy. Those were the three things I looked at.” (Joseph, Resident Session #9) 
“I think it was good that he referenced the stuff she’d already filled out [when he said], ‘I 
saw from your paperwork that you’re feeling better.’ I think that lets the patient know that 
he’s taken time to review her stuff, and it also lets us know that he’s taking time to review 
that information before he’s in the room.” (Laura, Attending Session #2) 
Attendings found it unacceptable when residents just guessed about the reason for a 
visit and did not know why patients were there, even when it is a follow-up visit. On the other 
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hand, some residents thought it can be hard to really prepare for a visit when their schedule is 
busy. For example:  
Gary: “[The patient said], ‘And you gave me this and it got better.’ It was kind of funny, 
[then the resident] goes, ‘Oh yeah, I remember that.’” 
Charles : “That almost lets off the impression of, ‘Well, I must have guessed right.’”  
Morhaf: “… barely remembering who she is and what she had!”  
(Gary, Charles , and Morhaf, Attending Session #4) 
 
John (Peer Resident): “I think from our capacity, which I can definitely work on as well … 
at least looking up your patients … knowing, okay, what was the last note and why is this 
person coming to me again.”  
Anthony (Reviewed Resident): “No, I was going to say sometimes it’s tough to look up 
20 patients, uh, and know everything.”  
Morhaf (Facilitator): “No, well, that’s an expectation … you chose this dripline!”  
(John, Anthony, and Morhaf, Resident Session #4)   
In the review session, residents also came to realizations that maybe they should have 
prepared better for the visit. For example: 
“I went to the computer and was just trying … to [look up] more information … I was 
thinking maybe I should have been more prepared before I stepped in to talk to this 
patient.” (Gregory, Resident Session #7) 
 
2. Greeting patients and introducing oneself 
Residents and attendings valued it when residents greeted the patient by name and, if 
appropriate, shook the patient’s hand. They felt residents should introduce themselves 
appropriately and explain their role to the patient, the family, and everyone else in the room. For 
example:  
“At the beginning, Brandon did a good job of introducing himself and acknowledging both 
of the people in the room.” (Cynthia, Attending Session #9) 
“When he first walked in, [he] got introduced to everyone in the room.” (Michael, 
Resident Session #9) 
 
3. Negotiating the agenda for the visit 
Both residents and attendings valued residents who started the visit with good 
introductions and set the agenda at the beginning. Setting the agenda can be done by 
explicating and clarifying reasons for the visit. For example: 
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“I think overall he’s done pretty well, kind of setting an agenda for the visit. Finding out if 
the patient has any concerns and then kind of setting a plan for ‘we’re gonna talk about 
your wrist and we’re going to go over your pregnancy today.’” (Matthew, Attending 
Session #3) 
 
“I try to set the agenda from the very beginning, because the one thing that always 
happens is if they have new staff and the staff sees them, they bring up more stuff all of 
a sudden. Just kind of like really quickly … Because it’s easier to be efficient when you 
are actually only dealing with the three problems, instead of six, seven, eight … So, it’s 
like, ‘Okay, so which are the two things that are bothering you the most?’” (Brian, 
Resident Session #12) 
Both residents and attendings identified times when no clear agenda was set. Attendings 
and residents pointed out a time when the doctor did not elicit what the patient wanted from the 
visit and carried out the visit without having any agenda of his own either. Sometimes the 
agenda was set late and residents noticed that the visit was going out of control. For example:  
“[Five minutes into the visit] I was noticing that I didn’t have a set agenda. So, it needed 
to happen then since it wasn’t flowing naturally from the conversation … he had multiple 
problems … so this kind of helped to clarify what am I actually doing.” (Richard, Resident 
Session #15)  
 
4. Eliciting the patient’s history  
Residents and attendings valued residents who gathered essential information. They 
appreciated when residents asked the right questions to delineate the problem and got the story 
in sufficient detail. Taking a good history can mean screening for symptoms and risk factors, 
especially ones associated with serious consequences or with mental illnesses that occasionally 
get overlooked. It can also mean asking about social history, weight loss, as well checking 
medication and their dosages. For example: 
“I don’t think there were any concerns. He was asking about both injuries and got the 
story in great detail.” (Cynthia, Attending Session #9) 
Attendings and residents expect residents to use different types of questions to get 
answers. Residents should ask a mix of direct and indirect questions. They should ask open 
questions to elicit relevant aspects of each patient’s life and closed-ended ones to direct 
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patients to give specific information. They should also interject appropriately and ask non-
judgmental questions in an open conversation style. Residents sometimes need to repeat 
questions for clarification and need to make good transitions. For example: 
“I think she knows that he has a complicated life and so it’s not just, ‘How do you feel 
today? How’s life going?’ … How’s life going? That’s a really open ended one!” (Jennifer, 
Resident Session #13) 
 
“I think she’s doing better getting the specific information, and she even outright stated, ‘I 
need very specific details for this. How much? How often? Be as specific as you can,’ so 
I think that’s better and she’s going to more closed ended questions, or she’s saying, 
‘How often does this happen? How much is she eating? Does he throw up every day.’” 
(Matthew, Attending Session #8) 
Residents and attendings also pointed out suboptimal practices. Of importance were not 
gathering sufficient information, not asking about serious and potentially dangerous symptoms, 
and not asking about lifestyle or social context. Diet often received attention from attendings 
when it was overlooked. Not infrequently, residents would ask only general, broad questions, 
and not cover essential information, or omit aspects of the illness history that were of relevance; 
residents and attendings were prompt to call this out. For example: 
“I mean, if somebody has a [Patient Health Questionnaire] PHQ of 25 you have to ask, 
‘Do you want to hurt yourself? Do you want to kill yourself or anybody else?’” (Gary, 
Attending Session #4) 
Morhaf: “What are some of the stuff that could have been done differently?” 
Anthony: “More information … You get a full history, um … I had no idea she was 
suicidal. I should have saw [sic] that. I completely glanced over the PHQ. I didn’t catch 
that.” 
(Morhaf & Anthony, Resident Session #4) 
 
“I would have liked more questions about his diet, his fluid intake, salt intake. She did 
ask about whether or not he’d been checking his blood pressure since he went home, 
which is good.” (Margaret, Attending Session #5) 
 
“I think I could have delved a little bit more into [the drug use history].” (John, Resident 
Session #1) 
 
While sometimes there was an agreement between the attending and resident sessions 
about what needed to be asked, that was not always the case. For example: 
“I think as soon as he said he relapsed … she did need to come in and say, ‘Why did 
you relapse? Did something happen?’ … Then he probably would have gone into his 
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anxiety, which seems to probably be a trigger, partly for his drinking. Then gone into 
more in regards to his symptoms in regards to that.” (Margaret, Attending Session #13) 
 
Morhaf: “What else can be done when he asked about the Valium?”  
Elizabeth: “Ask him more about his anxiety.” 
(Morhaf & Elizabeth, Resident Session #13) 
 
“It’s hard for me to know what her thought process is, because in the first two minutes of 
him talking, before even the second part, I wrote down orthostatics. It was [an] 
orthostatic presentation. She asked if the medication that he received last time worked 
… I don’t know that she needs to ask much more questions, other than she said, ‘Well, 
I’m glad that medicine’s working.’” (Margaret, Attending Session #5) 
 
“[Regarding] the vertigo, she asked a very good question to see if it actually was vertigo. 
Which is, ‘Are you feeling it’s spinning or do you feel the room spinning?’, which I think is 
a very good question that we forget to ask. I think that’s really good … I think that’s a 
very good question to ask. It helps narrow things down. I think she did a very good job 
with that.” (Steven, Resident Session #5) 
Attendings and residents criticized residents for not asking sufficient open-ended 
questions, or on the other hand, for not narrowing down the questions to close ended ones 
when needed. They asserted that asking open ended questions to a person who rambles does 
not give useful information. On the other hand, failing to ask the patient to explain more or using 
rigid formulaic ways of assessing symptoms were also thought to be inappropriate. Repeating 
questions when the patient does not have the answer or when the patient has already given the 
answer were looked at negatively as well. Not picking up on contextual factors and social 
determinants of health were also criticized as was being fixated on predisposing contextual 
factors to prove a ready-made hypothesis. Finally, waiting for important information to filter 
through the fluff rather than asking direct questions and, on the other extreme, suggesting 
answers to the patient, were both criticized. For example: 
“It’s almost if he’s sort of asking rapid fire questions just to get the information. Not necessarily, 
sort of, responding to what she’s saying.” (Beverly, Attending Session #3) 
 
 “I think she’s a patient, I probably would not ask any open-ended questions of, like, I’d sort of 
ask yes/no type questions, especially when she starts off on those tangents.” (Beverly, 
Attending Session #8)  
 
“I think just knowing that we did enough talking for quite a while, I think I got all the information 
that I wanted, but it took a little while. I could have potentially just kept asking/redirecting 
questions.” (Linda, Resident Session #8) 
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5. Examining the patient 
Residents and attendings had few comments on the physical exam, likely due to the 
nature of the recorded vides; only a small portion of the physical exam can be seen in the video 
recordings of the session. Nonetheless, in the few comments that were made, they all valued 
giving the patient a heads-up before the exam and explaining the findings in real time. They 
appreciated thorough exams and paying attention to aspects relevant to the problem at hand. 
For example: 
“I think it’s good that she gave him a heads up [about] what she was going to do. She 
said, ‘We’re going to look at your back. I’m going to do this and have you walk and then 
we’ll [look] at the groin issue,’ so that he knew.” (Laura, Attending Session #5) 
 
“She explained what she was doing [in] real-time. She initially started with medical lingo, 
but then broke it down a bit to more layman’s terms.” (William, Resident Session #11) 
Residents and attendings paid attention to inappropriate techniques during the exams. 
Attendings were particularly concerned when insufficient exams were conducted or when 
diligence was not maintained. They also called out when sensitive exams were avoided for 
convenience or when adequate courtesy measures were not followed. For example: 
“Probably not getting nose to nose with the patient when you do your eye exam. When 
he pulled away, he checked her left eye with his right eye, so he had to be nose to 
nose.” (Gary, Attending Session #4) 
 
“Since I’m not a physician, I don’t know how those kind of exams should happen, but I’ve 
also seen them done where someone says, ‘Tell me when you can feel something,’ 
rather than, ‘Do you feel this?’” (Cynthia, Attending Session #9) 
 
“One thing I would say with sensation, [instead of saying], ‘I’m doing this now. Do you 
feel this? Yes or no?’ Say, ‘Tell me when you feel it.’ Because they’re expecting, ‘Oh, I 
should be saying yes because he’s touching me.’” (Michael, Resident Session #9) 
 
6. Making the diagnosis  
Residents and attendings explicated very little on the norms for making diagnoses. It 
was as if that function were taken for granted and, therefore, went unnoticed when it occurred 
appropriately. However, on the few occasions this task was noticed, reviewers expressed 
satisfaction with the adequacy of the process when residents sufficiently considered the 
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differential diagnosis and attempted to find the likely one. Residents were particularly impressed 
when a peer recognized the root of the problem during a poorly presented history. For example: 
“She considered even the thyroid. She did all of the CBC.” (Mary, Attending Session 
#12)  
“It was when I started formulating the idea that they hadn’t really been feeding her 
enough. That they stopped. Basically, that they stopped feeding.” (Linda, Resident 
Session #8) 
Residents and attendings criticized making diagnoses by relying solely on the history 
without doing an adequate physical exam. They also criticized not including a differential 
diagnosis into the medical reasoning. Attendings criticized classifying patient presentation as 
abnormal when they were only part of normal processes. Residents also criticized making 
incorrect diagnoses by taking for granted what is reported in the chart. For example, while 
attendings criticized a resident for not being methodical, the resident justified relying on gestalt 
feelings to making a diagnosis when he felt competent with the task at hand. Both attendings 
and residents criticized when residents got off track and missed the diagnosis. These omissions 
sometimes led to serious harm. For example:  
Mark: “My other question was, ‘How often are you taking the splint off [the non-healing 
fractured index] a day?’”  
Matthew: “And he started moving and then Ryan was even encouraging him. I wouldn’t 
… if the splint is not there maybe it explains why it’s not healing.”  
Mark: “Not surprised.” [laughter] “That’s why it’s not healing.”  
Matthew: “If the patient comes in to us and the fracture’s not healing, I’m not thinking 
diabetes.”  
Mark: “I’m thinking, ‘Where’s your splint?!’” [laughter]  
(Mark and Matthew, Attending Session #6) 
 
Ryan: “I did the x-ray and it was a month out, and he still, it wasn’t healing, so then I 
thought maybe he was diabetic. It was not healing well.”  
Daniel: “I think, shouldn’t he be in, like, a splint too?”  
Gregory: “He’s probably not compliant with it then.”  
Ryan: “They gave him like a finger splint … so I told him to use it at work, so that, to 
prevent any further injury and then after work take it off because he lost like complete 
functionality. He wasn’t able to bend it. So, after work I told him to take it off and try 
exercising a little bit!”  
(Ryan, Daniel, and Gregory, Resident Session #6) 
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7. Managing health conditions   
Residents and attendings seemed to take also for granted that residents would 
adequately manage a problem. Reviewers rarely pointed out when expectations were met. They 
expected residents to prescribe the right medicine, develop plans, and simply do what was 
needed for the visit. When residents were not capable or not willing to provide a service for 
some reason, they would arrange for a referral. For example: 
Mark: “She is effectiveness… already putting a plan together, the patient knows what 
she’s thinking.” Mary: “She’s developed [a] plan.”  
(Mark & Mary, Attending Session #12)  
 
“But the goal can still be achieved, I mean he did refer. He did say, ‘I’m going to refer.’ 
Because his line is his line [regarding not prescribing contraceptives for religious 
reasons] … and you’re not going to cross that.” (Nancy, Resident Session #2) 
Attendings and residents expected residents to provide information and counsel patients 
appropriately. Residents were expected to go over signs, symptoms, and findings on physical 
exams. Residents should also make what they are thinking explicit to patients. This includes 
giving reasons for their diagnoses, explaining findings on diagnostic tests, sharing reasons for 
ordering a specific test or prescribing/not prescribing a treatment without pressuring the patient,  
and explaining test findings. Residents should educate patients about lifestyle and behavioral 
changes, such as diet, to promote health and prevent illnesses or injuries. Residents should 
cover all important points when counseling, clearly giving specific instructions and reassuring 
patients when appropriate. The instructions should be given in a handout form and 
communicated at an appropriate level to fit each patient’s educational attainment. Residents 
should give a summary at the end of the examination and should check for understanding. For 
example: 
“I think that was really good that she used very specific instructions and wrote them 
down for the family, because I know there are probably a number of caregivers for this 
child at home and so I think having something written down, you know, all of them [can] 
make sure they’re sticking to these recommendations.” (Matthew, Attending Session #8) 
 
“The counseling was good with that and [with] being specific and giving clear instructions 
at the appropriate educational level. When she said, ‘She’s very clear on four bottles a 
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day,’ and being good about not saying, ‘This is what was happening,’ rather than just 
saying, ‘This is what should happen from now on.’” (Robert, Resident Session #8) 
 
“She went over signs and symptoms and she explained why; she justified with medical 
reasoning and that she also said, ‘If things do change, look out for these signs or 
symptoms.’” (William, Resident Session #11) 
Residents and attendings criticized not addressing problems thoroughly, giving hurried, 
inaccurate recommendations, and developing loose plans without measures to ensure fidelity. 
Residents who did not perform the right management were called out as were the ones who 
chose costly plans of action or unnecessary testing. Of interest, while expressing understanding 
for a resident’s position in the medical hierarchy, both residents and attending criticized those 
residents who do not sufficiently advocate for their patients even if that would require overriding 
a decision made by a senior. They also considered it unacceptable to avoid dealing with health 
problems that were difficult to navigate. For example:  
Doctor: “Do you feel like you have more anxiety or more depression?”  
Patient: “Anxiety … I think it’s to the point I can’t function. I get these sharp pains in my chest. I 
start sweating. I can feel my heartbeat in my face. You know what I mean?"  
Resident: “Yeah. Yeah. Are you still going to the counselor too?”  
(Resident Doctor and Patient, Session #13) 
 
“I think it’s okay to listen for a period of time if you’re going to clarify, okay, let them get their 
spiel out for a period of time and then kind of summarizing, ‘You talked about anxiety. Can you 
tell me a little bit more about that? What are symptoms that make you think you have anxiety?’”  
(Margaret, Attending Session #13) 
 
“That’s probably just my thing in psych … He’s having a panic attack, but I don’t really want to 
address that because he’s not going to get benzos from me. That’s what was going through my 
mind. Let’s just try and glaze over this because I don’t want to give him benzos … I was 
recognizing it as a panic attack, but I was also recognizing it in my head that that would warrant 
benzos, which I don’t want to give him. I just kind of wanted to gloss over that and say, ‘Are you 
still seeing your counselor? Good. She’ll take care of that.’ Which isn’t good.” (Elizabeth, 
Resident Session #13) 
 
Attendings and residents criticized residents for giving wrong medication 
recommendations. They also criticized those who provided minimal or zero counseling about 
behavioral modifications, such as diet, fluid intake, sleep hygiene, or combining alcohol with 
prescribed medications. They also criticized when residents did not communicate their thought 
processes. They looked negatively at the practice of not reassuring patients who voiced 
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concerns about normal variations or, on the other hand, the practice of inadequately giving 
reassurance to patients with serious concerns. Residents were also criticized for rushing 
through counseling or missing an opportunity to counsel an engaged patient. It was also looked 
at negatively when residents did not explain test results in detail. It was considered a missed 
opportunity not to counsel patients adequately on managing chronic diseases. Furthermore, it 
was criticized when residents did not explain about a disease in general nor about the 
recommended treatment strategy. Attendings also criticized when residents did not use specific 
communication strategies. However, reviewed residents were, on occasion, able to provide 
rational justification of the act within the context of the interaction with the patient, despite not 
using that specific strategy. For example: 
“Also think it would be helpful to have the patient use teach-back … for Joseph to say, 
‘Can you tell me what the top three things are that I’ve asked you to do to take care of 
this wound?’ Or something like that … because I don’t know how much he’s going to … 
If he didn’t take his whole antibiotics, I don’t so much trust that this patient understands 
the need to do the things that are kind of basic simple things to address this.” (Cynthia, 
Attending Session #9) 
 
“He was finishing my sentences, almost. That’s how I was like, ‘Okay, he knows what I’m 
saying.’” (Joseph, Resident Session #9) 
 
8. Documenting the visit in the notes 
Residents and attendings expected residents to accurately document what took place in 
the visit. They expected their notes to flow well and be sufficiently detailed. For example:  
Morhaf: (After reading the note loud) “What do you think of the note? Of the [history of 
presenting illness] HPI?”  
Beverly: “Yeah it looks accurate.”  
Matthew: “The history’s good, assessment plan I think is really good and really specific, 
which I think is important in this case, for whoever is seeing her next, even though it’s 
Linda that’s going to see her next. I think that’s helpful just for kind of what we talked 
about today so then it helps with the follow up, especially if she’s seeing somebody 
else.”  
(Morhaf, Beverly, and Matthew, Attending Session #8) 
 
Morhaf: “Jeffry, do you want to read?”  
(Jeffry reads the note.)  
Robert: “It’s [a] good synthesis … Solid job, Linda.”  
Jeffry: “It reflects what they told.”  
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Morhaf: “Her review system is adequate, nothing more, nothing less than what she did. 
Then this is also [a] very nicely detailed documentation of her plan for the two problems.”  
(Jeffry, Morhaf, Robert, Resident Session #8) 
 
Residents and attendings criticized residents who did not include what was addressed in 
the visit in the note, or worse, the opposite: residents who included in the note what did not take 
place in the visit. Attendings and residents called out the use of “macros” and pre-written note 
segments without carefully editing out those items, such as a physical exam or system review, 
that were not performed during the visit. Notes that were not written with a style were also called 
out. Examples include: representation of multiple problems in one paragraph, the use of 
unacceptable abbreviations, and the presence of typos. Finally, residents and attendings were 
concerned when information essential to patient care was omitted, such as pain level at the time 
of the visit, the number of pills that were left, and the justification of an ordered MRI. For 
example:  
“I get like constipation, so I [am] forced to go to the bathroom.” (Patient, Attending Session #3) 
 
Beverly: (Regarding his review of system) “He didn’t ask all of the questions.”  
Morhaf: “No excessive thirst. Did he ask about thirst?”  
Beverly: “No.”  
Morhaf: “And he had [written] no constipation.”  
Matthew: “Pretty clearly looks like a dot phrase.”  
(Morhaf, Matthew, and Beverly, Attending Session #3)  
 
“I learned that dot phrases are dangerous. It’s a fine balance between efficiency and accuracy. 
That’s what it is. It’s really a fine line between accuracy and efficiency.” (Thomas, Resident 
Session #3) 
 
 
9. Billing for provided services 
Residents and attendings expected residents to bill correctly. It was respected when 
residents asked about the right bill or consulted the auditing staff. 
Morhaf: “What do you think of the note?” 
Carol: “It’s exactly what she did.”  
Morhaf: “Billed it as level 3, which I think was appropriate.”  
(Carol & Morhaf, Attending Session #11) 
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Morhaf: “Level of service?”  
William: “Three.”  
Morhaf: “Three is ok.”  
(Morhaf & William, Resident Session #11)  
 
When attendings and residents looked at what took place during the visit itself, rather 
than what was documented in the chart, they judged that 12/15 visits were billed inadequately. 
The vast majority of visits were coded incorrectly with lower codes than what they should have 
been (99213 instead of 99214) or without including the right modifier (25) when appropriately 
indicated. Residents commonly did not bill for provided services or for addressed problems. 
Both attendings and residents recognized and acknowledged these billing errors when they 
happened.  
Mark: “Definitely billing a 99214.”  
Morhaf: “That was billed three, actually.”  
Mark: “To address six problems. Yes, I would have a 215!”  
(Mark and Morhaf, Attending Session #12) 
 
Brian: “Did you go to 214?”  
Kathleen: “I am sorry?”  
Brian: “Is it a 214?”  
Kathleen: “Probably. I don’t remember.”  
Morhaf: “No, actually, it was 213.”  
(Kathleen, Brian, and Morhaf, Resident Session #12) 
 
Richard: “Probably a three, just because that was what I was doing most of the time. 
When I didn’t know if it could be a four or not.” (Richard, Resident Session #15) 
 
Secondary reconstruction of the visit aspects  
The doctor–patient interaction has many nuanced aspects that are essential to the 
relationship, although they do not follow the same predictable chronological order as the 
previously mentioned tasks. This secondary reconstruction of the visit aspects can be looked at 
as an assessment of the second-order workings of the physicians. These aspects are often 
assessed by making broader remarks about what is taking place during the visit. I reconstructed 
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these analytic aspects along five themes: (1) efficiently addressing concerns while building 
rapport; (2) being engaged and engaging the patient; (3) utilizing computers without 
compromising interaction; (4) directing patients and asserting boundaries while respecting 
autonomy; and (5) asking attending for help when needed after making efforts.  
 
1. Efficiently addressing concerns while building rapport 
Residents and attendings judged the visit heavily on whether it succeeded in addressing 
concerns while building rapport. The visit, on the one hand, should address the main concerns. 
Residents were considered to be doing well if they got to the heart of the matter and spent time 
addressing the main points that matter. Residents were praised if they handled difficult 
situations and if they were being thorough, making sure not to miss serious findings. Concerns 
were defined not just by what the patient brought to the table, but also by what providers 
thought should be a concern. On the other hand, building rapport was also a goal in and of itself 
and was recognized as an acceptable end if all of a resident’s actions were done to “build 
rapport.” Residents were expected to address concerns and build rapport efficiently. Residents 
were considered to be doing a good job if they were dealing with the challenges of multiple 
problems in a short time. Reviewers admired residents who covered multiple problems, 
especially the complex ones, quickly. They pointed out some behavior that made that possible, 
such as placing orders in the room. They recognized that there may be a compromise made 
between efficiency and building rapport, but they valued most those residents who could be 
efficient without compromising rapport. Attendings said little when efficient practices were 
demonstrated, as if that was expected and to be taken for granted or because they expected 
residents to develop these skills overtime.  For example: 
“I felt that it was important to address that problem being that it’s my first [obstetric] visit 
with her. I felt that if I just focused on the pregnancy and was not addressing her 
complaint, I probably wouldn’t be doing justice to her. And then also in terms of building 
that rapport, it would probably reflect poorly on that.” (Thomas, Resident Session #3) 
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“I think she made great rapport with the patient from the very beginning.” (Margaret, 
Attending Session #5) 
 
“Well, I’m just looking at the time stamp and we’re at four [and] a half minutes and I feel 
she has done a great job with engaging the patient, still giving good eye contact, yet the 
efficiency [sic]. She’s covered two problems already in four and a half minutes. I think 
that’s very good because I don’t like … I think that’s really efficient but, at the same time, 
I’ve been watching her talking to the patient, you know, like, if I was the patient, I’ll feel 
like my doctor is engaging with me, so I think that’s really good.” (Michael, Resident 
Session #14) 
Residents and attendings criticized when a visit’s goal was not achieved, or problems 
were not addressed thoroughly. It was particularly worrisome when patient concerns were not 
addressed. Examples of such omitted concerns include: mental illness, such as severe 
depression; important medical problems; worries about abnormal findings, such as vital signs or 
lab results; not giving the patient what they ask when the ask is legitimate; and not supporting 
the patient in her social affairs. Different explanations were given for these omissions. Some 
happened due to glancing over the problems. Other omissions, as residents confessed, were 
the result of intentionally ignoring problems to avoid difficult conversations, such as prescribing 
controlled substances like narcotics, or due to time constraints. Some of the concerns were 
simply forgotten because residents were distracted or did not have a system in place to 
remember. Finally, not addressing patient concerns was judged harshly by attendings as that of 
a resident being ineffective and playing a role not more advanced than a medical assistant 
(MA). Of interest, “not building rapport” was criticized as manifested by the resident missing 
opportunities to build connection. For example: 
“With a PHQ of 25, she’s begging you to dig into it, and essentially all he says is, ‘I’m 
gonna go get you the sheet I gave you last time, but this time I’ll mark it for ya.’” (Charles 
, Attending Session #4)  
 
“You get a full history, um, basically what he said. I had no idea she was suicidal. I 
should have saw [sic] that. I completely glanced over the PHQ. I didn’t catch that.” 
(Anthony, Resident Session #4) 
 
“I mean, most private practices, you have an MA who can gather history.” (Charles , 
Attending Session #15) 
Attendings and residents criticized taking longer time than needed. They called out some 
practices as not being efficient or as being slow. They pointed to certain behaviors that maybe 
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contributed to inefficiency, such as using pen and paper for notes or taking too long, such as 
attempting to address all problems in one visit. Attendings were particularly disappointed when 
a long time was taken and very little was achieved. For example: 
Charles : “I think the visit’s going fine.” 
Gary: “It’s just a lot longer than it needs to be.” 
Morhaf: “This visit lasted [for] 40 minutes of actual face to face.”  
Gary: “So, it was an hour? By the time he went to talk to anybody.” 
(Charles , Gary, and Morhaf, Attending Session #1) 
 
“I think what [Morhaf] is saying, and I completely agree with him, is, is, is the stuff that I 
spent 10 minutes talking about, I could have probably done three minutes talking about, 
but this, you know, like the more musculoskeletal and the, and the neurological stuff, 
which I can definitely improve on.” (John, Resident Session #1) 
 
2. Being engaged and engaging the patient  
This nuanced theme included four subthemes: looking at the patient, avoiding jargon, 
using body language, and listening. The overarching topic is related to engagement to achieve 
mutual understanding.  
Residents and attendings expected residents to be engaged with the patient, that is, to 
spend time getting to know the patient and interject into the conversation when needed. For 
example: 
“She was sitting in a chair facing the patient. She was relaxed, and she drops her hands 
sometimes and clearly is not typing … She was looking at the patient, they were clearly 
just having a conversation.” (Jeannie, Attending Session #11) 
Residents and attendings also valued it when residents engaged the patient whether 
that was evidenced by seating the patient next to the table, validating her verbally, or engaging 
the patient in shared decision making. For example: 
“[You used] shared decision making is like everybody, we’re all here together. It’s like 
[you thought], 'I’m not just going to tell you what I’m thinking, but I’m also going to take 
what your thoughts are.’ You’re not forcing something on her at all, which was good.” 
(Joseph, Resident Session #2) 
Residents recognized aspects of body language as relevant. They appreciated 
residents for demonstrating open body language or using gestures and postures to 
communicate. They also valued it when the resident appeared comfortable. For example: 
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“You’re not just sitting there still and verbally talking to her. You’re very open, and then, like 
nodding your head, and kind of acknowledging what she’s saying. So, I thought it was very 
good.” (Joseph, Resident Session #2) 
 
“Her body language was very appropriate.” (Steven, Resident Session #13) 
Residents and attendings both pointed out the use of appropriate common language 
that is easy to understand. Residents accepted the use of medical language as long as the 
residents were breaking it down into layman’s terms. For example: 
“She’s respectful. I don’t think anything. She uses very common language, typically.” 
(Margaret, Attending Session #5) 
 
“I think he did a good way of explaining it was a shattered fracture and explaining what 
the medical term was, and that was really good, I thought, because we tend to, and I 
know I tend to, use medical jargon, and I don’t, and I don’t put it down in layman’s terms 
for the patient.” (Gregory, Resident Session #6) 
Residents and attending valued it when residents maintained eye contact. Residents 
should sit facing the patient when talking, preferably at eye level. For example: 
“I think it looks always nice having the patient sitting next to you like that and not on the 
exam table yet.” (Elizabeth, Resident Session #5) 
 
“I think it’s good that he sat down. He’s at eye level with him. You know, he didn’t go, 
you know, just start typing at the computer. He focused on the patient eye-to-eye and it 
was good.” (Gregory, Resident Session #6) 
Residents and attendings valued it when residents listened to the patients. Residents 
were praised for sitting and listening, letting patients vent or talk about what was important for 
them, not interrupting patients or cutting them off, giving patients undivided attention, and 
allowing patients to talk about what was important to them.  They particularly appreciated it 
when residents showed evidence that they were actively listening, as evident by making 
reassuring sounds during interviews, paraphrasing what patients said, using reflection, using 
teach back, recognizing what was behind a patient’s words, acknowledging aspects patients 
brought up, using reflection, and validating concerns. For example:  
“From the very beginning … She sat and listened. She let him talk and say what has he 
been doing since and she just listened, and reinforced things that he was doing well … 
She congratulated him on that and encouraged him in regards to that. [She] listened to 
[the] treatment change that’s happened.” (Margaret, Attending Session #13) 
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“I like that she allowed the patient to talk about it instead of something new about what 
happened. She was very polite about letting the patient discuss it.” (Steven, Resident 
Session #13) 
 
“I feel … he’s able to talk and vent and he has your undivided attention.” (Jennifer, 
Resident Session #13) 
Attendings called out responses that showed residents not being present, such as 
responding inadequately to what patients were saying (e.g., appearing cheerful in reaction to 
bad news and congratulating a patient when they expressed disappointment) or not responding 
at all, not showing sufficient engagement or compassion, and appearing to be rushing through 
things. They also described times residents lost engagement as patients kept wandering or 
gave the impression they just wanted to get the visit over and be done. They were particularly 
concerned when residents had very little or no interaction with their patients. For example: 
“In a patient you’ve never seen before, and you know, you’re trying to build this 
relationship from the start, and so that would be helpful if you were showing that you 
were that engaged and passionate about what’s going on with the patient. But it may be 
hard to just spontaneously demonstrate that within five minutes of meeting somebody.” 
(Matthew, Attending Session #3) 
Attendings and residents criticized residents for not engaging their patients. Evidence 
of that was ignoring patients, being too directive rather than collaborative, not eliciting what 
patients wanted from the visit, or not engaging the right person in the room. Attendings called 
out when residents demonstrated a lack genuine interest and when they merely gave the patient 
the impression of paying attending to them. On the other hand, they also criticized giving too 
much personal information when unnecessary. For example: 
“I noticed that I really wasn’t looking at her too much, although I did a little bit and we 
were joking a little bit, but not as much as I hopefully normally do.” (Donald, Resident 
Session #10) 
 
“It feels like the visit is not focused on her as much as … he is on his computer and I feel 
that ‘I am trying to get my notes done’, that’s the impression I got...  ‘Just want to get 
over it and get done’, kind of feeling.” (Mary, Attending Session #10) 
Residents pointed out issues related to body language, such as appearing hesitant or 
nervous or putting hands in pockets. They picked on their own postures as well, albeit for 
personal betterment. For example: 
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“I’m ignoring you and I’m playing with my leg. Why am I stroking my leg?” (Elizabeth, 
Resident Session #13) 
 
“My posture was horrible. Didn’t realize I was always hunched over like a hunchback.” 
(Nancy, Resident Session #14) 
Attendings criticized residents for using medical jargon, too much wandering in 
pathophysiological explanation, and giving answers that were not at a practical level for 
patients. For example: 
“Do you think this guy has any f----- clue what he’s talking about? New receptors and 
hyperalgesia?” (Charles , Attending Session #1) 
Residents and attendings criticized it when residents had limited eye contact with 
patients. For example: 
“As far as eye contact, there was one section in there I think where there wasn’t a whole 
lot, but really, [during] most of it, I thought you had good eye contact.” (Michael, Resident 
Session #14) 
 
“Not all of the time, but she does [look at the patient directly] … I have been watching 
her, she does go back. She does do some kind of non-verbal communication, [some] 
connection with the patient.” (Cynthia, Attending Session #14) 
Attendings called out when residents were not listening, such as when residents asked 
questions that patients had already answered or when residents did not validate patient 
concerns. Residents called out when residents did not balance talking themselves with letting 
patients talk. They also called out not allowing patients to talk more. Assessments, however, did 
not always converge between the attendings and the residents. For example: 
“He listened to what her concern was, which was hemorrhoid[s].” (Joshua, Resident 
Session #3) 
 
“He just asked a question off a list. He’s like, ‘I need to get this information. I know I’m 
supposed to ask it, so I’m going to ask it. And I’m not responding to what you say, I’m 
not validating what you say, I’m just documenting what you say.’” (Beverly, Attending 
Session #3) 
 
“He went [on this and that] ... I mean, she’s letting him talk a lot. I think at this point she 
needs to now stop him and say, ‘Okay,’ then summarize or give, reiterate, what he’s 
done well or whatever.” (Margaret, Attending Session #13) 
 
“She started talking when she needed to. I thought it was really good so far. I can’t find 
anything wrong with that.” (Steven, Resident Session #13) 
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3. Utilizing computers without compromising interaction   
Residents and attendings extensively discussed utilizing computers in exam rooms. 
They focused on specific norms. They looked positively on residents who asked for patient 
permission to use the computer. They thought it was better when the computer was kept to one 
side and was used while paying attention to the patient. Computers should not become a barrier 
between doctors and patients. Residents could type in the room while still being engaged, such 
as by paying attention to patients. Computers can be particularly helpful to share results with 
patients, such as x-rays, or to obtain information necessary for the visit from the records, such 
as medication dosages. Residents should not go straight to the computer, but should first allow 
sufficient time for pure engagement with patients. Residents who were complemented were 
those who could perform tasks efficiently on the computer without compromising the 
engagement with their patients. For example:  
“He asked the person to [sic] permission to use the computer. We don’t always do it, but 
I think that’s, that’s really nice, because you want to explain what you’re doing a little bit 
in the computer.” (Anthony, Resident Session #1) 
 
“I think she utilized it in the best way … she was sitting in a chair facing the patient. She 
was relaxed and she drops her hands sometimes and clearly is not typing. And didn’t 
type for long periods of time while staring at the screen. She was looking at the patient, 
they were clearly just having a conversation.” (Jeannie, Attending Session #11) 
Residents and attendings criticized residents who just stared at the computer or patient 
documents. They looked negatively at residents who moved quickly to the computer or did not 
tell patients what they were doing on the computer. It was thought to be inappropriate to present 
oneself as if in a hurry to finish notes. Residents were criticized when they appeared to be 
writing detailed notes instead of jotting down a few sentences as reminders, especially when 
patients were sharing intimate information. Residents were also criticized when sitting at the 
computer to the side and not facing the patient or when they let the computer be a barrier 
between them and the patient. For example:   
“I’m wondering, ‘What am I looking at?’ All the time, when I’m looking at on the screen. 
Yeah, I look at it too much.” (Linda, Resident Session #8) 
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“I guess he could have waited until he heard her full complaint before starting, but I still 
think it was okay. Maybe she cut it off because he went to the computer.” (Joshua, 
Resident Session #3) 
 
“And I’m not responding to what you say, I’m not validating what you say, I’m just 
documenting what you say.” (Beverly, Attending Session #3) 
 
4. Directing patients and asserting boundaries while respecting autonomy  
Residents and attendings accepted that residents could direct patients and focus on the 
heart of the problem. They realized the need for structure and that residents must sometimes 
direct interaction with patients who are rambling by asking them to be specific. For example:  
“I think that what he does is appropriate. I think he’s sharing what his view is, and how 
he sees this intervention to be helpful. We haven’t heard the end of the conversation yet, 
so we don’t know if he’s saying, ‘And now I’m going to sign you up for that. Now I’m 
going to make sure they call you and you need to call, you know.’” (Cynthia, Attending 
Session #2) 
 
“I like how you kept her autonomy, saying like we do a thing called dis … You’re saying 
how you will give your opinion, but it’s like a group. Like this is, like, not you telling her or 
just putting it all on her that you’re there … shared decision making is, like, everybody. 
We’re all here together. It’s like I’m [not] just going to tell you what I’m thinking, but I’m 
also going to take what your thoughts are. You’re not forcing something on her at all, 
which was good.” (Joseph, Resident Session #2) 
Residents and attendings accepted that residents could lay the groundwork for 
expectations and set boundaries. It was also accepted that residents may practice medicine 
only within the limits of their own beliefs. Residents can share information about themselves to 
explain a particular practice, within set limits. Residents can say no to prescribing certain 
medications, such as controlled substances, in a respectful manner, if they find it appropriate. 
For example:  
“He may be trying to lay all this groundwork so he can really say, ‘This is why I’m not 
going to give you what you want.’ I mean he’s using, the patient doesn’t understand, but 
at least he feels … he feels like he’s telling the patient why he’s not getting opiates. I 
mean, I think that’s what he’s thinking in his mind, most likely. I mean, we don’t want to 
say what people are thinking, but he is portraying that, ‘I’m prepping you for this, [which] 
is why I’m not going to do what I already said I wasn’t going to do.’” (Gary, Attending 
Session #1) 
 
“[He was] setting boundaries … a lot of times they come … patients, and they have a 
history of abuse, or they’re currently using and they, either their thing is, ‘I use because 
I’m in pain and when you … magically stop using whatever I’m using? Um, or well, I’ll 
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wean off of this because you’re going to treat my pain, which is why I’m using heroin and 
stuff like that.’ And, th-, and some people, I think, actually do … you hear about it in the 
news like people were on pills, they got cut off, and they started using stuff, like this guy 
uses, like, everything. So, probably not all for pain.” (Anthony, Resident Session #1) 
Residents and attendings expected residents to be respectful to patients, acknowledge 
whether patients were interested in treatment, and motivate patients to make adequate 
changes, based on readiness, without pressuring them. Respecting patient autonomy and not 
just telling them what they should do was valued. Decisions should be shared and patients 
should be given options so that doctors can identify a patient’s true preference. For example: 
“She figured out the patient preference and gave her all the options.” (Donald, Resident Session 
#12) 
Residents and attendings criticized residents for letting patient descriptions wander, 
leading to a disorganized visit. They called out residents for not making patients focus. 
Residents should provide guidance to patients about sitting on the chair or at the table. 
Residents were criticized if they attempted to half-adequately manage all problems instead of 
instructing patients to come back for another visit. Not directing patients to give needed 
information and not asking the right kinds of questions to make patients focus were considered 
inadequate practices. Not calling patients out when they avoided engaging in a serious 
conversation about their health was also criticized. For example:  
“Very early, it was her concern that she’s losing weight, I want to figure out what’s going 
on, and then I think, when you’re going off into those tangents, that [you] are kind of 
moving away from that concern. I think it’s worth kind of stepping in and pointing that out 
and saying, ‘I want to address, you know, there are concerns with the cold that [the 
baby] had, I want to address those, but let’s get back and get the specific[s] for this thing 
[the weight loss] that has me really worried right now.’” (Matthew, Attending Session #8) 
 
“I think just knowing that we did enough talking for quite a while, I think I got all the 
information that I wanted, but it took a little while. I could have potentially just kept 
asking/redirecting questions.” (Linda, Resident Session #8) 
 
“I know that sometimes people who have a history of substance abuse or who have a 
thing they don’t want to deal with, like substance abuse, they’ll make a lot of jokes to sort 
of push you away from the issue. Needing to balance between building that report and 
acknowledging, ‘I appreciate your sense of humor and you’re deflecting something that 
I’m really worried about.’ … I think at some point it might have been appropriate for her 
to look at him and say, ‘You know I hear you cracking a lot of jokes, but this is really 
going to damage your health. It’ll ruin your liver. It can do horrible things to your brain. 
It’s going to make that anxiety feeling worse.’” (Laura, Attending Session #13) 
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Attendings found residents giving confusing information about their own beliefs 
inadequate. They also thought residents should correct patient expectations regarding 
prescribing pain medications. For example:  
“So, I, I don’t know. I probably would’ve taken the opportunity to correct the patient and 
say, ‘Yes, you’re out of narcotic pain medication for your ankle surgery.’ Well, I guess I 
would see how the visit plays out because I’m assuming that the patient’s gonna ask 
about some sort of narcotic therapy at the end.” (Charles , Attending Session #15) 
Attendings and residents called out speaking of shared decisions while pushing a 
resident’s own view. They also looked negatively upon practices that did not consider alternative 
options. For example: 
“She sounds like she’s a bit directive rather than collaborative … I wonder if the patient 
would hear it that way rather than it really being more collaborative.” (Cynthia, Attending 
Session #14) 
 
 
5. Asking attending for help when needed after making efforts  
Residents function under supervision; not all their decisions are truly theirs. Attendings 
and residents understand that residents could encounter situations when they do not know what 
to do. They valued when residents accessed articles or decision support resources to find 
answers. They expected residents to formulate plans and to ask their attending if they were 
unsure how to proceed. They further expected residents to rely less on preceptors as they 
advanced in their training. For example:  
Gregory: “I wanted to give her some type of plan and just be like, I didn’t want to be like, 
‘I don’t know what to do,’ you know? So, I wanted to give her some type of plan and then 
go discuss with the attending and come back and say, ‘Hey, well we’ve discussed it and 
we want to change.’”  
Daniel: “It’s all right not to have a plan too... I’ll leave a room and be like, ‘I’m going to 
discuss this with one of my other colleagues.’”  
Gregory: “That’s what I should have said.”  
Daniel: “See what their thoughts are. They may come in to take a look at a rash or talk to 
you. It’s all right not to have a plan unless, I mean, the plan could be to go come up with 
a plan with somebody else. It’s never, you don’t have to feel, like, on the spot, like you 
have to know all the answers right now. 
(Gregory and Jessie, Resident Session #7) 
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Attendings and residents criticized residents for not precepting serious conditions and 
making decision on their own. They pointed out situations when engaging the attending could 
have empowered residents to make the right decision and advocate for the patient. It was 
thought of as unacceptable to act as if residents had a plan, thus, leading patients astray with 
poor management. On the other hand, attendings criticized residents who gave up their 
autonomy, deferring to their supervising doctors to make all decision and playing the role of 
messenger. For example:  
Cynthia: “I am really confused why he is not … It seems like the patient is saying, ‘This is 
painful, I’m not able to actually be on, there is no such things [sic] as light duty.’ Unless 
he [was] totally taken off of the floor, which requires a physician’s note, which he’s never 
had … [be]cause everything he does causes more trauma to the, his finger, which is 
even worse than the fact that he’s not wearing the splint as often as he should be. And 
so, it seems strange that, I felt like the patient was basically saying, ‘I need your help. I 
need your help!’ And Ryan is just like, ‘Oh well, okay, well [continue the floor work that 
you’re doing now and see the hand surgeon].’” 
Matthew: “And I don’t know if some of this is [that] he doesn’t know how to manage this 
and if, whatever other doctor he saw told him to go back to work. Maybe he doesn’t feel 
comfortable saying, ‘No that’s not a good idea.’” (Cynthia & Matthew, Attending Session 
#6) 
 
“I was like wondering whether to write him one or not because he had seen this doctor 
who works at his, the doctor apparently is, like, on site or something. So, I was 
wondering whether the doctor there, like, knew something I didn’t and that’s why he 
released him back to work. So, I didn’t want to, like, overturn his decision … that’s what I 
was thinking, too. I mean, like, it’s my intern year. There’s this doctor who is in another 
clinic. He’s probably dealt with a lot of these injuries before, and he’s probably, you 
know, taken people off work and put people on work multiple times, so he kind of knows 
when to send him back. So, I was like, ‘Well, who am I, then, to tell him you can go back 
when the other guy cleared him?’” (Ryan, Resident Session #6) 
 
Discussion 
To my knowledge, this is the first study to comprehensively explicate what attendings 
and residents consider to be the norms of practice in primary care. While I am not the first to 
name the categories of actions the doctor engages in throughout the visit, explicating the 
normative/evaluative positions of residents and attendings around each category in a contextual 
way is novel. Furthermore, it is also novel to reconstruct themes to explicate the complexity of 
the workings of the doctor and, at the same time, put forth that the complexity of the workings of 
173 
 
the evaluator is best done from the perspectives of the participants. The work of a resident is so 
complex, nuanced, and contextualized that no checklist is sufficient to judge its merits and 
value. An application of a norm is judged as appropriate in one setting and is judged the 
opposite in another. The performance of actions that may appear good from a certain value 
stand point may only be judged as adequate in a context if not violating other norms that may be 
judged to have greater value in that context. The work of a resident is judged as adequate when 
it upholds not one value but many at the same time. This complexity invites a framework that is 
more elaborate and complex than what has previously been proposed in medicine and medical 
education. My work came to explicate just that framework. Thus, this study presents major 
contributions to the body of knowledge in the field of resident assessment, the methodology of 
research, and the theories of education research. Furthermore, it presents a working model that 
can be readily adopted in residencies for educational purposes.  
The study explicates the norms of practice from the perspectives of attendings and 
residents. Prior research has often focused on presenting the work of doctors as sets of 
technical skills. This study instead presents what is valuable to doctors at work in the context of 
their daily practice. These invaluable insights have not been captured in research before. The 
study shows that what matters for residents and attendings is often not the use of one specific 
skill or another, but rather the appropriate action itself in its own context. Roter et al. (2004) 
presented as outcomes of improvement the increased use of certain types of questions (open 
ended vs closed ended, relationship building statements, etc.) and letting patients talk more. 
Our study shows that what determines adequacy is a complex process that involves the 
evaluator taking the position of the acting doctor and contemplating what she could or should do 
in a specific patient interaction.  
There are no longer fixed norms that are decontextualized and abstracted. There is, 
instead, the acknowledgement of multiple norms and the recognition that in order for some rules 
to be maintained, others ought to be violated. Asking open-ended questions was judged as 
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inadequate in the context of interactions with rambling patients, and both attending physicians 
and residents expressed a preference for more focused visits with such patients, because they 
better allowed the doctor to address important concerns. Letting the interactions go astray with 
open-ended questions and allowing more time for the patient to talk and the doctor to listen was 
not, on such occasions, deemed appropriate. Determining which rule to follow can be done only 
from the perspective of a participant. The attending physician wrongly criticized a resident for 
not performing a specific act (such as teach-back). In this setting, the resident, upon engaging in 
reflection, gave a sufficient and convincing demonstration that the patient actually understood 
him very well, without the need for a regimented set of acts. My study provides evidence that 
conversations between doctors and patients are better evaluated in dialogue with a participant 
in the conversation (i.e., the doctor herself) than by a distant observer.  
Previous research has shown that residents err (Honey, Bray, Gomez, & Condren, 2015; 
Naveh, Katz-Navon, & Stern, 2015). Our study complements previous knowledge in this area 
and gives actual and explicit examples of patterns of errors. In our study, residents erred 
because they did not adequately perform some of the basic tasks of the visit, such as not 
eliciting sufficient information from a suicidal patient, not diagnosing the reason for not healing a 
patient with fracture, and not giving the right treatment. They also erred when they accidently or 
consciously did not address the patient’s concerns. Furthermore, they erred when they aimed to 
address many problems, only to end up doing a partially adequate job for a few. The common 
theme, however, was that residents often did not know what they did not know. Residents are 
building competencies, but they are not always competent. Our study showed that when faced 
with uncertainty, residents quite often acted and made decisions without asking for support from 
a supervisor.  
My previous work, using administrative billing data, has shown that residents billed 
differently compared to attendings (Al Achkar et al., 2018). Many of the visits an attending 
physician would categorize as moderate or high-complexity visits, the residents categorized as 
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low complexity. Consistent with my previous study, this work also showed that residents failed 
to assess the complexity of a visit in the vast majority of the cases, categorizing the visit billing 
code (an indicator of complexity) as low instead of moderate or even high. Failing to assess the 
complexity of a visit has left residents alone to manage highly-complex and potentially at-risk 
patients, only using the attending physician as a consultant after the patient leaves instead of 
engaging the attending in the management of the patient or even co-managing some of the very 
complex patients, such as the ones this study identified: a patient with a non-healing fracture 
who was advised to exercise his fractured finger, a patient with chronic obstructive pulmonary 
disease (COPD) exacerbation who was not given antibiotics, and a patient with a corneal 
laceration and also with severe depression who called 911 with a gun to her head two days after 
seeing the resident with a PHQ-9 of 27, to mention just a few. All these patients were 
documented as low complexity visits and were billed 99213, with minimal attending involvement. 
Our study provides evidence that ought to be used in an immediate “call to action” to examine 
current practices in resident supervision. Residents may not be as adequately supervised as we 
think they are. For the attending to greet the patient at the end of a visit and read the visit note a 
few days or weeks afterwards, my study shows, is insufficient levels of supervision. And, in the 
absence of a reliable method of monitoring, the inadequate supervision of residents may be 
causing more errors than are captured.  
In addition to its contribution to the literature in education, my study also contributes to 
the literature in research methods, demonstrating the methodological advantage of taking a 
naturalistic approach to the matter at hand. My training in research methodology and my 
background as an educator and as a physician provided me with tools to probe at the heart of 
the matter in its natural context. Unlike studies that relied on standardized patients or structured 
settings (Edelstein and Ruder,1990; Holmboe, 2003; Zick, 2007; Collins, 2001), this study used 
actual patient interactions. It also leveraged an ongoing structure for resident evaluation, while 
introducing a parallel structure to elicit resident perspectives. If we add the perspectives gained 
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from the video recordings to allow observation of exactly what took place, this research method 
has provided unprecedented richness to data collection methods, especially with the 
triangulation with perspectives from attending physicians. Unlike previous work that relied on a 
researcher’s observation of research subjects or video analysis conducted by researchers, the 
method employed here allowed the use of low-level inferences to understand meaning since the 
participants have already engaged in the process of judgement and left for the researcher only 
the task of organizing the data. All these methodological advantages gave this study an 
advantage over previous research, which relied only on abstracted documentation of the 
interactions or on participants’ answers in post-course surveys (Edwards et al. 1996; Abbass, 
2004; Jain, 2017). 
My study no longer links appraisal processes to those of giving feedback, which 
assumes the technical nature of the working of the doctor and assumes the observer’s position 
of the evaluator. This work, instead, is oriented toward normative aspects and reintroduces to 
the medical literature the normative-evaluative vocabulary of ought, should, good, adequate, 
inadequate, etc., which are at the heart of the process of appraisal. The notion of adequacy is 
expanded from an emphasis on truth and effectiveness to encompass normative (i.e., right, 
wrong, etc.) and evaluative (good, bad, etc.) concerns as they are taken up by the participants 
in this social context. It further introduces the act of judging the rule-following behavior as 
coming from someone on an equal footing with the actor and with the judgement itself 
susceptible to being judged. My study takes a reflective gaze on the evaluator, within the 
framework of critical theory, and recognizes the different positionality of participants. No one 
participant or group of participants has the infallible position. All the participants have a place at 
the table and provide perspectives that are valued, yet fallible, and susceptible to criticism.  
My study shows that the insights shared by reviewed residents making confessions 
about their subjective world were of most value for understanding. Without such authentic 
representation of the self, some of the actions would have never been understood beyond the 
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certainty of mere speculation. Examples of this kind of observation are confessions, such as 
those rephrased here: “I knew I did not know and I had to make it up!”, “I heard the patient say 
he was anxious, but I glossed over it because I did not want to deal with prescribing hypnotics!”, 
and “I thought to myself, that doctor is more senior and he must know better. Who am I, as an 
intern, to change his plan?”. Residents made these confessions and received acknowledgement 
from other residents, who reciprocally admitted of doing the same while calling out the error. 
This practice of reciprocal recognition can potentially help individuals achieve forgiveness and 
higher levels of truthfulness and authenticity without normalizing the error. The learner herself 
knows she has erred and is at times eager to announce her judgment, almost as if it is a 
confession. Announcing this confession and receiving acknowledgment from others who have 
erred makes it acceptable for the resident to undergo the process of acting, erring, and learning.   
The study provides a novel method for appraising resident work. The model includes the 
perspectives of attending physicians and residents in open dialogue focused on learning. I, 
however, am not the first to propose a variation of this model. My thinking is traced to a 
collaborative pilot undertaken with Debra Roter when I was a resident. Roter suggested creating 
audio-recordings for resident-patient interactions, then letting residents listen to their audio-
tapes in pairs, while using a simplified coding schema based on her sophisticated Roter 
Interactive Analysis System (RIAS) coding system. The experiment faced logistic challenges 
and failed to show statistically significance impact, likely due to limited resident engagement. 
The project I led here builds on what was already implemented at the same institution. My 
literature review, not surprisingly, showed similar working models already in use, such as the 
work of Muench et al. (2013) and the work of Benedek and Bieniek (1977). The model I 
developed is unique because it blends the principles of resident engagement and autonomy 
with the principles of faculty coaching and supervision. The balance between the two is a 
nuanced one and is at the heart of my teaching philosophy. Unlike the work of college 
educators, residencies are ascribed the task of cultivating and nurturing the authentic self of 
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competent physicians. Autonomy and self-motivation are not sufficient to assure competency; 
coaching and supervision are also necessary. The platform of education illustrated in this study 
can be readily used by residency programs. The developed guide (Appendix 2) can be used to 
coach resident and attending conversations without constraining their flow.  
This paper brings an important contribution also to research methodology and theory. It 
illustrates the dialogic and reflective potential of video reviews in medical education, an area 
that is both under-developed in practice and under-theorized in research. The work stands as a 
critique of the empirical use of video that does not sufficiently articulate implicit theories in that 
use. Reflection in video reviews, essentially an action of the one in the first-person position, is 
also an internal dialogue with an other and a taking of a third-person position toward oneself. 
Dialogues, whether with a peer or a supervisor, are similarly an I/thou interaction that involves 
acting, making judgments about the other’s action, and surrendering this judgment to be judged 
by the first person. In reflection, there is a dialogue with an other. In dialogue, there is a 
reflection on the person’s action and her judgment. In both, there is also a place for taking a 
third-person position when looking at the reflection or dialogue. In reflection, just as in dialogue, 
the relation is that of subject to subject and never that of subject to object. Reflection is not 
looking into a mirror. In making judgments dialogically, what is judged is the subject as acting 
and never as an objectivated act as an object in itself.  
My work is not without limitations. First, the organization of the themes of the visit tasks 
is somewhat rigid and only serves to make sense of what is taking place in the interaction 
between the doctor and the patient and what is taking place when appraising the interaction. In 
reality, just like any conversation, there can be a back and forth in the performance of the visit’s 
tasks. Similarly, the functions of the appraisal often take place alongside the played videos. An 
ideal way of representing what takes place in an evaluation setting is the working of a play 
scene: there are the two main actors, the patient and the doctor, dialoguing while surrounded by 
other peers and attendings who appraise the interaction at the same time. The flow of the scene 
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between the two main actors is interrupted by monologues (self-reflections) by both the patient 
and the doctor and by side dialogues or group conversations. This representation will be the 
subject of a collaborative work with partners talented in playwriting. Second, as a naturally 
occurring experiment, the selection of cases may have been determined by the contingency of 
what patients comes to the office in the day of recording. I believe that the 15 included patients 
presentations represent a fairly robust sample. I also argue that the cases included were quite 
diverse and sufficient to present the type of interactions of interest. Third, since the work aimed 
to engage learners and attendings in authentic conversation, one can assume that the 
representation of the authentic self can develop in a more cultivated way as participants 
continue to engage in these kind of exercises. The study represents the first round of resident 
interaction using this model. The familiarity of the group with one another, I believe, has 
provided the conditions for sufficiently truthful and authentic conversation in the group, although 
I acknowledge that this may take a different shape over time.  
This project is not yet completed. Future work will aim to explore the roles played by the 
participants, both attendings and residents, as they engage in the practice of appraising oneself 
and others. Such work will provide invaluable insights into the diversity of patterns of actions 
followed by participants, and sometimes the diversity of patterns followed by the same 
participants in the same session. I also aim to explore the type of vocabulary (normative claims, 
objective claims, and subjective claims) that were in the foreground in the participant 
conversations and how that differed between attendings and residents. I believe that while 
primarily normative claims lay in the background of the appraisal, people in social settings follow 
the norms of the interactions (it is good to be polite, use of indirect language is permitted, a 
reviewer can refer to her practice while hinting at another’s performance, etc.). This presentation 
variation can help abstract strategies for delivering appraisal to the person that can be effective 
yet normatively-authorized, as well as authentic. Finally, I also aim to explore how learning 
takes place as residents engage in such a model of reflection and appraisal. I expect to see 
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resident performance developing to simulate enacting the norms of the discipline. I also 
anticipate seeing critical reflections on the norms and their legitimacy. Most importantly, I also 
expect to see a cultivation of authenticity and orientation towards understanding oneself and the 
other.   
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Reflections on the experience of being the patient 
It was back in the Fall of 2015. I was hospitalized in room 94 on the fifth floor at 
Methodist Hospital, the same room I used to see patients in when I supervised the residents as 
an attending physician. I had been admitted to our own service, and a resident was called in the 
middle of the night because my blood pressure was low and I had no IV access. I’d had a flare-
up of my inflammatory bowel disease. I was put on steroids and sent home to later start more 
long-term treatment with an immunomodulator. I was now the patient, and I was ill—very ill. I 
was afraid that one of these flare-ups would make the doctors want to remove my colon, and 
then I would have an ostomy bag. I was also afraid that my disease would eventually cause me 
to have colon cancer. I was afraid of losing my ability to work as a physician and of losing my 
identity. Mostly, I was afraid because I did not understand why. 
I pursued PhD studies in inquiry methodology, seeking an unknown unknown. I did not 
have the specific question; I just did not know. I did not want to lose myself if I became only a 
patient, so I wanted new sets of tools. I wanted tools I could still use if my mind was the only 
thing that was still working. Being in that hospital bed woke me up. I realized that being a patient 
is not a comfortable position. The patient is vulnerable, and doctors take for granted that they 
can walk in, poke around, and ask questions about the patient’s most intimate reality. Because I 
was also on the other side, I called myself out when I did not cherish with honor the privilege of 
being able to care for others. 
My early dissertation work reflects my existential struggle as I grappled with the position 
of doctor and the position of patient. That work represents an early exercise in lending my voice 
to patients who are marginalized with their pain. Laws in different states have come to regulate 
the prescribing of opioids. On occasion, patients have become victims of the power of the law 
taking the side of doctors in an already lopsided relationship. The study, published in the British 
Medical Journal, was a qualitative interview of nine patients and five doctors. It aimed to 
evaluate the impact of Indiana’s opioid prescription legislation on patient experiences with pain 
management. The study explores the effect of these laws on decision-making and satisfaction 
with the prescriber–patient partnership, and it presents patients’ perspectives, which often go 
unheard. 
 
The first paper 
Two years later, on the eve of Thanksgiving 2016, I was diagnosed with stage IV lung 
cancer. My disease resulted, at least partially, from the immunomodulators, which saved my 
colon but weakened my immune system in face of cancer. As I was coming out of the crisis of 
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being diagnosed with a terminal illness giving a life expectancy of months to a few years, I had 
to recreate my identity. The world, as a place with an objectivity that is determined for us, 
became oppressive. I reinvented myself over months of intense reading of Hegel and 
Habermas. I was only liberated when I came to accept my subjectivity in a relevant world and 
reconstructed my relationships with others based on norms I intersubjectively negotiated with 
them. The objective world became relevant only when I shared access with multiple people, and 
even then, our knowledge was criticizable. I began to believe that dialogue was how I came to 
know others and wanted others to come to know me. I refused to be measured or predicted by 
mere calculation or definitions or by rules that determine how people would behave when they 
are in my situation. As I was “tarrying with the negative,” my fears were not only of death itself 
but also, and probably more intensely, of mental illness. 
I was redefining my norms and recreating my identity. I was reshaping who I was, in a 
drift; I did not know where it would take me and did not want to know. I felt I had to open my soul 
to becoming whoever I would become. I was losing myself, and I wanted that loss because I 
thought I would only gain some new sense of self if I lost my old one. I was striving for 
authenticity, not only through doing things in harmony with who I am but also as the quality that 
is recognized as authenticity by others. I wanted recognition while I was deconstructing the self 
others had recognized for 33 years. 
My family was also struggling to make sense of my illness. My brother, the psychiatrist, 
was the best candidate to visit from the UK for a few days to be by my side. To me at that time, 
he was, like most psychiatrists, perceived as trained to be the “guardian of normality.” These 
guardians set out for people what is right and wrong, what is healthy and what is ill, and what is 
sane and what is mad. His visit came at a time when I realized that I needed to be mad in order 
for my soul to heal. My rational mind would not make sense of my experience, and I had to go to 
the dark side of insanity. I wrote to him once, “If you see me become manic, do not treat me 
against my will!” My thoughts were erratic, and my feelings were like a roller coaster as I swung 
back and forth between madness and sanity. In the midst of this chaos, I prepared myself to 
have a dialogue with him as I hosted him for a few days. 
To me, my brother saw not three worlds of subjectivity, objectivity, and normativity, but 
rather only one world—the objective world of facts. In order to have a dialogue with him, I 
placed myself in his position and accepted the relevance of the objectivity, giving it a privileged 
place so that we could have a conversation. I described my experience to him and told him my 
story. My sense was that he listened with the silence of the observer. Although he was the best 
listener, he did not say the words that would allow me to feel my experience was heard. He 
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validated my fears and deemed my struggles normal. But despite his care, I felt deserted. So, to 
break through the perceived cold-heartedness, I shared with him a section in the book I was 
writing about my cancer. I chose the part that is dedicated to him, in which I wrote, “It is an 
irrational idea, and this is not usually me. I am usually a rational person. I once said I would be 
ready to die when I understand The Phenomenology of Spirit—of Hegel. When I got the cancer 
diagnosis, that book saved me from resorting to a spirituality or religion. I have been studying 
the book intensely, and I am still far from comprehending it, but it is becoming less cloudy. I also 
have the notion (irrationally) that a person dies when she is ready. I AM NOT READY TO BE 
READY!” 
I shared pages of what I wrote, and I cried as I exposed my deepest vulnerability 
washed in tears. I wanted him to recognize not that my experience was normal but that it was 
authentic. We then discussed other family affairs, and I expressed some opinions about norms 
he did not agree with. I felt devastated. He neither recognized my subjectivity while I confessed 
my deepest vulnerability, nor would he assent to negotiating norms to hold intersubjectively 
agreed-upon values with me. He only spoke of “facts” that I did not share access to with him 
and that I did not recognize as such. I felt the pressure of what, by then, I had been pushing off 
my chest for months, of claimed objectivity and truth as I reconstructed who I am. It felt like the 
objective of death looming again. I was asked, I felt, to surrender all of myself and vanish. I had 
already surrendered part of myself on my own by assenting to represent my experience in his 
language so we could have a conversation. But now, I was losing all of me. 
I experienced madness at its worst. I cried myself to sleep and woke up the next 
morning with revelations that I wanted to live not for any particular reason others might refute 
but rather to search for an unknown answer to an unknown question. I thought no one could 
criticize that reason because it is plausible and, more importantly, powerful. That was my first 
commandment. I also had another epiphany in which I decided to live until I am 82 years old! I 
had no particularly good reason for selecting the number of years, but exactly because of the 
fact that it was an arbitrary number, it became meaningful to me. That was my second 
commandment. More importantly, I felt just fine in the morning and was at peace, like someone 
who had survived the worst storm of her life. The experience liberated me from my fear of 
madness. More importantly, I needed to transcend these binaries and expand my “normal” to 
include the whole, making my state of being the sole criteria for itself. 
As my brother was cleaning the apartment the next day, I asked him to stop giving me 
what I perceived to be a helping hand, and I shared with him my whole experience. He was 
distraught, shocked, and confused. It was not until I gave him a ride to the airport that he shared 
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his true feelings and thoughts with me. I realized then that I really did not know whether there is 
more suffering in dying of cancer or in watching your loved one die. My brother came with the 
attitude of being fully present for me. He held back on being himself so that he would not 
become a burden on my soul. He was more tormented than I ever was. It was not until he 
returned back to the UK and after I recreated myself by transcending my fear of insanity that we 
reconciled. 
Thus, my first paper came as an ambitious abstraction of this equally existential struggle 
to make meaning and have an authentic dialogue. In it, I grappled with the critical notion that “all 
research in the social sciences engages with the consequences of its philosophical answers to 
the question ‘How is social order possible?’” I presented in the paper a sketch of the way a few 
philosophers engaged in this question and attempted to develop my own position. I first outlined 
Thomas Hobbes’s answer to the question as put forth in his Social Contract Theory. Next, I 
presented Foucault’s critique of Hobbes before I explicated outlines from Foucault’s theory of 
power. I then examined Jürgen Habermas’s critique of Foucault and sketched an outline of 
Habermas’s Theory of Communicative Action focusing on the distinction between strategic 
action and communicative action. My main hypothesis was that this distinction leads to a 
tension. To elaborate on this issue, I invited tools from Hegel’s critique of morality in 
“Conscience. The ‘beautiful soul,’ evil and its forgiveness” to expand the conversation in social 
sciences by exploring the notions of conviction, action, judgment, forgiveness, and love–notions 
that are essential to our existence and relevant specially to conducting research with humans. 
 
The Second paper 
Being a teacher and a student myself, I grappled with the notion of coaching a resident 
as a learner to cultivate her most authentic self while still fulfilling my commitment to provide 
compassionate and safe patient care. I developed a model of learning where residents reflect 
on their own interactions with patients, reviewed on videos, as they receive their peers’ 
appraisals. The model has the person moving between the position of reviewer and the position 
of the reviewed. In a parallel structure, I facilitated the interaction between faculty groups 
engaging in appraising the resident’s performance, but this time, without the resident in the 
room. As a naturalistic experience, I collected rich data and was able to engage in examining 
multiple questions. Working on the same theoretical theme of criticizing the tendency to 
technicize the work of the doctor and objectify the appraisal of the person, I was determined to 
focus on the normative aspects of the process of video reviews. I had the theory (expanding on 
Habermas and Wittgenstein) that when someone evaluates, she is judging the rule-following 
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behavior of the person. I proposed that an adequate framework for presenting the work of 
appraisal is a normative/evaluative one. The person looks at what took place and makes, in the 
foreground or the background, normative/evaluative claims of the kind “that was good/right or 
bad/wrong” and “you should do it this way/you could (as in it’s OK) do it that way.” 
My literature review supports my claim that this normative vocabulary is almost absent 
from the medical literature on evaluation. Instead, the literature is filled with technicized 
objectified claims that are cut off from their normative/evaluative roots and assumed to be 
grounded in unexamined objectivity. I wanted to argue that laying a normative/evaluative 
foundation is adequate and right. My explication of the work using this normative vocabulary 
and its soundness to the medical audience is the evidence. I am deferring exploring my 
secondary yet-to-be-related hypothesis (based on conversations with David Estell) that the 
diversity of foregrounded claims (rarely normative, often objective, sometimes subjective) is a 
manifestation of the (social) norms of the place. In a sense, even the selection of this or that 
type of word has its root (at least the most salient root) not in objectivity (effectiveness, etc.) but 
rather in the normative ground of reason. Explicating this position is left to another paper. To 
another paper is also left the explication of the related notions of roles taken by the participants. 
 
Final words 
This work represents exercises on my path toward becoming an independent 
researcher. They are in no way complete products. They will move closer to meeting the 
standards of academia only with the continued engagement and further development of my 
caring mentors and respected peers. 
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Appendix 1. Exploring perceptions and experiences of patients who have chronic pain as state 
prescription-opioid policies change: A qualitative study in Indiana State 
 
Background 
The misuse and abuse of prescription opioids (POs) is an epidemic in the United States today. 
Since 1999, the rate of drug overdose deaths in the US has doubled in 29 states, tripled in 10 
states, and quadrupled in 4 states, including the State of Indiana (The Indiana Attorney General, 
2014). In 2013, physicians wrote over 200 million prescriptions for opioids, and over 2 million 
Americans suffered PO use disorders (National Institutes of Health, 2014). According to 
Birnbaum et al. (2011), the societal costs of PO abuse, including lost productivity and increased 
utilization of healthcare, were estimated at $55.7 billion in 2007. Not surprisingly, there is 
growing evidence for a correlation between consumption levels of POs and measures of 
morbidity and mortality, including PO overdose-related deaths and admissions to substance use 
disorder treatment programs (Imtiaz, Shield, Fischer, & Rehm, 2014). According to the National 
Institute of Health Survey (2011-2012) on Drug Use and Health, Indiana ranked 3rd for 
nonmedical PO use (NMPOU): an estimated 5.63% of its residents aged 12 and older reported 
NMPOU in the prior year. In the same year, Indiana ranked 9th among US states for opioid 
prescribing, with a rate of 109.1 per 100,000 residents (Paulozzi, Mack, & Hockenberry, 2014). 
In 2012, 999 Indiana residents died of drug overdose, an increase of 57% over the prior decade 
(Healthy Americans, 2013). 
Many states have implemented legislation to curb the use of POs resulting from inappropriate 
prescribing (Franklin, 2014). Legislative strategies include oversight by prescription monitoring 
programs (PDMPs), the regulation of pain clinics, and the establishment of PO dosage 
thresholds above which pain expert consultation is mandatory (Franklin, 2014). Indiana 
legislated opioid prescribing rules (Title 844 IAC Article 5, Rule 6) that went into effect on 
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December 15, 2013 (Indiana State Medical Association (ISMA), 2013). The new regulations, 
while not setting a ceiling on opioid prescribing, require physicians to: (1) screen patients 
receiving POs for psychiatric conditions, (2) review patients’ drug prescription history in 
Indiana’s drug monitoring database (INSPECT), (3) perform regular drug tests, and (4) require 
patients on POs to sign a controlled substance agreement (ISMA), 2013). 
Studies evaluating state-level initiatives’ impact on opioid prescription rates and related 
morbidity and mortality have indicated significantly lower PO prescribing, but mixed evidence of 
a favorable impact on death by drug overdose (Franklin et al., 2012). The new Indiana rules 
have been associated with a similar decrease in the volume of prescribed opioids; the impact of 
the policy, however, differs by gender, age, and payer types (Back, Payne, Simpson, & Brady, 
2010; Choo, Douriez, & Green, 2014). The impact was larger for men than for women, for 
younger rather than older patients, and for Medicaid and Medicare patients when compared to 
patients with private insurance (Al Achkar et al., 2018). The “success” of state policies in curbing 
the over prescription of opioids, however, raises two concerns. First, the sharp decline in opioid 
prescription rates suggests the excessive application of prescription guidelines, which may 
consequently (and unintentionally) result in the under treatment of pain. Second, the varying 
rates of decline across subpopulations may be an indicator of disparity in an area of patient care 
that is already laden with disparities (Back, 2010; Chow, 2014). Pain experts agree that 
individuals with a legitimate need for pain control should have access to adequate pain 
management (Garcia, 2013; Burgess et al., 2014). However, there is little consensus about how 
to restrict the overprescribing of opioids, which results in misuse and abuse, while 
simultaneously maintaining legitimate access to pain care (Phillips, 2013). This delicate balance 
is further complicated by considerations such as the impact on patient satisfaction, patient 
empowerment, or the patient–provider/prescriber relationship. 
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This paper’s aim is to evaluate the impact of Indiana’s opioid prescription legislation on the 
patient experiences with pain management. The study explores the rules’ effect on decision-
making and satisfaction with the prescriber–patient partnership and presents patients’ 
perspectives, which often go unheard. To enhance the trustworthiness of the findings and 
provide confirmation of the clinical practices that define patients’ experiences, the triangulation 
of participants was used to supplement patient accounts of experienced pain with the healthcare 
providers account of experienced pain management. The actual experiences of patients will 
help deepen understanding of the implementation of the rules and may also provide insight into 
the patterns observed in previous quantitative studies. 
  
Methods 
Ethics 
The Indiana University Institutional Review Board approved the study. 
Setting 
Patients were recruited from clinics in a safety-net health system, which consists of a set of 
health care facilities that provide care to the indigent and under-insured patients. Patients 
receiving care at these clinics have diverse racial backgrounds, and most are either Medicaid-
insured or underinsured. The selection of the site was based on the assumption that patients 
with a lower socioeconomic status are more likely to be negatively affected by the PO rules.  
Sampling, Eligibility, and Recruitment 
Critical case sampling, a type of purposive sampling, was used to recruit participants. This 
sampling technique is particularly useful in exploratory qualitative research, as it permits logical 
generalization and maximum application of results to other cases, i.e., “If this is true for this 
197 
 
case, it is likely to be true of others” (Patton, 2015). Patients who have chronic pain were eligible 
for the study if they met all of the following criteria: (1) received pain treatment through the 
health system’s Integrative Pain Program (IPP) after the December 2013 policy change, (2) had 
been on long-term opioid therapy for a chronic pain condition for at least one year prior to policy 
implementation, and (3) were proficient in English. Primary care providers (PCPs) were eligible 
to participate if they had been practicing at one of the clinics in the system for at least one year 
prior to the enactment of the Indiana rules. We recruited these PCPs via email. 
Interview Instruments 
We designed a semi-structured interview with a set of core questions and follow-up probes that 
were informed by literature and consultation with and input from a pain management specialist 
(Appendix 1.1). The patient interview addressed patient descriptions of pain, experiences of 
pain before and after the policy change, perceptions about the impacts of the new policy, 
patient–provider communications and relationships before and after the policy change, and 
satisfaction with treatment/management before and after the policy change. The provider 
interview focused on the experience of managing pain before and after the implementation of 
the rules, knowledge of the rules, and satisfaction with practice. Interviews lasted between 30–
45 minutes on average. 
Interview Protocol 
Interviews with patients were conducted by Al Achkar between July and December 2015. We 
conducted interviews with providers in person except for one provider who completed the 
interview by phone. All interviews were audiotaped and participants received a $50 gift card at 
the conclusion of the interview. 
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Analysis 
Audiotapes were transcribed verbatim and imported into Dedoose, a web-based application for 
managing, integrating, and analyzing qualitative data. A member of the analytical team (Al 
Achkar) added descriptors to each transcript that included demographic information. Three team 
members (Al Achkar, Revere, Dennis) participated in an inductive, emergent thematic analysis 
(Paton, 2015; Miles & Huberman, 2014). Team members individually read transcripts several 
times, and subsequently met to discuss initial impressions. To enhance the rigor of the study, 
team members independently coded the data and then collaboratively reconciled the codes until 
a classification scheme was developed. Discrepancies were identified and resolved by 
consensus throughout the analysis. Excerpts from the transcripts of the participants and 
providers were selected to support the themes. This paper is the result of collaborative efforts 
and dialogues between researchers from different philosophical backgrounds. All the authors 
reviewed the manuscript and contributed to the background and discussion.  
 
Findings 
Characteristics of the Sample 
Nine CPPs and five primary care providers participated in the study. Table 1.1 describes the 
participants. 
Themes and Sub-themes 
As outlined in Table 1.2, three overarching themes with associated sub-themes emerged across 
both CPP and PCP groups: (1) Living with chronic pain is disruptive in multiple dimensions; (2) 
established pain management practices were disrupted by the change in prescription rules; and 
(3) Patient–provider relationships, which involve power dynamics and decision making, shifted 
in parallel to the rule change. Detailed results for each theme are as follows. 
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Living with chronic pain is disruptive in multiple dimensions. Embedded within this central theme 
are three sub-themes that include: CPPs report a wide range of emotional responses 
associated with their pain experience; unmanaged chronic pain disrupts the relationships CPPs 
have with others; CPPs experience ongoing challenges to their QOL; POs can help with daily 
functioning but their effect is not persistent or long-lasting and have negative side effects. 
Most CPPs reported feelings of depression, anxiety, frustration, and anger about their pain 
experience. Living with chronic pain has disrupted their lives, led to unemployment or 
underemployment, reduced their ability to engage in activities they formerly enjoyed, and 
undermined their sense of autonomy and independence, despite receiving pain treatment and 
medication. 
I’ve not gone to work and don’t even go out. I don’t go out with my husband. I don’t go out 
with my daughter. I don’t go out with anybody. [...] My life is pretty much at a standstill. [HQ] 
I get irritable. [...] Sometimes I get more aggravated. [...] I get impatient a lot. A little sadness 
too. [IS] 
 
[Pain] affects your relationships because it affects your attitude. [...] Sometimes, somebody 
might want to talk to you or whatever and you are in pain and you don’t mean to be mean 
and rude or not responsive. [...] You just don’t wanna move; you just wanna sit there 
because of how bad you hurt and that’s not fair to the person that you are with. [EM] 
 
I can’t do the things that I used to do and it kind of makes you feel like you can’t do anything. 
[...] You have to depend on people to do stuff for you because, like I said, I can’t even walk 
from here to the bus stop. [MN] 
 
...to have to ask for help [...] to use instruments just to put your clothes on, tie your shoes, 
pick something up off the floor or, you know, just the normal daily stuff that people take for 
granted. [RJ] 
While POs provided some relief, they alone were not sufficient for managing pain and were 
frequently considered ineffective, particularly when adverse side effects were taken into 
account. However, the use of non-PO medications and approaches also varied in effectiveness. 
[Pain medications] would give me the shakes, not visual but the way I talked. My speech 
would be a little slurred and I just didn’t like the effect. [KD] 
 
200 
 
…after so long [pain medications] just seemed that they just didn’t work; they were only 
making me tired [...] and the injections only lasted for 10, 15 minutes. By the time I made it 
to the car, it was over. […] the injections, the medicated rub, pain relief rub, and Ibuprofen, 
Proxen, I’ve tried everything, you know? Cold packs for my knees and hot packs to my 
knee, you know, they only work for a small period of time. [HQ] 
 
I try to put like a heating pad on [my knees] to kind of control it while I sleep and then it kind 
of feels a little better but soon as I take it off, I mean, if I get up and I’ll just try to walk or try 
to move on it, it kind of starts back. [MN] 
 
Established pain management practices were disrupted by the change in prescription rules. 
Three sub-themes emerged regarding the impact of the rules on perceptions of providing and 
experiencing pain management by providers and patients, respectively. These include: After the 
rules, patients experienced changes in medication regimen; the multiple layers of "vetting" were 
disruptive; lack of care coordination with requirement to see pain specialists and additional 
providers. 
Patients mentioned changes in their medications or medication regimen, having to undergo new 
protocols such as needing to be “vetted” for medications by frequent urine screens, having more 
frequent doctor appointments, being given lower pill allowances that necessitated more frequent 
refills and pharmacy visits, and needing to see multiple providers for pain management. Some 
patients were taken off prescribed opioids when their drug screen results were inconsistent. 
During office visits, patients underwent additional monitoring procedures, such as pill counting 
and urine drug screening, among others. 
[The doctor] kept lowering the medicine every month, lowering it down. [...] I’m still going in 
pain. [NC] 
 
I get drug tested about [every] 2 or 3 months. […] I think it [the rules] made it more difficult 
for patients to get their medicines [...] it’s hard to take off work to be able to go in every 
month or 2 months to the physician, whereas it used to be able to get refills every 3 to 4 
months without having to go to the physician. [Now] it’s usually every 6 weeks I see [the 
pain management] doctor. [IS] 
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PCPs also described the change in rules as impacting their approach to pain management, their 
prescription practices, and both the frequency and focus of their appointments with CPPs. 
Providers had to reconcile their enforcement of the law with how to best treat patients with 
chronic pain. On occasion, the providers’ practices were even more restrictive than the 
mandates of the rules themselves, especially with respect to setting a ceiling on prescribing.    
I prescribe lower volumes of opiates and patients that were on higher [...] morphine 
equivalent doses previously, I brought it down to much lower levels. [The law] effectively set 
a ceiling on [...] how much, what volume of opiates I’d prescribe to a patient. [...] It’s really 
made us formalize a lot of what we do in terms of [...] how frequently we see the patients. 
[...] We don’t just tell them to come every three months; we force them to come every three 
months. [Dr. AM] 
In addition to lower dosages, more strenuous monitoring activities, and more frequent 
appointments and prescription refills, some patients were also required to attend chronic pain 
self-management classes or see allied health providers such as occupational therapists. For 
CPPs who were employed, these requirements placed an additional burden on their lives, which 
were already disrupted by chronic pain. 
[The law] affects people like me [who are employed] because they won’t give [opioids] to 
you unless, you know, you go [...] to the special clinic, the classes, to get them. Well, I knew 
that I couldn’t get [medications] until I went to the classes. I had to go to the classes in the 
winter. I had to hop out and catch the bus and go out west to go to the [pain] clinic to see the 
doctor. [MN]   
The new and stricter monitoring requirements led some PCPs to refer their CPPs to pain 
management specialists who became overwhelmed by the demand. In addition, some CPPs 
experienced confusion when their primary and specialty care were not well-coordinated.  
…after the policy came in [the pain] clinic got saturated. [...] I think it might have been a little 
harder to get into physical therapy and even into anesthesia too. [Dr. NB] 
 
My rheumatologist tells him not to change my medicine but he changes it anyway. [EM] 
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Patient–provider relationships, with respect to power dynamics and decision making, shifted in 
parallel to the rule change.  
Six sub-themes related to a reversal or shift in power dynamics and patient centeredness 
emerged from both CPP and PCP interviews. These include: The rule change shifted power and 
privilege that dis-empowered patients; providers found the law effective in supporting their need 
to change pain management and lower prescriptions; patients perceive themselves as being 
objectified by providers; the objectivity of the rule and accompanying testing changed the patient 
from a person in pain to a public health problem that needed to be objectively addressed; the 
law overshadows caring for patients; patients experienced disenfranchisement that adversely 
impacted their trust of their doctors Providers were empowered by the law to change their pain 
management approach or to enforce changes they had struggled to implement prior to the rule 
change.   
Personally, I was happy because I never really believed in heavy use of narcotics to begin 
with [...] so I was grateful that finally I didn’t have to say it was me being the bad guy. [...] I 
could point to the laws and policy around this and use that kind of statement with the 
patients to say that, “It’s not that I don’t want to give you these narcotics or more narcotics, 
we are not allowed to and we must document any change or escalation because the law’s 
requiring it.” [...] It felt like a scapegoat in some ways, but in a way it felt like support, so I 
actually used it to my advantage. [Dr. NB] 
 
[The law has] given me support in drawing lines with patients to not only say, “No, I won’t 
prescribe that to you because I don’t think it’s likely to help you.” Some patients will argue 
that point endlessly, but if you say, “No, I won’t prescribe that to you because it’s not likely to 
help you and I’m not allowed to.” [Dr. PY] 
 
These are the rules. You know the rules. They’re not my rules. Uh, this is the law and we 
can both agree that, you know, and those situations really practice in a way that’s against 
the law. Hum, and so this makes it, it makes it more clear and objective and greatly reduces 
that kind of degree of emotional energy that was stressful prior to that. [Dr. KS] 
In fact, some PCPs viewed the law as improving their practice with respect to CPPs. 
I think people that were really actively drug seeking before being effectively weeded or 
weaned out of the system. I think a lot of them are using heroin, but you know they’re not 
coming to my clinic and yelling at me and yelling at my staff and threatening people. [Dr. PY] 
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Parallel with the rule change, some patients experienced a change in their relationship with their 
PCPs, from one in which they perceived that their needs and struggles were being heard and 
acknowledged to a relationship in which the law dictated not only changes in medication but 
also changes in the quality of the provider encounter. This changed the patient’s relationship 
from one where they felt heard and involved in the treatment process to one in which they felt 
controlled and treated in a more objective manner. 
They didn’t really allow me to speak about anything or tell them anything: they just came in 
and looked at me real quick. [...] The thing is that the doctor just don’t [...] want to listen to 
me about my pain. They just... it’s like they thought that I was making it up or something just 
try to get the medicine. They made me feel like [...] I was an addict trying to get fixed. [IS] 
The doctors… you know, have too much control of… of the patient’s care. The patient and 
the doctor should be a team. [...] It seems to me that the patient should come first. Ah, ah, I 
mean, isn’t that what, what the doctor, one of the doctor oaths? Didn’t they take the oath to 
help their patient? [EM] 
Indeed, PCPs acknowledged that the law created a firmer boundary between their patients and 
themselves, leading to less personal or less patient-centric encounters and relationships. 
[The law] shapes the conversation with patients about facing an expectation and then 
requirements and, uhm, boundaries, and makes the interaction more objective. [Dr. KS] 
 
I’m managing them more appropriately even though they may be less satisfied. [Dr. RC] 
Some patients expressed feeling less as individuals and more as an abstract public health 
problem that instigated the rule change in the first place. CPPs expressed an inability to 
negotiate this dynamic. Patients often used a passive voice when describing this change, 
seeing themselves as witnesses to the changes happening to them. 
I don’t care about people overdosing. I don’t care about people getting robbed on the street 
because I’m not the person that’s doing that; the only thing that I care about is my health 
[and] my quality of life. [...] What does [the law] have to do with the person that’s in front of 
[the doctor] in a wheelchair – they can’t walk, they can’t do this, they can’t do that, but 
they’re in pain but you’re telling them that, “Oh, we can’t give you any pain medicine.” [EM] 
[The new law] messes up people that don’t use drugs and the ones that do use it, that’s on 
them. I don’t put nothing in my body that’s not prescribed by a doctor. [MN] 
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Both patients and providers started to feel as if that the main focus of the patient–provider 
relationship is enforcing the legal requirements regarding pain management. 
So I stopped allowing the escalation, even, you know, that I just did out of maybe sympathy 
instead of objective and I started de-escalating [...] a lot of people, because of the [...]risk of 
managing these individuals [or] having someone say that you’re doing something. [It] made 
this more sensitive to even prescrib[ing] opioids. [Dr. PY] 
I was doing just fine [before the law change]. Now I have to struggle, suffer, to make to the 
next time that I can get my medicine. And I don’t think it’s fair to me because if I can take my 
medicine a little more regularly, I would be able to do more and thought that we have a 
better effect in your life and I don’t think that law, people, politicians, or anybody should be 
able to tell anybody that’s in pain what type of medicine that they can take. [EM] 
However, patients who felt cared for and listened to tended to trust their PCP, despite needing 
to comply with the rule change. 
I really felt like [the pain management doctor] and all of the team, they really did help me; 
they really did. They really did and got me on the way to where I need to be. [HQ] 
This highlights a division among CPPs: The shift in the power dynamic and decision making 
between patient and provider was seen as adversely impacting the patient–provider relationship 
depending on patient perceptions of trust and caring and changes in provider practices after the 
rules. Some CPPs viewed their providers as preferentially treating other patients, despite the 
law; while other CPPs expressed anger and extreme dissatisfaction with treatment to the extent 
that they planned to change providers. 
I know some women that smoke pot and do other drugs and he’s prescribing them pain 
meds and giving them drugs and not treating the women like he does the men. I just think 
that he is playing favoritism towards the women. […] [In fact] I don’t care to see that doctor 
right now, am in the process now of trying to find another doctor. [VN] 
 
[My doctor is] the coldest person you have ever seen in your life. [...] He don’t care. I come 
at him crying… I can’t stand the bastard. I will tell him what shape I am in and he just ignore 
it. [...] [As a] matter of fact, I signed up for another doctor; they don’t know it yet but I signed 
up with another doctor. [NC] 
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In summary, a range of perceptions and experiences associated with the PO law change were 
described as creating barriers to effective pain management, both self-management by CPPs 
and pain management practices by PCPs. 
Discussion 
Chronic pain is a complex, subjective phenomenon that is, our study confirms, disruptive to a 
person’s day-to-day experiences and can greatly reduce quality of life. We found that in 
subjective matters like pain, the patient's personal narrative is critical for health care providers 
who are designing and providing an effective pain management plan, however the Indiana PO 
law change disrupted established pain management practices as well as shifted the power 
dynamics and decision-making relationship that are built on these shared narratives between 
providers and their patients. 
A number of factors were described by patients as hindering their perception of "being heard" 
regarding their pain experiences, particularly the mandate to utilize objective measurements of 
pain levels and ancillary experiences, such as surveys to screen for other health conditions and 
urine drug screening. While these measures can support understanding, collaboration, and 
shared decision-making in the context of the new PO rules, relying on these “objective” scales 
are perceived by patients as diminishing their providers' ability to truly understand their pain. 
Patients viewed these tools as creating or increasing barriers to effective pain management, by 
increasing the frequency of these office visits, reframing the pain experience in an "objectifying" 
way, and overall, diminishing empowerment in regards to patient autonomy and decision-
making.  
In response to the opioid use crisis that stemmed partially from laxed used of PO, the Indiana 
prescribing rules were developed to regulate prescribing and to foster a more bio-psycho-social 
approach to pain management by increasing the contextual understanding of individuals and 
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their unique experiences of pain, suffering, and expectations (ISMA, 2013)). However, the 
providers’ practices and patient experiences suggest that the new rules have over-empowered 
doctors to leverage the force of the law while transforming patient pain management into an 
administrative task. Some patients feel more marginalized as they are being denied medications 
and receiving impersonal care that fails to address their needs while focusing on the public 
health opioid epidemic—an epidemic they believe they have no part in.  
Because patients perceive a disruption in the focus and goals of treatment, they are left feeling 
unheard, disempowered, and even cheated. Many patients now endure additional struggles to 
obtain access to pain management and must adhere to requirements—in some circumstances,  
such as the urine drug testing, not paid for by some insurers, which add financial burden to both 
clinics and patients—to demonstrate their compliance with the demands of healthcare providers 
and the law. For some patients, such barriers are insurmountable; consequently, they seek care 
from different providers who might be more sympathetic or less rigid regarding clinical oversight.  
In addition to disrupting prior pain management practices and shifting patient-centeredness 
priorities, we found that the concept of effective pain management is perceived by providers and 
many patients as an “unwinnable fight” due to the complexity of subjectively experienced pain, 
the myriad conditions that lead to chronic pain, suboptimal effects achieved by most treatments, 
and the risk of harm inherent in some treatment options. Opioids lack evidence for long-term 
effectiveness and can be detrimental to individuals and society as a whole when they are used 
excessively, abused, or diverted. Thus, the decision to prescribe opioids can be difficult.  
However, the findings presented here should not be understood or employed to reject or revise 
a law arbitrarily. Beyond the benefits that have already been reported about decreasing drug 
abuse and mortality (Franklin et al., 2012; Johnson, Paulozzi, Porucznik, Mack, & Herter, 
2014),new legislation may be playing a role in bringing pain to the forefront of the doctor/patient 
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interaction. Our findings invite the reader to reflect on the opioid prescription rules and their 
implementation in practice. Pain cannot be reduced exclusively to numbers, and a patient’s 
experience cannot be fully characterized with surveys, even if such measures assess 
depression, anxiety, and risk of abuse. This study attempts to add to the dialogue about how 
patient care can be centered on the patient while still providing safe and effective care and 
shared decision making between patients and providers. Furthermore, the study provides 
evidence to support the national initiatives and patient-led organizations that aim to give patients 
a stronger voice in the discussion around healthcare reforms and to empower them in their day-
to- day encounters with healthcare providers.  
While this study gave voice to patients and presented providers’ perspectives to validate their 
stories, it has limitations. First, the critical sampling of 14 participants may have highlighted 
certain aspects of patients’ and providers’ experiences while obscuring others. However, it can 
be argued that selecting patients from safety-net clinics where the majority were either 
underinsured or uninsured gave voice to more vulnerable and often underrepresented patients. 
Second, while the study presented perspectives of patients and providers, no attempt was made 
to correlate findings between the two groups or conduct cross-confirmatory analysis. 
Nonetheless, by sampling from the same clinic, it is likely that the two groups together represent 
a shared experience within the culture and space of the clinic. Moreover, to the best of the 
authors’ knowledge, this study is the first to capture patient–provider experiences post-policy. 
Finally, this work provides a foundation for much-needed future quantitative research studying 
the experiences of a broader patient population. Doing so would provide practitioners and 
researchers with a more comprehensive assessment the opioid prescribing rules 
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Table 1.1. Study Participant Characteristics. 
A. Patients 
  Age Gender Location of Chronic Pain Pain 
Duration 
Currently on 
opioids? 
HQ 45 F knee 5 years Y 
SW 42 F neck, shoulder, back   Y 
LJ 61 F knee 18 years Y 
GW 43 M shoulder, back 12 years N* 
EM 43 M hip, back, neck 12 years Y 
NC 73 F back, legs, arms, hands 42 years Y 
RJ 54 F back, knees 15 years Y 
IS 58 M neck, back  Y 
DJ 63 F neck, arm, back 13 years Y 
B. Doctors 
  Gender Specialty % of patients with chronic pain 
Dr. RC M Internal Medicine 20-30% 
Dr. AM M Internal Medicine 30% 
Dr. NB F Internal Medicine 10% 
Dr. KS M Family Medicine 15% 
Dr. PY M Family Medicine 30-50% 
*This patient was on opioids in the past but was taken off opioids at the time of the 
interview.   
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Table 1.2.  Major Themes and Sub-themes 
Major theme: Living with chronic pain is disruptive on multiple dimensions 
 Sub-themes: CPPs report a wide range of emotional responses associated with 
their pain experience 
  Unmanaged chronic pain disrupts the relationships CPPs have with 
others 
  CPPs experience ongoing challenges to their QOL 
  POs can help with daily functioning but their effect is not persistent or 
long-lasting and have negative side effects 
Major theme: Established pain management protocols were disrupted by the 
change in in prescribing rules 
 Sub-themes: After the rules, patients experienced changes in medication regimen  
 The multiple layers of "vetting" were disruptive 
  Lack of care coordination with requirement to see pain specialists 
and additional providers 
Major theme: 
  
Patient-provider relationships, with respect to dynamics, power 
and decision-making, shifted in parallel to the rule change 
Sub-themes: The rule change shifted power and privilege that dis-empowered 
patients 
 Providers found the law effective in supporting their need to change 
pain management and lower prescriptions 
 Patients perceive themselves as being objectified by providers 
 The objectivity of the rule and accompanying testing changed the 
patient from a person in pain to a public health problem that needed 
to be objectively addressed 
 The law overshadows caring for patients 
  Patients experienced disenfranchisement that adversely impacted 
their trust of their doctors 
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Appendix 1.1 Interview Guides 
Doctor interview guide 
Thinking back to your practice before the change in opioid prescribing rules: 
• Do you mind sharing with me some about your practice 
• Do you have patients with chronic pain? 
• Before Dec 2013, how did you use to manage the patients with chronic pain?  
• Did you find managing patients with chronic pain in your practice difficult or easy? (probes: 
Why difficult? Why easy? What difficulties did you have?) 
• Were there particular pain conditions you found more difficult to handle than others? 
• What were the biggest barriers to effective pain management for your patients? 
• What helped you manage pain effectively for your patients? 
• Were you satisfied or un-satisfied with managing patients with pain?  
• What did you find most satisfying about treating patients with chronic pain? 
• What did you find mostly dissatisfying about treating patients with chronic pain? 
We're interested in your experiences now that the opioid prescribing rules have changed. 
Thinking about the chronic pain management patients you see now: 
• Have you heard about the new rules in managing pain in Indiana? 
• How did you learn about the law? 
• What do you know about the law? 
• The law required physicians to do the following:  1) evaluate opioid recipients for psychiatric 
conditions, 2) review the patients' drug prescription history in INSPECT, Indiana's prescription 
drug monitoring program, 3) perform regular drug screens, and 4) require that patients sign a 
controlled-substance agreement. From your perspectives, any particular component of the law 
you think is particular important for patients care? 
• Have the new rules changed how you manage chronic pain with your patients? 
• Do you find managing patients with chronic pain in your practice different, for example more 
or less difficult or easy? (probes: Why difficult? Why easy? What difficulties are you having?) 
• Are there particular pain conditions you are finding more difficult to handle than others now? 
• Have the barriers (insert ones identified above) changed in any way? (follow-up questions: 
New barriers?) 
• Any particular part of the law you think should not be there? Why?  
• What do you think about evaluate opioid recipients for psychiatric conditions? 
• What do you think about review the patients' drug prescription history in INSPECT, Indiana's 
prescription drug monitoring program? 
• What do you think about perform regular drug screens? 
• What do you think about require that patients sign a controlled-substance agreement? 
• Is the new policy changing how you manage chronic pain for your patients? 
• Are you more or less satisfied about treating patients with chronic pain since the new policy 
was implemented? 
• Have you seen any changes in your chronic pain patients' behavior since the new policy 
was enacted? 
• Do you find you are spending more or less time with chronic pain patients now or seeing 
your chronic pain patients more or less frequently? 
• Do you think your relationships with your chronic pain patients has changed in any way 
since the new policy was enacted? Have your prescribing practices changed in any way 
since the new policy was enacted? (probes: prescribing more, less, about the same 
narcotics?) 
• How do you think the management of pain by other providers changed with the law 
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Patient interview guide 
Thinking back to the care you received 2-3 years ago for your chronic pain (before Dec 2013): 
• Tell me about your pain back then  
• Tell me how your pain was managed back then 
• Would you say your needs for pain medication and management of your pain were being 
met or not met by your doctor?  
• Did you think your doctor made good choices or recommendations for you about how to 
handle your pain? 
• Did you need to seek additional treatment or help outside of that provided by your doctor? 
• Were you able to see your doctor when you needed help with your pain? 
• Was the time you spent in an appointment enough to help you with your pain? 
• Were you satisfied with how your doctor was handling your pain management back then?  
• We're interested in your experiences now and whether they've changed in the last year: 
• Tell me about your pain in the last year 
• Tell me how your pain is managed in the last year 
• Are you aware of the new law regarding prescriptions for pain medications? (probe re: 
knowledge) 
• What do you know about the new law? 
• How did you learn about it? 
• How did the new law affect your pain management?  
• The law required physicians to do the following:  1) evaluate opioid recipients for psychiatric 
conditions, 2) review the patients' drug prescription history in INSPECT, Indiana's 
prescription drug monitoring program, 3) perform regular drug screens, and 4) require that 
patients sign a controlled-substance agreement. From your perspectives, any particular 
component of the law you think is particular important for patients care? 
• Any particular part you think should not be there? Why?  
• What do you think about evaluate opioid recipients for psychiatric conditions? 
• What do you think about review the patients' drug prescription history in INSPECT, Indiana's 
prescription drug monitoring program? 
• What do you think about perform regular drug screens? 
• What do you think about require that patients sign a controlled-substance agreement? 
• How is pain impacting your life now? Has that changed in the last year? 
• How well would you say your pain is managed by your doctor?  
• Is your doctor meeting your expectations for pain medication? How so?  
• Is your doctor meeting your expectation for pain management in general? How so? 
• Do you think your doctor is making good choices or recommendations for you about how to 
handle your pain? (probe re: changes in last year) 
• do you seek treatment or help outside of that provided by your doctor? 
• Do you see your doctor for pain as frequently now as you did 2-3 years ago? 
• When you do see your doctor, does s/he spend as much time with you as 2-3 years ago? 
• In the last year, has your pain medication prescription changed? (probe: more, less, about 
the same narcotics?) 
• Are you satisfied with how your doctor is handling your pain? 
• Do you think the new law has changed how your doctor is treating you 
• Do you think the new law has changed how your doctor is helping manage your pain? 
• Has your relationship with your doctor changed in any way over the last year? (probe re: 
openness, communication) 
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Appendix 2. Video review guide 
This guide is to be used in video-review sessions to stimulate conversations around different 
areas. The facilitator starts by identifying, with the participants, the areas of health issues 
addressed in the visit. Then she can play segments of the video eliciting discussion around the 
topics identified below. The basic functions of the visit reflect a set of tasks the doctors perform, 
usually in order, at every visit. The nuanced aspects reflect a set of constructs used to judge the 
actions of the doctors in the doctor-patient interaction.  
The Basic Functions of the Visit 
1. Preparing for the visit before entering the room   
2. Greeting patients and introducing oneself     
3. Negotiating the agenda for the visit        
4. Eliciting the patient’s history         
5. Examining the patient          
6. Making the diagnosis          
7. Managing the health condition          
8. Documenting the visit adequately in the note       
9. Billing for the provided visit         
The Nuanced Aspects of the Doctor Patient Interaction 
1. Addressing concerns efficiently while building rapport    
2. Being engaged and engaging the patient       
3. Utilizing the computer without compromising interaction    
4. Directing patients and asserting boundaries while respecting autonomy  
5. Asking the attending for help, when needed, after making efforts  
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